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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: "RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS:
A REVIEW OF LITERATURE"
This paper attempts to make a survey of existing literature
and research works which would shed light on the issue of rural
finance.
The paper starts off with a discussion of LDC economies
and the importance of the financial markets in the development of
a Third World Economy. The role of the Central Bank in this
development process is highlighted as its concentration on
development and deficit financing is contrasted with its
perceived role in economic and monetary stabilization. 4
The paper also reviews the various schools of thought in the
area of rural finance. The old and the new approaches are
contrasted and the surplus school studied. The theor:etical and
empirical studies concerning savers, lenders (both formal and
informal) and borrowers in the rural areas are analyzed
thoroughly. The macro environment and instithtional framework
that affects rural financial markets are discussed, and the
previous government's ambitious credit subsidy programs
(particularly the Masagana 99) are evaluated.
In general, the paper agrees With the new approachto rural
finance, particularly with regard to the view that massive credit
subsidy to the rural areas will not work and cannot compensate
for a depressed rural economy. Direct subsidies to agriculture,
the promotion of rural employment, the termination of anti-
agriculture policies, land reform, liberalization of industrial
inputs to agriculture all these would create the environment for
%he rural economy to develop and grow, and subsequently for the
rural finance sector to expand and thrive. Credit subsidies
cannot substitute for failures in agricultural development.
The paper also agrees with the new view that rural savings
are far from minimal and that financial liberalization as well as
correct institutional support would create a good atmosphere for
rural savings mobilization and allocation of credit to the most
productive projects.
The paper also shows a lot of evidence that rural borrowers
borrow more from informal lenders and that informal lenders are
'%
more efficient and _more flexible than formal lenders. In
particular, the informal lenders can reduce administrative and
risk costs, and provide smaller loan sizes at the time they are
needed. More flexible repayment schemes and "rollovers" are
allowed. The paper, however, takes a cautious position in
calling for the expansion of informal loans or formalizing these
informal loans because of interlinked markets. Informal credit
markets are usually linked with factor and output markets and
some researchers claim that this interlinkage causes imbalances
in the economic power between lenders and borrowers. Thus,
informal lending may be eff{cient but not equitable. More
research work is recommended to resolve this issue.
ii
Finally, apart from liberalization of interes£ rates, a move
away from specialized, supervised and subsidized credit, and the
scrapping of unnecessary and often harmful state intervention in
the rural banking sector (such as the agri-agra requirements a,d
the deposit retentionJshheme), the paper calls for a state policy
of free entry and exit in the rural banking sector and the
selective rehabilitation of rural banks limiting them to honest,
viable and efficient banks.
iii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Rationale and Objectives of the Study
The emphasis of the present government on rural development
is understanGable. It came into power with broad support from
the masses, so it has to respond by directing a greater share of
its energies and resources to areas where majority of the people
live and to economic activities on which majority of the people
depend for their livelihooa. The government has committed itself
towards dismantling those policies biased against the rural
sector, in general, and agriculture, in particular. Programs in
support of rural development are envisioned to be launched,
without,, however, shelving industrialization. The strategy for
economic development has been changed, in recognition of the
country's resources.
The rural financial markets (RFMs) definitely play an
important role in the mobilization of the rural sector. But it
-can be asked: what specifically has been the role of RFMS in the
development of the rural sector? Knowledge of this is important
for policymaking and planning. Unfortunately, no comprehensive
study can give a direct and more complete answer to that
question. However, there are quite a number of studies done by
various institutions and individuals which deal with certain
%
aspects of >rural finance. Among them are Sacay et al.
(1985) and TBAC (1985). Thus, this paper hopes to integrate the
findings and policy recommendations and, at the same time,
identify research gaps needed for policymaking and planning which
are important steps towards a comprehensive study on the role o£
rural financial markets in rural development.
The general objective of this paper is to provide a
comprehensive review of existing literature on rural finance with
the end in view of integrating findings and policy implications
of existing studies on rural finance and identifying future
directions for policy-oriented researches on rural finance in the
Philippines. Specifically, the project attempts to:
(I) discuss theoretical issues on rural finance with
special focus on the strengths and weaknesses of
traditional and new views on rural finance_
(2 ) put together and draw lessons from the varied
experience of other less developed countries applying
certain views on rural finance;
(3 ) critically evaluate monetary and cred it pol ic ies
which have direct and indirect bearing on rural finance
in the Philippines;
(4) hig_ligh£ and integrate the findings and policy
recommendations of research studies on rural finance in
the Philippines; and finally,
(5) identify weaknesses and gaps o£ existing research
studies on _ura[ _inance with the purpose of drawing up
policy-oriented research agenda on rural finance in the
Philippines.
B. Frajnework for the Conduct of theReview
In identifying studies to be included in the review, a
simplified framework of rural financial markets is used. _unds
are used for productive and/or non-productive activities (i.e.,
consumption). Productive activities include agricultural and
non-agricultural activities.* The reason for including non-
agricultural activities in the framework is twofold. One is that
income from non-agricultural activities has been partly
responsible for narrowing the gap between urban and rural
household incomes (see ILO Report [1973]). A study by TBAC
(1981) shows that income from non-agricultural activities
comprised about 40 percent of the total income of farm households
in 1978. This means that non-agricultural activities are
becoming important economic activities in the rural areas and as
such, they are an important aspect in the • rural financial
markets. The other reason is that there is a need • to
recognize the complementary roles played by agricultural and non-
The use of the c0nce_ts agricultural and non-
agricultural activities instead of farm and off-farm
activities is appropriate for Our purpose. For a clearer
definition of these concepts•, see H.T. Oshima, "Levels and
Trends of Off-Farm Activities at Different Stages in Monsoon
Development", Seminar Paper,UP School of Economics (May
1985), pp. 1-2.
3
agricultural activities in rural development. Bringing together
the •findings of studies on non-agricultural credit and linking
them with the findings of•studies on agricultural credit can
certainly give us a better picture of the demand side of
rural financial markets. It can be conjectured at this stage
that studies on rural finance are lopsided in favor of
agricultural credit. This should not be surprising in view of
the ° special attention given to agricultural activities in the
rural sector.
So far, the demand side of the _inancial markets has been
discussed. Studies on the supply side of the financial markets
are equally important There are at least three ways by whl.h
rural entrepreneurs/households can finance their activities. One
is through self-financing; that is, entrepreneurs households use
their own surplus funds to finance their activities• AS pointed
out by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), entrepreneurs/households
in low income areas are more likely to engage in self-financing.
Lack of collateral and/or proven credit track record may be One
reason Why they do not have access to sources of funds in their
locality has forced them to engage in self-financing. However,
self-financing may not always be a matter of course. It may well
be that entrepreneurs/households have made this choice a£_ter
considering alternative choices. Studies that can shed light on
this issue are therefore included.
4
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The second direct source of funds IS the informal credit
market. A recent study has reviewed the literature on informal
credit markets and has found, among others, that the composition
of informal lenders have been changing through time (see Sacay et
al. [19851). However, most studies reviewed •have examined the
in£o_mal credit market from the borrowers' point of view. It
is equally interesting to include studies on informal credit
market from the point Of view of informal lenders themselves.
Knowledge of their economic behaviour will certainly clarify
policy issues concerning informal lending.
The third direct source of finds is the formal rural
financial system. In the Philippine setting, the rural financial
system is dominated by rural banks. However, other fi,ancial
institutions (e.g., branches of commercial •banks, thrift banks,
development banks, credit unions) are fast becoming important
financial institutions in the rural areas especially after the
policy of branching was extensively promoted starting in 1972 and
the financial deregulation in 1980. It is clear then that the
review does not limit itself to studies regarding the behavior of
rural banks. Studies dealing with the varying behavior of
different rural financial institutions are included in the
review. However, at this point it can be said that there is less
research done on the behavior of branches of commercial banks
which are operating outside Metro Manila.
Aside from studies examining the performance of rural
financial institutions as conduits of Central Bank funds, studies
6
focusing on the intermediation function of rural financial
institutions are also given attention. Corollarily, Studies
dealing with the saving-investment behavior of surplus units in
the rural sector are included.
Special attention is given to the behavior of the major
participants of the rural financial markets, namely the ultimate
users of funds, formal financial institutions, informal lenders
and surplus units. However, in the Philippine setting, the shape
and character of rural financial markets are to a large extent
conditioned by the monetary and credit policies of the Central
Bank. For example, the interest rate and rediscounting policies
of the Central Bank have certainly altered the behavior of
borrowers, financial intermediaries and savers. It is therefore
important to weave together the findings of studies dealing with
the impact of monetary and credit policies on the rural financial
markets. This also necessitates the inclusion of a critical
review of monetary and credit policies in the Philippines with
special focus • on those policies that have bearing on the behavior
and operations of the rural financial markets.
3
The study does not limit itself to reviewing key findings of
existing studies on rural finance. In certain cases, a • re-
analysis of data presented in existing studies is necessary to
draw more insights on rural finance. Also included are new
information or data to further enrich the review.
In the course of the review, it has been found that many of
the research materials on rural finance, especially the latest
ones, were done by TBAC. Access to these research materials has
greatly facilitated work. In particular, the work of Sacay et
al. (1985) serves as the take-off point for the review.
C. Organization of the Study
This study is composed of five chapters. Chapter I gives
the rationale, objectives and the framework for the conduct of
the review. Chapter II discusses some theoretical issues on
finance and development. The traditional and new views on rural
finance and the behavior of the participants of the RFMs are
extensively treated in this chapter. In Chapter III, empirical
findings regarding the behavior of the major participants of the
RFMs are critically reviewed. Chapter IV re-examines the
macroeconomic policy and institutional environment that have
conditioned the workings o£ RFMs. Some specific banking policies
are also discussed in this chapter. The last chapter presents
some policy recommendations and the agenda for future research on
rural finance.
Chapter II
THEORETICAL ISSUES ON FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT.
This Chapter starts with a discussion on,general theoretical
issues on finance and development, and then goes on to review
specific theoretical issues on rural finance.
A. Description of the Economies of LDCs
To fully appreciate the literature on rural financial
markets, it is necessary to start with a brief description of the
economies of LDCs.
It is a common characteristic among LDCs to have an agrarian
economy. In this economy, agricultural output comprises a
significant proportion of total gross domestic product. The
agricultural sector absorbs between 60 to 70 percent of the labor
force and shares between 70 to 90 percent of total exports. The
economy is usually punctuated with small industrial and
commercial enclaves whose links with the outside world are
stronger than with the rest of the domestic economy. Labor
productivity _s generally low and unemployment rate very high.
Aside from low pe.r capita income, income distribution is severely
r
skewed. Land concentration is one cause of incom_ concentration.
Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973) have described the economies
of LDCs as highly fragmented. That is, "firms and households
are so isolated that they face different effective prices for
land, labor, capital and produced commodities and do not have
9
access to the same technologies." The economy then
consists of several markets. Prices for land, labor, capital and
produced commodities are determined solely by demand and supply
conditions in that market, _ with no reference whatsoever to
demand and supply conditions in other markets. More concretely,
urban markets are segmented from rural markets. Prices for the
same commodities or factor inputs, adjusted for transportation
cost, do not tend to equalize in these markets. Even within
urban or rural areas, markets are fragmented. Investors have
r i;gid investment preferences and do not deviate from these
preferences no matter how attractive the yields for other
investment opportunities. Formal and informal markets coexist.
The capital market is singled out as the most fragmente_
among the various markets. In a fragmented capital market, one's
endowment or deployable capital, peculiar productive or
investment opportunities and market opportunities for external
lending or borrowing over time are badly correlated. MacKinnon
points out that "fragmentation in the capital market causes the
misuse o_ labor and land, suppresses entreprenurial development,
and condemns important sectors of the economy to inferior
I
technology." What is unfortunate is that government policies and
institutions have unwittingly given rise to market fragmentation.
In addition to market fragmentation, Shaw mentiones
other peculiar characteristics of LDCs' economies. Temporal
horizons in LDCs are relatively short due mainly to scarcity of
10
capital and instability in real rates of return to physical and
financial assets. Also, information regarding yields for both
physical and financial assets is expensive and incomplete; hence
it doesnot flow easily and quickly to all markets. Diffusion of
technology is usually slow and expensive. The new literature on
rural finance emphasizes the interlinking of credit market with
output and input markets. Imperfections of the rural markets,
which are oftentimes aggravated by government regulations,
encourage market interlinking. This brings altogether different
economic arrangements in the rural sector, which implicitiy
means that characteristics of LDCs shoula be seen from
perspectives different from those provided by Shaw and McKinnon.
This will be discussed in greater detail below.
B. Economic Development and Finance
Given the conditions in LDCs, the task at hand is to stage a
rapid economic development. Todaro (1977) defines economic
development in "terms of reduction or elimination of poverty,
inequality and unemployment within the context of growth." In
view of the main concern of this paper, the question that must be
posed is: What is the role of finance in economic development?
Historical experience and logic seem to point out that finance
has an important role in economic development. This issue
%
deserves me_re detailed discussion.
According to Gurley and Shaw (1967) the historical
experience of a number of countries shows that a_ income per
ii
capita increase, financial assets usually grow more rapidly than
national wealth or nationalproduct. Empirical evidence seems tO
support this view (see Table II.l). Comparing countries at any
moment of time, it can be observed that countries which have
high incomes per capita also have higher financial assets to
national product ratios (or financial ratios), while countries
which have low incomes per capita have lower financial ratios.
TO investigate the main determinants of financial ratios in
eight Asian countries, Cole and Patrick (1.986) estimated a linear
model and obtained the following regression results:
MTwo = ._8 YDPC - .O03DP + .169(HK)
9+ .00 +
+ .0[3(PH) + .074(SG) + .O0_(TA)
2
+ .O_0(TH); R = .90
where MTwo = Ratio of M_ to GDP
YDPC = GDP per capita in thousands of 1980 US dollars
DP = Percentage change in the GDP deflator during
the previous year (a proxy for price expecta-
9
tions); the only variable having no signifi-
cant effect on MT_.
HK = HongKong
IN = Indonesia
KO = Korea
MA. = Malaysia
PH = Philippimem
SG - $i_apore
Table II. I
Bank Loanable Funds in Typical Semi-industrial LDCs
(ratio of M2 to GNP)
/
Mean
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1960 - 80
Argentina 0. 245 0. 209 0. 267 -_'.168 0. 234 O. 225
Brazil 0. 148 O. 156 O. 205 O. 164 0. 175 O. 170
Chile 0.123 0.130 0.183 0.099 0.208 0.149
Colombia 0.191 0.204 0.235 - 0.222 0.210
Mean ratio of M2 to GNP to four Latin American countries 0.184
India 0.283 0.262 0.264 0.295 0.382 0.297
Philippines O. 186 O. 214 O. 235 0. 186 O. 219 O. 208
Sri Lanka 0.284 0.330 0.275 0.255 0.317 0.291
Turkey 0. 202 O. 223 O. 237 0. _.22 0. 136 O. 204
Mean ratio of M_ to GNP for four Asian countries 0.247
Bank Loanable Funds in Rapidiy Growing Economies
(ratio of M2 to GNP)
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
a
West Germany 0.331 0._94 0.448 0.583 0.727 0.913
b b b
Japan 0.554 0.737 0.701 0.863 _ 1.026 1.390
South Korea 0.069 0.114 0.102 0.325 0.323 0.337
TaiWan 0.iI_ 0.166 0.331 0.462 0.588 0.750
b
Singapore - - 0._42 0.701 0.668 0.826
Notes: a As well as deposits and currency the German series
includes bank bonds sold directly to the public.
b The bias is downward _ecause deposit information on
sp_ialised credit institutions was not collected.
_rce: R. I. McKinnon (1986).
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TA = Ta iwan
TH = Thailand
As expected, per capita income has a strong and positive effect
on MTwo. Figure II.l shows the fitted trends of MTwo relative to
YDPC using individual country regressions. Generally, the
results show a strong positive relationship between econ0mic and•
financial growth. Curiously enough, Philippines is the only
country which shows a negative relationship. This could be due
to some measurement problem. Patrick and Cole •used M2 instead of
M3 (=M2 + deposit substitutes). In the 70s, there was a
signifi icant shift from traditional deposits to deposit
substitutes due to substantial interest rate• differential. Using
M3 as the measure of financial ratio, a positive relationship
between financial and economic growthcan be observed.•
According to Gurley and Shaw, the secularly rising financial
ratios to finance is being associated with division of labor in
production, in saving and investment, and in intermediation.
What Gurley and Shaw and others who followed their ideas had
demonstrated is that financial development is indeed crucial for
successful economic growth. Yet, one may venture to ask 'this
critical issue: Which sector, financial or real, leads in the
dynamic process of economic development?
Patrick (1966) has attempted to settle this issue. Me
hypothesized two patterns of causal relationship between
financial development • and economic growth, under the "demand-
14
Figure II.l
Filled trends in monetary and real growth, 1960-1981
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Source: Cole and Patrick (1986).
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following" phenomenon, the financial sector develops as a
response to the demand for £heir services by investors and savers
in the real economy. The underdevelopmen%, of the financial
sector ind%cates the lack of demand for their services, which in
turn reflects the anemic growth of the real sector. Thus,
finance is essentially passive and permissive in the growth
process. The ability of the financial sector to respond quickly
to the demand for their services depends on the assumptions that
the supply of entrepreneurship in the financial sector is highly
elastic and that there is generally favorable, legal,
institutional and economic environment.
The "supply-leading" phenomenon, on the other hand, posits
a causal relationship running from financial sector to the real
sector. Specifically, it suggests that the creation of financial
institutions and the supply of their financial assets,
liabilities, and related financialservices be done in advance
of demand for them, especially the demand for entrepreneurs in
the modern or growth-inducing sectors. The two main functions
of supply-leading finance are: (i) to transfer resources from
traditional (non-growth) sectors to modern (high-growth) sectors;
and (R) to promote and stimulate an entrepreneurial response in
the modern sectors. The proble_mmost commonly encountered by
supply, leading institutions is that initially they cannot lend
profitably to nascent modern sectors. This problem can be
circumvented if: (i) supply leading financial institutions are
government-owned, using government capital a_dreceiving direct
governmen t subsidies; (_) they are private institutions receiving
16
direct or indirect government subsidies; or (3) they may
initially lend a large proportion of their funds to traditional
sectors profitably, gradually shifting their loan portfolio to
modern industries as they emerge.
As pointed out by Patrick, a country may not follow one
approach all throughout. Instead, he hypothesized the following
sequence: Before sustained modern industrial growth gets
underway, supply leading may be able to induce real innovation-
type investment. As the process of real growth occurs, the
supply-leading impetus gradually becomes less important, and the
demand-following financial response becomes dominant.
%
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) treated the discussion on
the causal relationship between financial development and
economic growth in a more rigorous manner. Specifically, they
attempted to show that finance has an impact not only on the
movement of the economy over the business cycle but also on
economic growth.
In a neoclassical growth model, the savings rate and the
output/capi_tal ratio affect the growth in output. Money is
included in this model by assuming that it is part of wealth.
The accumulation of money is an alternative for savers to
accumulation of physical capital. In other words, money and
capital are substitutes. The implication then of the
neoclassical growth model is clear. The accumulation of
additional money leads to a reduction in growth of physical
17
capital, which in turn causes a reduction in the growth in
output. This is indeed a curious result!
McKinnon :has proposed an alternative model. In an
underdeveloped economy where self-finance and indivisibilities in
investment are pervasive, monetary accumulation is a complement
to physical capital accumulatioh, not a substitute. Because of
lumpiness in investment and absence of external finance, people
lead to accumulate purchasing power equal in value to the
investment before makingan investment.
McKinnon's attempt to demonstrate that money and physical
capital are complements presupposes that money is part of wealth.
Shaw approached the problem in a somewhat different context. He
argued that money, whether currency or demand deposits, is debt
and therefore it is not part of national wealth. When the
aggregated balance sheet for the entire economy is considered,
only physical capital remains since money, like other financial
assets, is cancelled out against financial liabilities. Thus,
the accumulation of money and other financial assets can never be
a substitute for the accumulation of physical capital. Shaw then
went on to suggest that the financial system shouldbe viewed as
a service sector employing inputs to produce outputs. The latter
are in turn used as intermediate inputs in the production process
of the real sector. Thus, producing more of the financial
services outputs would enhance the growth of the real output.
Money should not receivespecial treatment since it is only one
of the financial assets produced by the financialsector.
18
The studies of Patrick, McKinnon and Shaw prompted some
economists to empirically tegt their hypotheses. Fry (1978)
tested McKinnon's complementarity hypothesisand Shaw's debt-
intermediation hypothesis using data from ten less developed
Asian countries. The empirical test rejected McKinnon's
hypothesis in favor of.Shaw's hypothesis. Fry explained that
McKinnon's assumptions that investment is, in the main, self-
financed and money is the predominant financial repository of
domestic savingsdo not apply any more to these countries. In
another empirical test, Fry claimed that the result supports
McKinnon's and Shaw's point regarding the importance of financial
conditions in the development process. _ However, his model cannot
really produce unequivocal results regarding the direction of
causation. Further, the exclusion of the historical experience
of developed countries at their earlier stages of development
weakens the argument that the financial sector leads the real
sector in the development process.
Jung (1986) tried a rmore rigorous approach in determining
the causality between financial and real development. He applied
the Granger causality test to _6 countries, of which 19 are
developed, industrialized countries. Two measures of financial
development were used, namely: the currency ratio (i.e., the
ratio of currency to MI) and the monetization variable (i.e.,. the
ratio of M_ to GNP). Jung's results are as follows:
(i) the hypothesis that LDCs have a supply-leading
causality pattern more frequently than a demand-
following pattern is supported by the data;
19
(2) the hypothesis regarding the changing causality
pattern, i.e., •from supply-leading to a _ demand
following causality pattern, during the course of
development is moderately supported by the data; and
(3) the hypothesis that high-growth LDCs are characterized
predominantly by supply-leadin_ financial development
is also moderately supported by the data.
Jung was less committed in his second and third results.
Indeed, a number of objections that could weaken the validity of
his results can be raised. For instance, the use of the same
time period for both DCs and LDCs •to test the hypothesis on the
changing causality pattern between financial and real
developments is inappropriate. •The appropriate procedure is to
take the historical experience of DCs, divide it into two sub-
periods namely,• the early stage of development and the later
stage of development, and apply the causality test in each
period. Aside from dealing with the second hypothesis correctly,
this procedure can•also yield results that could strengthen his
first and third findings. As it is now, his first result can
also be interpreted differently. That is, LDCs •remain
underdeveloped because • they employ supply-leading finance.
Multiple i_trepretation of a result can be prevented by applying
the correct test procedure. Although Jung's results are not
robust, nevertheless, •they have provided us a way of dealing with
the issue of the causal relationshipbetween financial and real
developments.
Ranis (1977) approached the issue of the causal relationship
between financial and real developments in a different manner.
He argued that there is "relatively little mileage in analyzing
the role of financial institutions in the developing economy
irrespective of time or place. In fact, an awareness of such
typological and/or historical differences may be an essential
ingredient if we are to be in a position to treat the financial
sector as an integral part of the development problem rather
than as an isolated, if fascinating, afterthought." In other
words, the economy will have different requiremehts as it moves
from one sub-phase to another sub-phase in the transition
process. This implies that financial institutions will have
different rolesto play for each sub-phase.
Ranis started his analysis by defining "development problem
as an attempt at transition from a long epoch of agrarianism to a
lomg epoch of _odern growth." Between these two economic states
are several distinct sub-phases: the econ(_my first moves out of
dependent (or colonial) agrarianism into independent (or post-
colonial) primary import substitution; from there into either
secondary import substitution or export substitution; and
finally, if successful, into modern growth.
The typical historical experience of LDCs is that once
inde_m%dence was gained, they tried to a_z_ieve rapid economic
development. The general prescription for rapid economic
development was to strive for economic characteristics of the
industrial West. Hence, primary import-substitution. Ranis sees
some merits _ in this strategy as long as it is well managed by
21
authorities. After all, the overall purposes of import
substitution are the maturation of a newly emerging industrial
entrepreneurial class and the construction of missing
infrastructures in industry, agriculture and in the field of
intermediation. During the primlry import-substitution regime,
the main role of the financial syst_n is to "shift resources,
domestic as well as foreign, into the hands of the nascent
industrial entrepreneurial class (or possibly into the
government's own hands whenever the public sector is involved in
overhead construction and/or in directly productive activities)."
Quantity, not quality, of saving and investment, is the main
concern of financial intermediation. Usually, successful import
substitution is accompanied by increases in agricultural
productivity and saving. Ranis seems to agreewith Patrick that
during this stage of development, supply-leading finance plays a
greater role.
Once the primary objectives of primary import substitution
are attained, the economy can either move to export substitution
phase or to secondary import-substitution phase. In Ranis
analysis, successful countries like Japan, Taiwan and Korea,
chose the former, while unsuccessful countries like the
Philippines and Brazil chose the latter. During the eKport
substitution regime, the economy is exposed to foreign
competition. Traditional land-based exports are supposed to
give way to non-traditional labor-based exports in the foreign
trade. This requires liberalization in a number of markets
previously controlled, directly or indirectly, by government,
mainly on behalf of the new industrial class. More importantly,
the financial system should be liberalized which includes
freeing of the interest rate and reduction of subsidies and the
role of credit rationing in investment decisions. Thus, the
financial system will now be able to pay attention to the
quality of saving and investment, rather than to quantity. Under
this sub-phase, demand-following finance is given more emphasis.
The economy has new requirements that need corresponding response
from the financial system. Specialized financial institutions
will emerge in response to the varied needs of the real sector
and portfolio holders. Thus, the sustained increase in the
financial ratios will be realized.
Countries that followed the secondary import substitution
strategy are bound tO perform dismally. To continue protecting
the inefficient industrial sector, foreign exchange controls and
terms of trade @re turned against the agricultural sector. This
is tantamount to extracting forced savings f_om the latter. The
increasing capital requirement of the protected industrial sector
and the provision of more infrastructures and facilities in
urban areas place a_dditional burden on the financiil sector.
Continued financial repression and the inadequate infrasture in
the rural areas weaken _he ability of the agricultural sector to
increase productivity and provide surplus funds to the industrial
sector. Hard pressed for funds, the government often resorts to
infl_tionary financing and external borrowings.
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McKinnon (1973) seems to disagree with Ranis, specifically
on the latter's argument that the financial system assumes
different roles for different sub-phases in the transition
_rocess. He defines "ecOnomic development as the reduction of
the great dispersion in social rates of return to existing and
new investments under domestic entrepreneurial control." A
society solely dependent on self-finance is bound to have a
stagnant economy. The reason is that in a fragmented economy,
resource endowment, productive/investment opportunities and
opportunities for external lending and borrowing are badly
correlated. External finance is thus called for. This means a
revision in financial policy. Specifically, a high interest rate
regime will induce other surplus units to disinvest from inferior
technologies and invest in high yielding deposits which can be
used by investors who have higher investment opportunities. "The
release of resources from inferior uses in the underdeveloped
environment is as important as new net saving per se." Thus,
financial institutions will have a greater role in mobilising
domestic savings and allocating the funds to the most profitable
ventures in the early stages of development.
McKinnon reminds us that saving and inves£ment should not be
treated independently with the reward system. This is one area
where McKinnon's view differs from that of Ranis. The former
places a premium on quality of saving and investment even at the
early stage of development, while the latter stresses on the
quantity of saving and investment. T_e other area of
disagreement concerns the import substitution phase which Ranis
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believes to be a meritorious strategy. McKinnon, on the other
|and, has pointed out that authorities do not have superior
:wisdom 'in determining which industry has •long-run comparative
advantage. 'In many cases, trade and fiscal policies are
initiated to deal with what is essentially a financial problem.
• For instanoew tax subsidies designed to develop certain
industries cannot substitute for a financia_ system where
borrowing and lending are undertaken freely at high rates of
interest._ Indeed, efforts of the government to get results
quickly by adopting import substitution policy will merely
result in the creation of new forms of fragmentation.
According to McKinnon, the key tO economic development is
the unification of the capital markets through financial
liberalization. "The unification of the market which sharply
increases rates of return to domestic savers by widening
exploitable investment opportunities, is essential for
eliminating other forms of fragmentation."
McKinnon has advanced several arguments with corresponding
empirical support thatare surprising to neoclassical economists.
For instance, he argues that foreign aid and capital inflows
encouraged through special incentives given to foreigners would
be harmful to ,the development process as long as the domestic
financial market is repressed. Also, h_ believes that even poor
rural: folks do save in financial form so long as the reward for
saving is attractive. Thi.s view has indeed revoiutionized the
[
thinking regarding rural financial markets and agricultural
:
cred it.
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The MCKinnon view has not gone unchallenged. At the macro
level, Wijnbergen (1985) found that in Korea, increases in time
deposit rate are contractionary in the short-run, because they
t_igger tightened credit conditions and cause higher costs of
£inancing •working capital; people shift out of the curbmarket
rather than out o_ cash. The higher cost of financing working
capital also pushesup inflation, making the increase in time
deposit rates inflationary, at least in the short-run. However,
the medium to long-term net effect on economic activity could be
positive if the increase in the savings rate dominates the short-
run output depressing effect. Indeed, this is what Dowling
(1984) found out for Korea. The possible explanation suggested
by Cole and Park (198•3) is that the formal and informal credit
,narkets may be•viewed as complementary on the demand side. That
is_ Korean industries finance their fixed capital through the
Eormal financial institutions and the residual working capital
requirements from the informal sector. The flow of •funds into
the formal financial system stimulates business investment,
resulting also in greater loan demand for working capital in the
informal credit markets. The main lessons we can draw from these
studies is that high interest rate policy may have different
output effects depending on whether formal and informal credit
markets are substitutes or complements. Of course, size Of the
informal credit markets also matters a lot. This is one area
where more in-depth studies are needed. •
At the micro level, McLeod (1984) challenged the view that
small firms are forced to rely on either very limited self-
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finance or exorbitantly expensive moneylender loans. His
findings show that the means by which small fimns are financed
are in fact quite diverse, and the cost of informal finance is
not unreasonably expensive and that small firms financing
options steadily widen over time as they build up their assets
and their reputation. In other words, McKinnon's view that
entrepreneurs with potential production opportunities lack
resources of their own, as well as access to external finance is
overly exaggerated. The evidence Ross gathered tends to show
that small business firms do not necessarily suffer from capital
market imperfections.
McLeod's •"findings are rather weak in supporting his
hypotheses. The study focused only on successful firms, and
that makes it a a self-fulfilling prophecy. To strengthen his
results, stillborn or unsuccessful firms which lacked access to
external funds should have been included. Indeed, the issues
that Ross brought outneed more research.
C. Central Banking in LDCs •
A very important and, perhaps, the most influential
institution any Country in this modern world has set up is the
Central Bank. Views on what role central banks should play
differ across countries because of their varying economic
characteristics and•dominant political framework. However, the
diverse •views can be divided into two general views: the
orthodox and the unorthodox views.
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The orthodox view considersstabilization of the economy as
the only role of the Central Bank. This view is usually espoused
in advanced industrialized economies where the banking system and
the securities markets were already developed long before the
creation of their Central Bank. The main concern in these
countries is to regulate the banking system, in general, and
credit flows and money supply, in particular. Central banks
mainly rely on quantitative credit controls, such as open market
operations, changes in reserve requirements and rediscount rates,
to affect the overall • monetary and credit climate of these
economies. Recently, however, the literature on Rational
Expectations have challenged the effectiveness of these monetary
instruments in stabilizing the economy. The controversies
generated by the rational expectations hypothesis are
not the main concerns of this• paper, however; thus, they need not
be discussed here.
The conditions in LDCs are different from those of the
developed countries. The financial system is underdeveloped and
highly fragmented. Perhaps in most cases, the informal financial
market is large compared to the formal financial market. The
market for securities hardly exist at all. It is believed •that
the orthodox central banking approach cannot be effective =rK]er
this environment. Hence the emergence of the unorthodox view.
According to this view, the Central Bank • in LDCs should also
assume a developmental role in addition to its regulatory • role
(Bhatt [1974]). It should cre@te banki,g institutions in areas
where there are no banking institutions operating. It should
irect credit to economic activities deemed vital to the
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development effort. It should not merely be a lender of last
resort; it has to be a lender of early resort and in some cases a
lender of primary resort. •Essentially, the central banks in LDCs
are required to adopt a supply-leading posture. This is indeed a
tall order for central banks in LDCs.
A related issue in central banking is the degree of
independence of the Central Bank from the executive branch of the
government (see Tan [1972]). ThQ so-called "right-wing, central
bankers emphasize the advantages of having an independent
Central Bank. The Central Bank can perform its function more
effectively without being hampered by pol_tical interference.
Credit could b_ directed by the Central Bank to well-deserving
economic activities, not to pet projects of politicians.
The "left-wing " central bankers, on the other hand,
emphasize the merit of coordinating monetary and fiscal
measures. If the Central Bank were development-oriented, rather
than stabilization-oriented, then some of the measures it •is
going to initiate would be very much related to those of the
fiscal sector. Thus, it has to share some of its functions and
responsibilities with the executive branch of the government,
especially in determining which economic activities credit should
flow.
In LDCs, it seems that the "left-wing" central bankers are
winning. The close coordination between the Central Bank •and
executive branch of the government is accomplished in various
ways. For example, the Finance Minister may be a member of the
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Monetary Board. Another example is that the Monetary Board
which is composed of full-time members reports directly to the
Finance Minister. The interesting question that must be a_ked
is: Under this kind of arrangement, doesthe Central Bank
perform better in terms of achieving its mandated objectives?
This is indeed an important issue that must be examined in the
context of the Philippine experience.
To achieve its mandated objectives, a development-oriented
Central Bank relies on two sets of policy instruments, namely:
quantitative credit controls and selective credit controls.
Quantitative credit controls are the traditional tools of any
central bank. These include: reserve requirement ratio,
rediscounting, open market operations and moral suasion. Among
these instruments, open market operations are virtually
ineffective in affecting the levels of credit and money supply in
LDCS since the securities markets are virtually nil (Tan
[1972]). This is usually compounded by the tendency of
governments to price their securities at below market rates.
O_tentimes, government _ecurities are made attractive by adding
sweeteners to them, like reserve eligibility. But this has
serious limitations since banks treat them mainly as habitat of
the required reserves, not of free reserves.
A development-oriented Central Bank usually puts more
emphasis on selective credit cdntrols (SCCs). These instruments
Q
are used by the CentralBank to direct credit towards certain
economic activities considered as "high-priority" areas.
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Selective credit instruments include:• interest rate ceilings
applied to loans to priority sectors, differential reserve.
requirement ratios among various, categories of banks,
preferential rediscount rates for papers originating from "high-
priority" sectors, loan quotas or portfolio regulations, and loan
insurance and•guarantee schemes.
The effectiveness of SCCs as instruments of development
policy has been debated. The opposing views are summarized in
Johnson (1974) and Khatkhate and Villanueva (1978).
The first issue is whether there is a strong case for an
interventionist policy in the credit markets. Johnson and
Khatkhate and Villanueva argue that LDCs' imperfect and
inefficient markets require state intervention. In an imperfect
market, private profitability and social profitability differ In
respect to loans granted to the different sectors. The
divergence is attributed to the following three factors. First,
commercial banks may underestimate the risk, administration, and
collection costs associated with extending loans to "high-
priority" sectors, such as agriculture. Second, commercial
banks' desired rate of return on loans may be higher than the
correct marginal social rate of time preference. Third,
commercial banks may not take into consideration the external
benefits which expansion in the "high-priority" sectors will
yield for the rest of the economy.
McKinnon (1973) criticized" the interventionist policy
because of the fear that it would only succeed in
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institutionalizing or in strengthening market fragmentation
instead of unifying markets. In his view, a more liberal policy"
would pave the way for a unified capital market which is
essential for eliminating other forms of fragmentation. A high
interest rate policy should be pursued in order to lure funds
away from less productive opportunities to more productive
opportunities.
For those who espouse the interventionist policy, one issue
still remains: what form of intervention would do the trick?
Selective credit policy or selective fiscal policy?
Johnson criticized the use of SCCs as instruments of
development policy. He pointed out that SCCs are actually
implicit tax-cum-subsidy schemes which seem to alter the market-
determined allocation of real resources. The reallocation may be
done in two ways. One is through inflation taX. Preferential
rediscount rates increases the volume of c_edit going tO the
"high-priority" sectors without necessarily decreasing the volume
of creditgoing to the "low-priority" sectors. This results in
an increase in money supply.. Having more financial resources now
than before, "high-priority" sectors bid away resources from
"low-priority" sectors, ultimately resulting in higher prices for
those resources. The additional cost that "low-priority" sectors
have to bear is actually equivalent to a tax. Thus, the ,low-
priority" sectors are taxed %o subsidize the "high-priority"
sectors.
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The other way of reallocating real resources is by altering
the profits of banks "and their traditional clients vis-a-vis the
"high-priority" sectors_ This may be accomplished by imposing
portfolio ceilings _nd/or differential reserve requirements which
would force banks to increase the ratio of loans going to the
"high-priority" sectors. This reduces the liquidity and
profitability of banks' earning assets. The reduced
profitability of their earning assets is the implicit tax on
banks
/
J_hnsQn argued against the use of SCCs for at least three
reasons. First of all, there are welfare costs associated with
SCCs. The infiation tax exacts welfare loss. Apart from this,
the reduced p_ofitability of bank earning assets causes
disintermediation, with low returns on saving and investment as
the ultimate consequence. SCCs also cause marginal rate of
substitution of capital for noncapital factors of production to
alter. Most likely, the marginal rate is higher for the "low-
priority" sectors than for the "high-priority" sectors.
Moreover, tax incidence is non-neutral to the "low-priority"
sec to_s 0
Secondly, SCCs weaken the ability of the monetary
authorities to control money supply. Specifically, differential
reserve requirements among different types of banks and
differential rediscount rates virtually leave monetary aggregates
uncontrollable by monetary authorities. Thus, although SCCs hawe
all0cative effects, they also have indirect quantitativ@ effects.
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The third reason is that SCCs are inferior to other
alternatives, notably explicit tax-cum-subsidy scheme and the
creation of special credit institutions which have comparative
advantage in assessing the credit worthiness of individuals and
institution.
Khatkhate and Villanueva, on the other hand, defended the
selective credit Policy. They pointed out that the criticisms
hurled against SCCs arose from inadequate understanding of their
mechanism and that most of them focus on the faulty design and
implementation of selective credit policy, rather than on their
intrinsic value, In their view, the alleged automatic
relationship between SCCs and inflation has no logical basis.
Even if money supply increases with SCCs, prices would not
correspondingly increase if there are idle resources. The
relationship between SCCs and inflation observed in certain
countries was mainly due to the fact that preferential rediscount
rates were given to almost all sectors so that SCCs have
literally lost their selectiveness. Curiously enough, Whatkhate
and Villanueva did not mention that this usually occurs in
countries where the Central Bank is subservient to the executive
branch of the government. The party in power also views SCCs as
political instruments to win more votes or confidence of the
people, at least those of the targeted benefeciaries.
SCCs generate welfare $oss if they halt the process of
intermediation. But according to Khatkhate and Villanueva,
financial intermediaries in LDCs have not been necessarily the
best allocators of mobilized savings. That is why intervention
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is necessary to improve allocation of resources.• Any adverse
effects of SCCs can hardly be a cause for concern. The reasons
given by Khatkhate and Villanueva are rather weak. In the first
place, they seem to presume that the authorities have superior
knowledge, and therefore, they can determine which sectors should
be highly favored, secondly, countries which according to them
were found to have inefficient banking system have already a
repressed financial system. Thus, before any conclusion can
0
be made, the inefficiency due •to financial represslon should be
isolated first from that Which arises from pure market
imperfection.
Perhaps, the most devastating attack against selective
credit policy is the claim that credit is fungible. It means
that borrowers may use loans for purposes other than the ones
stated in the loan contract. Thus, it is useless to direct
credit to the preferred economic activities. Khatkhate and
Villanueva countered by saying that the effectiveness of SCCs
depends on where the controls are applied and the conditions
required for• the effective controls. The conditions are:
existence of inadequate substitutability among assets in the eyes
of both lenders and borrowers when controls are imposed on
lenders; •presence of a large• degree of substitutability among
securities available to lenders when controls are placed on
borrowers; absence of .desire, both on part of •borrowers and
lenders, for a particular pattern of financial assets and
liabilities;• and finally, the same degree of interest elasticity
Of different investment expenditures.
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If banks were mere conduits of Central Bank funds, as is
often the case in LDCs, then control should be imposed on
borrowers and the necessary requirements for the effective
control boil down to the following: poor substitutability among
different categories of • securities and different interest
elasticities among different categories of expenditures.
Unfortunately, these requirements are not always met •in LDCs.
For example, a farmer who obtains subsidized credit •for rice
production may use the loans for consumption or for house
repairs. Although, poor substitutability among securities canbe
policy-induced, •e.g., close surveillance, the cost could be
enormous, especially if a large number of geographically•
dispersed small borrowers are involved. Even lending in kind
would not neutralize the fungibility of • credit because borrowers
can sell the borrowed goods in the informal market and use •the
proceeds to buy other inputs or goods that satisfy their needs.
D. Various Theoretical APProaches to Rural Finance
After discussing general issues, we come now to a more
specific issue, i.e., agricultural credit. As mentioned earlier,
a large part of the population of the predominantly rural economy
is engaged in agriculture. Therefore, any rural development
strategy, should devote substantial efforts at agricultural
development. To increase the outputs in agriculture, funds are
needed to provide improved seeds, better livestock, new farm
implements, fertilizers, etc.
36
The main issue at hand is whether cheap agricultural credit
should be considered as an essential part of rural development in
general and of agricultural development in particular. There are
two main opposing views on this issue. The "traditional" view
espouses the cheap credit policy_ while the "new" view rejects
it. These views are extensively discussed in the two volumes,
one edited by Von Pischke, Adams and Donald (1_83), and the other
by Adams, Graham and Von Pischke (1984). A newly-emerging and
Still less known view is the "surplus" view. All these views
will be discussed here.
i. The Traditional View
The "traditional" view describes the plight of farmers in
the following manner: they have low income because they have low
productivity; they have low productivity because they are
confined to the traditional methods of farmingi they are confined
to the traditionalmethodsof farming because they do not have
any savings that could be used to acquire the new technology;
they do not have any savings because their income is so low; and
so an. The only way to breakthis vicious circle is to let
farmers resort to external finance. But the market rate of
interest is too high for farmers. Hence, they do not borrow to
inve_t in new technology. It is clear then.that the only way to
induce farmers to borrow and invest in new technology is to offer
them cheap credit. Besides, cheap c_edit policy would free
farmers from the exploitative hands of informal moneylenders who
charge exho_bitant rates. The cheap credit policy may be
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accomplished by imposing a ceiling on the • lending rate way below
the normal rate and/or by setting up supply-leading financial
institutions whose sole function is to deliver cheap credit to
farmers. Implied in this policy environment is that savings
mobilization ••is not an essential function of financial
institutions, whether private or public, since rural people do
not save anyway and do not respond to price incentives. Hence,
most, if not all, of the funds should come from the government.
The selective credit policy of the Central Bank should be made to
support the cheap credit policy.
2. The New View
The "new" view appeals to both logic and facts to dispute •
the claims of the "traditional" view. •In the first place, cheap
credit will not make unprofitable activity profitable. A
sufficiently profitable economic activity will have returns that
will adequately cover the costs of the resource employed, since
in the "new" view, farmers are assumed to make efficient and
rational decisions, consequently they also allocate borrowed
funds in the most efficient manner. Secondly, interest payments
usually comprise only a small portion of the total cash expenses
of farmers. A large portion goes to payments on fertilizers,
insecticides, transportation. The high price of fertilizers and
insecticides could be due to the monopoly rights given to a few
importers or to the protection" given to local producers of
fertilizers. The high •cost of transportati_Dn could be due to bad
farm-to-market roads or their complete absence and to the high
acquisition price of •vehicles,• which Is in turn due to the
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protection given to importers of vehicles or to local producers
of vehicles. Thirdly, credit is not a binding constraint to
agricultural development. The '!new" view argues that many inputs
and technologies are divisible and can be adopted in small
amounts. Fourthly, credit is not like any other inputs, such as
fertilizers, seeds, etc. Credit is a facilitator in the sense
that the borrower who obtains it has a claim over certain
resources. An important characteristic of credit is that it is
fungible. Thus, a special credit program may not achieve its
desired results, say adoption of new rice production technology,
for the simple reason that the target borrowers can divert cheap
credit to consumption or to non'priority, yet more profitable
venture.
The fifth counterarg_nent advanced by the "new" view is that
cheap credit provided by formal financial institutions may not be
at all cheap to farmers. What is important to farmer-borrowers
!
is the effective cost of borrowing which includes the nominal
interest rate and the transaction costs per peso borrowed. The
latter arise from out-of-pocket costs and opportunity costs of
the borrower's time spent in carrying out loan procedures.
Although, the nominal interest rate may below, transaction costs
could be very high, which makes the effective cost of borrowing
also high. For instance, farmers incur out-of-pocket
expenses on transpor%ation and meals to follow up their loan
application. These ,costs'increase with the distance they have to
travel and the n_Mbe_ of times they have to go to the bank. More
often than not, the cost of loan evaluation is shifted to less
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creditworthy borrowers instead of being absorbed by the bank.
For example, borrowers are required to present guarantors, and
they have to pay for their transportation and meal expenees.
Sometimes, .•cheap credit is hot available _to farmers at the time
they need it most. It takes a long time to process a loan, • and
when the loan is finally released, the planting •season is
practically over. To go ahead with planting would be more risky
and therefore costly to farmers. That is why farmers often turn
£o informal moneylenders. To them, accessibility and timeliness
of credit are more important than the interest rate they have to
pay. Besides, interest rate in the informal credit market may
not necessarily be very high. ••It could be lower than• the
effective cost of borrowing from the formal • credit market. Thus,
to the "new" view, informal moneylenders are not necessarily
evil.
The• sixth counterarg_ment of the "new" view is that rural
people, however, poor, also save but most of their savings are in
the form of • unproductive physical assets. They hardly•have any
financial savings for the simple reason that the real return on
•financial instruments is most of the time negative due to low
" nominal interest rate ceiling imposed by government. Thus, this
makes unproductive physical assets relatively more attractive to
rural people.
And finally, the "new" view argues that cheap credit policy
stifles the growth of formal financial institutions. Because of
ceilings on n_minal interest rates, formal financial institutions
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cannot increase their resources through savings mobilization.
Therefore, they have to depend largely on Central Bank
rediscounting, government budgets, and foreign aid for loanable
funds. As such, they are mere brokers of government funds and
foreign aid, not full-pledged banking institutions. This is
sustainable only if the government constantly runs budgetary
surplus, if inflation rate is not disruptive, and if foreign aid
keeps on flowing. However, most LDCs run huge budgetary
deficits and have relatively high inflation rates. This would
make the flow of credit to agricultre more uncertain, as is often
the case with countries which encounter periodic economic crisis.
In such situation, they have to close the Central Bank rediscount
window and effect drastic cuts on expenditures to reduce
budgetary deficits macroeconomic imbalances canbe arrested. The
"new" view therefore favors higher and more flexible interest
rates. This would permit formal financial institutions in the
rural areas to mobilize Via voluntary financial savings a much
larger part of their loanable funds than is currently the case.
Aside from being an inducement to invest in new technology,
cheap credit to agriculture is considered by the "traditional"
view as an income-transfer mechanism. To effect an income-
transfer to rural areas where poverty is concentrated is indeed
socially desirable. This is warranted if cheap credit really
gets throug_ the majority of rural people and if there is no
other more effective means of transferring income. But this is
not the case according to the "new"view. Access to cheap credit
is usually limited to a few, usually big farmers in the rural
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areas. Even if small borrowers have access to cheap credit,
still the benefits are unevenly distributed between big and
small borrowers since the income-transfer effected through this
mechanism is proportional to the size of the loan. Further, the
Iron Law of Interest Rate Restrictions (ILIRR) advanced by
Gonzales- Vega hypothesizes that when interest-rate ceilings
become more restrictive to make credit cheaper, the size of the
loans granted to the nonrationed borrower classes increases,
while the size of the loans granted to the rationed borrower
classes decreases. This is redistribution in reverse. This is
depicted in Figure II.2. It is assumed that there are two
borrower classes, namely the big (nonrationed) and small
(rationed) borrowers. D2 and MC2 respectively the demand and
marginal curves of big borrower, while D1 and MCI are
respectively the demand and marginal cost curves of small
borrower. Note that MCI is steeper than MC2, reflecting the
higher cost of lending to small borrower than big borrower. At
the interest rate ceiling r*, the big borrower obtains loans, L2*
while the small borrower gets LI*. If the interest rate ceiling
is further reduced to r**,' the big borrower obtains a larger
amount of loans, M2, while the small borrower can get only M1
which is smaller than when the interest rate was r*. Thus, more
loans will be concentrated in the hands of the big borrower at
the expense of the small borrower when interest-rate ceilings
become morel restrictive. Indeed, this has been the experience of
several Latin American countries which pursued overly cheap
credit policy. (Vogel [1984]).
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The "second best" argument is another justification used by
the "traditional" view for cheap agricultural credit. In LDCs,
macroeconomic policies usually tend to be biased against
agriculture. For instance, industrial protection policy results
in higher prices for farm implements and inputs. Overvalued
localcurrency and export taxes penalize agriculture which is the
main foreign exchange earner. Food price controls tend to favor
urban consumers at the expense of primary food rural producers.
Rural areas get very little social overhead capital, like roads
and bridges. All these are taxes On agriculture, and as such,
they discourage production and reduce incomes in rural areas.
So, to neutralize the effects of these policies, cheap credit
must be given to farmers, The "second best" argument is rejected
by the "new" view. In the first place, targeting loans to
specific sector, say agriculture, is a futile exercise because of
the fungibility of credit. In particular, cheap agricultural
loans may have no impact on agricultural output and employment
because they can be diverted to other economic activities, like
manufacturing, which are already heavily protected through tariff
and exchange rate pol_cies. Thus, cheap agricultural credit
policy just creates another form of distortion. Instead of cheap
credit, the approach should be to directly deal with the sources
of distortion. In particular, macroeconomic policies, which are
biased against agriculture should be reformed. The equity
implication of the "second best" argument cannot be
overemphasized. While all farmers pay the tax, only those who
receive the cheap credit receive the subsidy. The tax is
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proportional to the amount of the good produced or sold by the
farmer, but the subsidy isproportional to the size of the loan
received. Thus, the "second best" argument for cheap credit is
weak because of the inefficiencies and inequity that results.
The main differences between the "traditional" and the "new"
view to RFMS are summarized in Table II.2.
3. The Surplus View
The "surplus" view is another school that can be considered
non-trad itional for it views the whole cred it relation in
agriculture as part and parcel of the relations of production and
relations o_ exchange. Thus, the description of the relationship
between the informal lenders and the farmers resemble that of the
interlinked markets (a concept to be discussed below). But for
this school, the market failure and high transactions costs are
just manifestations of unequal power relations between poor
farmers on one hand and their creditors on the other. The
creditors have dominance and power over land (the landlords),
trading (traders) and finance capital. The poor tenant has very
little bargaining strength and cannot even have the liberty to
migratedue to the hold that his landlord and creditors have on
him. Bharadwaj (1974) and Bhaduri (1917) represent some of the
works done in this field.
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Table II. 2
DIFFERENCES ,BETWEEN THE TRADITIONAL AND THE NEW APPROACH
TO RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
Traditional View New View
Savings I. Rural savings i. Rural poor do save
minimal, given proper
incentives.
Financial markets _. Subsidized and 2. Financial markets
supervised credit should be allowed
needed for small to operate without
farmers, intervention and
interest rate
ceilings.
Target borrowers 3. Most farms. 3. Bankable and
viable farms.
Purpose of loan 4. In farm 4. Allow financial
production market to allocate
among uses of
loans.
Role of informal _. Monopolist, _. Efficient alloca-
lenders exploiters, tor of funds to
usurers, small farmers
usually not
reached by formal
system.
Interest rate 6. Artificially low 6. Interest rates can
structure interest rates be high to cover
for small farmers, opportunity cost
of money, transac-
tions costs and
risk premium.
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Recently Floro applied a mix of the interlinked market
theory and the surplus approach to study informal credits offered
by trader-lenders and farmer-lenders. She found that the net
result is that small farmers are slowly forced to mortgage their
land to their creditors and that increased tenancy and/or
landlessness may arise due to the credit and debt nexus. The
informal market may perhaps be efficient as the recent trend
claims, but it may also exacerbate gross inequities in the rural
areas.
Other non-traditional schools attack both formal and
informal credits because they support a system and a technology
which to these researchers are not at all consonant with the
peasants needs. Particularly, these researchers attack the
introduction of the new Green Revolution technology as
exacerbating the peasants suffering by: i) making them more
dependent on monopoly capital for industrial inputs to
agriculture (fertilizers, pesticides, etc.) and 2) changing
relations of production and increasing the number of ways of
extracting "surplus from the peasants - from one that is merely
concentrated on land rent to one that emphasizes surplus
extraction via the input and output markets and via the "dm_t
nexus". Such viewpoints occur in varying degrees in the works of
Ferrer (1986), Feder (1983), and Keith Griffin ([_).
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E. Behavior of Participants of RFMs
The preceding sections have discussed macro issues which
have direct bearing on the RFMs. This section will deal with
micro issues. Specifically, it will examine models that att_mpts
to explain behavior of major participants of the RFMs, namely,
net borrowers, financial intermediaries, and net savers.
i. Behavior of Lenders
According to the description of RFMs given in Chapter I,
there are generally two types of financial lenders, namely the
formal financial institutions (FFIs) and the informal
moneylenders (IMLs). Studies deaiing with the volume and types
of credit given by the two types of lenders to rural borrowers
are quite substantial. Unfortunately, however, less effort is
exerted in modelling behavior of FFIs and IMLs. Lack of
understanding of or misunderstanding the behavior of these
lenders has often resulted in errors in policy making or at least
inconsistent credit policies.
a) Formal Financial Institutions
Theoretical models that attempt to explain the behavior of
formal financial institutions in advanced economies are quite
Copious. Baltensperger (1980) has classified these models into
"partial models" and "complete models". In the former, "the
total size of the bank's portfolio is assumed to be exogenously
determined, so that only the question of the optimal allocation
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of this portfolio remains to be solved," whereas in the latter,
"the joint determination of not o?ly the structure of assets and
liabilities and their interaction, but also the total scale of
the bank's operation and portfolio" are being explained.
Santomero (1984) on the other hand, has classified the
models according to the functions of the FFIs being emphasized by
such models. Some models focus on the role played by F_'Is as
asset transformers. Others emphasize the nature of the
liabilities issued by the FFIs and thei_ central function in a
monetary economy. Still others emphasize the two-sided nature of
FFIs, that of mobilizing savings on one hand and that of
allocating mobilized funds to their best alternative uses, on the
ot_r hand.
Those models are, however, less useful in describing
behavior of FFIs in LDCs, much less in rural areas. As commonly
known, market imperfections prevail in rural areas. In
addition, FFIs in the RFMs are basically supply-leading financial
institutions which exist because of artificial environment
created bY policies. These factors should be considered in
modelling behavior of FFIs in the rural areas.
There are at least two models available to us that attempt
to describe the behavior of FFIs in the rural areas. These are
basically variants of the "complete" models described by
Baltenspenger. Because of the interesting hypotheses derived
from these models that are relevant to rural finance, they will
be briefly described here.
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(i) The Gonzales-Vega Model
The Gonz_les-Vega mode_ (1980) was formulated• _or the
purpose of determining socially optimum allocation of credit.
The latter is defined as "that allocationwhich maximizes the
i
aggregate net income of all various participants in the economic
activity, including those participating merely as producers as
well as those participating as financial intermediaries." The
financial institution is assumed to be a multi-product, profit-
maximizing firm and can distinguish different classes of
borrowers. For our purpose, there are • only two classes of
borrowers, namely theLarge and Small borrowers. There are three
components of the firm's lending costs z the opportunity cost of
the funds which is exogenously determined and is identical for
all borrower-classes; the costs of loan administration which tend
to be independent of the size and degree of riskiness of the
loan; and risk-reducing costs which are not independent of ioan
size or of the expected losses due to default. That lending to
Small borrowers is relatively costly compared to lending to Large
borrowers is reflected in different marginal costs for lending to
the Small and Largeborrowers, the latter being lower and slowly
rising than the former. The condition for achieving the social
9ptimum is that each producer be granted a loan which equates the
_narginal cost for the bank of lending to him with the value of
the marginal product of the variable inputs purchased with the
loan. At this socially optimum allocation of credit, the ban_
has to charge higher interest rates for loanm to Small borrowers
5O
and lower interest rates for loans to Large borrowers. This is
depicted in Figure II.3.
r_
Without access to external finance, the Large and Small
borrowers' gross income depend• on their respective productive
opportunities, represented by the curves of the value of the
marginal products of the variable inputs employed, D1 for Large
borrowers and D2 for Small borrowers, and their own resources
saved, N1 for Large borrowers and N2 for Small borrowers. The
net income of the two producers is just the difference between
their gross income and the value of the variable inputs employed.
The aggregate net income under a regime of self-finance is
a lal 'd iNiON2d2a2 'a2.
With the presence of the bank, which charges different rates
for different borrower-classes, aggregate net income increases by
al'bldl plus a2'b2d2, of which al'blgl goes to Large, a2'b2g2
goes to Small, and the sum of blgldl and b292d2 goes to the bank.
Charging different interest rates to different classes•of
borrowers is essential in achieving a socially optimum allocation
(If credit. This is so because the bank has different marginal
costs for lend ing to the d if ferent classes of borrowers.
Consider for example if a uniform interest rate were imposed.
This policy intends £o subsidize the Small borrowers and tax the
Large borrowers. The result is depicted in Figure 4. Here, r is
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the legislated uniform interest rate. It is assumed that while
the allocation of credit changes, the total amount lent by •the
bank remains the same. •With the legislated uniform interest
rate, r, the amount lent to Large borrowers decreases from L1 to
LI', while the amount lent to Small borrowers increases from L2
to L2'. But the private gain for Small borrowers, represented by
the area r2b2b2'r is less than the sum of the private loss for
Large borrowers, represented by the area blbl'rlr and the private
loss for the bank represented by the area bl'glel plus e2b292b2'.
Thus, society as a whole Suf£ers a dead-weight loss.
Under the uniform interest rate policy, a bank attempting to
maximize profits • may not necessarily satisfy the credit
requirements of all producers, but instead practise some kind of
credit rationing. It is assumed here that the Small borrower
represents the rationed borrower whose loan size is smaller than
the loan demand while rthe Large • borrower represents the
nonrationed borrower • whose loan size is always equal to •loan
demand. A profit-maximizing bank responds to restrictive uniform
interest rate policy by increasing the amount lent to Large
borrowers at the expense of Small borrowers. This is shown in
Figure II.4.
Given the interest• rate ceiling, r, the bank lends L2' to
Small borrower which is less than the loan demand, L2, whereas
the •bank lends L1 to Larg e borrower Which is equal to the loan
demand. Lowering the interest rate ceiling further to rl results
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in less loans given by the bank to Small borrowers and mor_ loans
given to Large borrowers.
In summary, the Gonzales-Vega model attempts to show that a
profit-maximizing bank responds to interest rate restriction by
rearranging its loan portfolio in favor of nonrationed borrowers.
Given this bank behavior, any effort exerted by authorities toi
redistribute income towards the small farmer-borrowers through a
restrictive uniform interest rate policy will always be
frustrated. Instead, efforts should be directed at lowering
the marginal cost of lending to small farmer-borrowers.
(ii) The Tolentino Model
The Tolentino model (1986) is much more limited than the
Gonzalez-Vega model in the sense that it does not try to
determine the socially optimum allocation of credit. Rather, it
focuses on the private profitability of a small bank given a set
of regulations and incentives. In his model, Tolentino shows
that a sm_ll bank will always try to maximize profits given a set
of regulations and incentives. If incentives to become small are
very attractive, then banks tend to remain small. The model
mainly draws inspiration from the New Institutional Economics.
The model assumes a profit-maximizing small (agricultural)
bank. Incgme is mainly'sourced from the small bank's lending
operations. Its Costs consist of fixed and variable costs.
Maximum profit is _ttained by equating the bank's marginal
revenue (MR) with its marginal cost (MC).
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Under "normal" conditions, the small bank satisfies the
profit-r_a×imizing condition by lending at L*. This is shown in
Figure II.7.
Government authorities, however, regard small agricultural
bank as a supply-leading institution that must provide cheap
credit to the agricultural sector. Usually, an interest-rate
ceiling way below the market rate is imposed by authorities.
Since the revenue, R, is the product of the interest rate and the
the loan size, the interest-rate ceiling has the effect of
shifting the revenue line clockwise, from R* to R'. This has two
implications. One is that to maximize profits, the bank has to
reduce its loans to farmers from L* to L'. This is rather an
unwanted development. The other, which is worse than the first
one, is that the maximum profit rate obtained by the small bank
under this condition may be less attractive compared to other
opportunities available to owners of the bank's resources. There
is then a possibility that bank owners leave the banking
industry, thus, leaving the agricultural sector with no banking
support. The authorities, however, can prevent this by giving
small banks incentives or subsidies which can reduce the bank's
cost. Attractive spread between rediscount and lending rates,
tax exemption, equity contributions are examples of such
incentives/subsidies which have the effect of reducing bank's
cost. %_ith these cost-reducing, incentives, the bank's cost curve
shifts downwards, from C* to C', as shown in Figure II.5.
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Thus, in terms of profit rate and size o_ loans, the small bank
is back to the pre-interest-rate ceiling condition.
The model has been extended to include the effects of other
regulations and incentives. For example, if incentives are
withdrawn beyond a certain bank size, the total cost curve of a
bank will assume the shape as depicted in Figure II.8. Here, the
amount of loans is used as an indicator of bank size. It is
linked at the output level, LI, beyond which the cost-reducing
incentives or subsidies may no longer be availed of. Here, there
is strong tendency for a profit-maximizing bank to remain small.
T
T_e Tolentino model attempts to capture many of the
realities of finance in LDCs. The fact that small rural banks
still operate despite the restrictive interest-rate ceiling
policy is a proof that the subsidies or cost-reducing incentives
provided by the authorities are at least enough to put thebank's
optimal profit back to the same level as the pre-policy package.
b) Informal Moneylenders and Interlinked Markets
The old view that market segmentation was restricted to
isolated barrios and mon_iff markets have now given way to the
idea that segmentation means different term structures, different
characteristics and types of loans that meet certain particul_r
specialized needs not substitutable by other types of loans. The
fact that many markets are imperfect in the rural areas provide
the basis for understanding the varied credit arrangements
between heterogenous lenders and hetexogenous borrowers,
particularly in the informal market.
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The credit market for one is highly underdeveloped. The
formal syst_n is wary of lending to sma[l farmers which they
perceive to be unbankable and bereft of any marketable
collateral. Small-sized loans to the small farmer also have the
disadvantage of entailing high transaction costs and high risk
of default, aggravated by the fact that no adequate crop
insurance scheme exists. Thus, if left alone, informal credit
will also be afflicted with the same problem as the formal
system, and may become an unprofitable enterprise.
Other markets too are quite underdeveloped. There is hardly
a competitive land market to speak of mainly due to sharecropping
arrangements and depressed agricultural incomes. The labor
market is also not operating competitively again due to
sharecropping arrangement and the prevalence of owner-cultivator
farming. The lack of a strong futures con_odities market and
crop insurance sch_.me mark much of the trading of agricultural
crops. Imperfect markets, market failures and missing markets
call for very high transaction costs to retrieve proper
information flows and monitoring. They also entail high risks on
uninsured and uncollateralized transactions. The result is an
"internalization" (or creation) of particular institutions and
arrangements to meet these unmet needs.
The interlinked markets school share this similarity with
the transaction costs school of Industrial Organization. The
definition of interlinked markets is given by Braverman and
Srinivasan (1980) "(Market Interlinkages) are contracts made
_9
between the same pair of individuals relating exchanges in mor_
than one commodity or service, the contracts being linked in an
essential way. -- (Any) delinking (of) contracts would be
infeasible or costly for one party --- (thus) linking may
constitute a Pareto superior move as opposed to a delinked
situation."
Most of the theoretical studies on interlinked markets have
studied the landlord as the main informal source of credit.
Some of the major works that have been done can be summarized as
follows:
i. Braverman and Srinivasan (1981) show how sharecropping
arrangement can interlink land, labor, and credit
transactions. In an imperfect credit market, a landlord may
offer credit to his tenant, oftentimes at s_bsidized rates
without necessarily insisting that the sharecropper borrow
only from him. It is to the landlord's interest that the
tenant gets his loan from the cheapest source since a lower
repayment will increase the landlord's share in rent form.
2. Braverman and Guasch (1984.) shows that in a situation of
heterogenous labor ability and imperfect information,
interlinking credit and tenancy contracts allows the
landlord to sort and screen the tenants so that the ones
with higher ability will be the ones to get the tenancy
_agreements. Tenants a_e compelled to accept the credit
terms set by the landlords for the purchase of capital in
order to be allocated a plot of land. High ability tenants
will be subsidized for larger purchases of capital. The
6O
resulting arrangement is an efficient allocation whereas a
delinking of the markets will degenerate into an inefficient
allocation.
3. Braverman and Stiglitz (1982) demonstrate that the linking
of tenancy and credit relations can be used to intensify the
work effOrt of the tenant. Loan subsidies and indebtedness
of the tenants results in higher intensity of work and
increase in land rent that more than offsets the decrease in
returns to lending. The interlinkage again increases
efficiency of production.
4. Kotwal (198_) claims that landlord's provision of
consumption loans to their tenants is a means of sharing
risk with the latter. This is in response to the lack of
crop insurance in the system and tenant's lack of access to
capital markets.
The above interlinkages have attempted to show that
interlinkages of markets result in more efficient allocation.
They also reduce transaction and risk costs yielding positive
contributions from the informal lenders.
But some of their results do not jibe with this rosy
picture. Braverman and Srinivasan (19.81) claim that a landlord
who interlinks credit with the size of pl0t to a tenant ensures
that a tenant's utility will remain at that level equivalent to a
full time rural wage laborer. To improve the welfare of the
4
tenants no less than genuine land reform will be necessary.
Government subsidization of tenants' credit results only in the
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subsidization of landlords. Other partial reforms, such as a
limit to the landlord's share, only results in using the credit-
tenancy link to recoup what was lost in the curtailment of land
rent. The tenant's welfare will remain in the reservation
utility level.
The surplus approach precisely maintains that the credit
relation should not be separate from the relations of productin
and exchange. The fact that landlords, traders and rich farmers
can use interlinked markets reflects their respective dominant
positions in the production and exchange processes. Through
these mechanisms they can exert influence and control over the
borrower. Additional surplus and monopoly rent can then be
appropriated. Moreover, because the interlocker can reduce
transaction and risk costs, they are in a position to force their
competitors ta also use interlinkages. But vertical integration
and tie-in arrangements can force the borrowers not to deal with
other lenders. Thus, interlinked markets can be a way of
limiting entry to the credit market.
2. Behavior of Savers
Since the macroeconomic theories of saving, such as the
Keynesian current income hypothesis, Friedman's permanent income
hypothesis, Ando-Modigliani life cycle hypothesis, Duesenberry's
relative income hypothesis are well known, the discussions in
this section will therefore concentrate on the microeconomic
theories of saving which are relatively less known. Financial
instruments are assumed to be the only form of savings.
6_
The Fisherian model is usually used to describe the behavior
of savers and borrowers in an exchange economy. In a risk-free
world, an individual maximizes his present and future
satisfaction given his endowment, production opportunities, and
market opportunities for external lending and borrowing. By not
consuming part of his present resource endowment, the individual
can both be a saver and investor at the same time. If he has low
productive opportunities compared to others in the economy, he
will be better off if he withdraws his low-yielding investments
and instead buys relatively high yielding, risk-free financial
assets offered by deficit units who have better productive
opportunities. The main idea of this model is that individual
savers respond to the reward for holding financial assets. The
interaction between savers and borrowers in the economy would
lead to an equilibrium interest rate. At this rate, desired
saving or lending would be equal to desired borrowing. In this
model, income is considered as a shift factor.
The simple Fisherian model described above assumes a
riskless world with only one financial instrument and one
interest rate. This'has been extended to the world with risk
In a world characterizedby risk, multiple financial instruments
with different rates can exist.
The importance of these models is that they give us
prescriptions for mobilizing financial savings. In particular,
the McKinnon-Shaw "interest-rate elasticity" approach prescribes
high real interest rate to induce potential savers to buy
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financial assets. Price stability is essential in maintaining
attractive real interest rates. The risk of holding financial
assets is mainly attributed to price instabilitM. In view of
f_nancial policies that repressed financial markets in LDCs,
McKinnon and Shaw recommended the liberalization of financial
markets.
The effectiveness of high interest rate in mobilizing
savings will be severely constrained by the absence of formal
financial institutions offering financial assets. Indeed, this
is the case especially in rural areas of LDCs, where only few
formal financial institutions exist. The creation of formal
financial institutions in rural areas is therefore expected to
have greater impact on savings mobilization. The "institution-
elasticity" approach, or "supply-leading" approach proposed by
Hugh Patrick (196_) emphasizes accessibility to financial
services as a determinant of saving. In particular, small savers
will be motivated to buy deposit instruments if financial
institutions are close to them.
Burkner (1980) criticized _,e "interest-rate elasticity"
approach and the "institution-elasticity" approach for stressing
too much on only one feature of the instrument i.e., interest
rate in the case of the "interest-rate elasticity" approach and
accessibility in the case of the "institution-elasticity"
approach. In addition, both approaches attribute the financial
repression either to the government or private sector when in
reality it can be attributed to both. Specifically, reforms of
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government financial policies, e.g. deregulating the interest
rate, would not necessarily make the financial instruments
attractive if quasi-monopolistic policies of private ba,ks tend
to be repressive. A maximum deposit rate and deposit s_ze
prescribed by bankers association are examples of repressive bank
policies that would offset the merits of favorable government•
policies. Hence, surplus units would not be attracted to
financial instruments. Burkner then proposed the "financial
instrument" approach which considers together several features of
financial instruments that surplus units may be looking after.
By regarding yield and accessibility as just two of the many
features of financial instruments, the •"financial instrument"
approach treats the "interest-rate elasticity" approach and the
"institution-elasticity" approach as special cases. The set of
features of financial intruments to a large extent influences
the decisions of surplus units. And the "main channels through
which the policy of financial institutions and government
authorities exert their impact on savings and portfolio behavior
and the distribution o£ benefits from investment are the
financial instruments that are offered and their features."
Burkner identified at least six major characteristics of any
financial instrument, namely yield, risk, accessibility,
liquidity, information and product variation. For illustrative
purposes, a profile of the features Of savings deposits and
government bonds is presented in Figure II.7. In this example,
savings deposits look more attractive than' government bonds.
65
Figure II. 7
+1"111:_PI_.OFILI/. (,)i." FINANCIAL INSI'II.UMI._+NTS
Saving=Del)osilsAcce_sibility
.... GovernmentBOndl
Producl Voriatlon "'_. _quldlty
• "_" ._ s *" \_
A_sk
Source: Burkner(1980)
66
It should be noted, however, that individuals may place
different weights on those features.
The implication of the "financial instrument" approach is
clear. Both monetary authorities and private financial
institutions have to constantly monitor the needs of surplus
units and adjust their policies accordingly so as to arrive at
features of financial instruments that would meet the needs of
surplus units. A financial system that offers a variety of
financial instruments will likely succeed in mobilizing savings.
3. Behav_o [ of Borrowers
The most popular model that attempts to explain the behavior
of farmer-borrower is that of McKinnon (1973). It is basically
an extension of the two-period Fisherian model in which an
individual has to make a decision whether to consume all his
endownments at period one, or to lea_e part of them for
investment so that he can consume more in period two. BecAuse O_
insufficient resource endowments and indivisibilities in
investments, the farmer has to resort to external borrowing so
that he can free himself from inferior technology and acquire a
new technique of production. This improves the situation of both
the farmer-borroWer who have better production opportunities and
savers who have relatively inferior production opportunities.
McKinnon's model stresses the virtue of external finance and
high interest rate policy to transfer resources from less
productive to more productive entrepreneurs. His model can be
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criticized in several respects, however.: First of all, farmers
incur transaction costs in securing a loan over and above the
interest they have to pay for the loan. This means that farmers
concern themselves with the effective cost of borrowing in making
decisions regarding borrowing, not the interest cost only as in
the case of McKinnon's model. The effective cost of borrowing
includes the nominal interest rate and transaction costs. The
latter arises from out-of-pocket expenses and opportunity costs
of farmer-borrower's time spent in processing his loans. If the
investment in new technology is attractive enough given the
interest rate, but that the transaction costs involved in
securing a loan are excessively prohibitive, then farmers may not
resort to external finance. Secondly, McKinnon stresses too much
on the indivisibilities in investment, requiring relatively large
amount of loans. As pointed out earlier, the "new" view believes
that many of themodern technology are actually divisible, so
that farmers need loans smaller than what are usually expected
with the assumed indivisibilities. This has to be recognized
because the amount required to acquire the divisible technology
and the effective cost of borrowing are two crucial factors in
making decisions on whether to borrow or not, and where to berrow
from if alternative sources of credit are available. The latter
is especially important in the rural areas because of the
presence of informal credit markets as alternative sources of
credit. Unfortunately, these factors are not taken into account
in McKinnon's model.
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Any model that attempts to explain the behavior of farmer-
borrowers has to grapple with the reality that farmer-borrowers
cQncern themselves with the effective cost of borrowing in inaking
decision whether to borrow or not. Ladman's model (1984) has
this feature and it yields interesting testable hypothesis. It
would be worthwhile to briefly discuss his model here.
The profit equation of the borrower-farmer may be written as
P = R - (r.L + BTC) (i)
where P = profit in pesos,
R = revenue net of costs of the resources purchased
with borrowed funds, but not net of borrowing
costs,
r = interest rate,
L = loan size, and
BTC = borrower's transaction costs.
Equation (i) can be rewritten into:
p = L(P) -= L[R - (r.L + BTC)] (2)
L L L L
= LIAR - (r + ABTC)] = LIAR - AEC]
where AR = average revenue,
ABTC = average borrower's transaction cost, and
AEC = r + ABTC = average effective borrowing cost.
This may be depicted in Figure II.8. The demand for credit
schedule (DD) consists, of the loans of present values of the
marginal value products (MVP) resulting from the resources
employed using successive loan units. The profit maximizing
condition is
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14L_L-i. uw_ L-
and Ccls t ii
Borrowing Oosts ,and Be_-nue$: One Lender
70
r = MVp (3)
To maximize profit, the farmer has to borrow L' and his profit
would be L'(AR-AEC). Note that T1 is the borrowing threshold or
the minimum loan size below which the borrower would not be
willing to borrow from a lender. If ABTC increases while r
remains the same, AEC curve would shift upwards. This does two
things. One is that it reduces the optimal profit of the
borrower. The other is that it increases the borrowing
threshold. This means that a farmer confxonted with higher
4
transaction costs has to be assured of higher loan size than
before the increase in the transaction cost so that he will be
induced to borrow.
Ladman extended his model to the case of one borrower and
_two lenders. This means that the farmer-borrower would have two
choices of lenders; namely the formal financial institution which
charges low nominal interest rate but demands high transaction
cost on the part of the farmer and the informal moneylender who
charges high interest rate but otherwise requires low transaction
cost on the part of the farmer. Figure II.9 summarizes possible
borrowing behavior of a farmer. At L", the farmer would be
indifferent between the formal financial institution and the
informal moneylender. If the loan size requirement is above L",
then the farmer prefers to borrow from the former. If it is
below L", then he prefers to borrow from the latter. The optimal
loan size for borrowing from the formal financial institution is
LII, while the optimal loan size for borrowing from informal
moneylender is LI. Farmers who want to borrow an amount between
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Figure II.9
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TI and T_ will definitely prefer to source funds from the
informal moneylen@er, not from the formal financial institution.
One of the main lessons that can be drawn from Ladman's
model is that promotingcheap agricultural credit does not
necessarily induce farmers to borrow from formal financial
institutions. As rational economic agents, farmers compare the
effective cost of borrowing from the alternative sources _ of
credit, given their desired loan sizes before making any
decision. This partly explains why despite the massive cheap
credit progrmn of many governments, farmers still look at
informal moneylenders with favor.
Ladman tested his hypothesis using the Bolivian experience.
He found that the high transaction costs for borrow%ng from the
formal financial institutions which offer concessionary interest
rates forced many potential borrowers to seek loans from informal
moneylenders. Whether this has also been the experience of the
Philippines is indeed an interesting issue worth examining.
The basic weakness of Ladman's model is that it forcgs
farmers to borrow either from the formal credit market or from
the informal credit market. In certain instances, however,
farmers view these sources as complementary. In other words,
access to one market, say the formal credit market, would
facilitate access to another market, i.e., the informal credit
market. Or one market, say the informal credit market, may be
considered by farmers as a supplemental source of credit. There
are several reasons for this. One is that farmers are rationed
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by lenders because of certain legal constraint, like the ceiling
on the amount farmers can borrow from formal financial
institutions or some arbitrary decisions by informal
moneylenders. Thus, farmers source credits from both markets so
long as there are profit opportunities perceived by them. The
o_,er reason is that farmers may finance different assets from
different sources of credit. For example, they borrow from
formal financial institutions to finance the acquisition of fixed
capital and from the informal moneylender to finance working
capital, or vice-versa. These aspects must be considered in
modelling and in empirically investigating behavior of farmer-
borrowers.
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Chapter III
BEHAVIOR OF MAJOR PARTICIPANTS OF THE RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS:
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This chapter reviews empirical results of studies dealinc
with the behavior of the major participants of the rural
financial markets (RFMs). It consists of three sections,
namely: a) formal and informal lenders in the rural sector; b)
saving in the Philippines and'in the rural sector; and c)
behavior of borrowers in the rural sector.
A. Formal and Informal Lenders in the Rural Sector
Economic activities in the rural areas are mostly
agricultural. It is therefore understandable that studies on
rural credit focus on agricultural credit.
The total volume of rural credit cannot be precisely known
because of the absence of information about the level of informal
credit. Recently, Sacay et al. (1985) put together several
studies on rural finance and came up with an indicative size of
informal credit vis-a-vis formal credit. In the 508, informal
credit comprised about 80 percent of the total value of loans
obtained by farmers. Its share dropped to about 30 percent in
the middle of the 708, then rose to 37 percent in the early 80s.
The number of farmer's dependent on informal credit market more or
less follows the samepattern. The massive agricultural credit
programs in the 70s could have temporarily reduced the importance
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of informal credit. Their subsequent failure, however,• has
forced majority of farmers to depend again on informal credit.
i. The Formal Sector
Loans granted by the formal sector to the agricultural
s'ector _ reached _27 billion in 1984. This is only 9 percent of
the loans granted to the formal non-agricultural sector which
consists mainly of industrial enterprises located in urban
centers. The real average growth rate for formal agricultural
loans for the period 1966 _ 84 was 3.27 percent which was way
below the 8.4 percent real average growth rate for non-
agricultural loans (see NEDA [1986]). Understandably, • the
share of agricultural loans to total loans granted •by •the
formal sector• declined from 18 percent in 1966 to 8 percent in
1984. Although both the formal agricultural loan.s to
agricultural gross value added (GVA) ratio and formal non-
agricultural loans to non-agricultural GVA ratio had been rising,
the former averaged only 23 percent during the period 1966 - 84,
while the latter averaged 87 percent. This can be interpreted
in two ways. One is that it is a reflection of the general
, ....
policies which are biased against agriculture (David [198_]).
The • other interpretation is that the agricultUral sector is more
efficient than•the non-agricultural sector with regard to the use
of loans. However, this should be taken with caution since a
significant proportion of the to[al agricultural loans• come from
the informal sector. In contrast, non-agricultural loans mainly
come from formal financial institutions •in •the urban areas.
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The formal •lending• sector in the rural areas conslsts of
rural banks, savings banks, and branches of Commercial and
development banks. Outstanding loans of banks to agriculture
reached _25 billion in 1983, then went down to _18 billion in
1985 as a result of the credit squeeze. About one-half of the
total outstanding agricultural loans was provided by commercial
banks,• about one-third by the rural banking system, and the rest,
by other types of banks.
The segmentation in the rural credZt market can perhaps be
partially reflected in the set-up of financial institutions
in the formal banking system of the countryside. The private
commercial banks •' and Philippine National Bank_(PNB) cater to
large commercial lending for viable projects which are mainly
agric_turalexports_ like sugar, coconut, •banana, etc., and
other commercial crops. Their clientele are mostly on big
landowners and large agribusiness firms. The commercial banks
are, _ however, the main•conduit for bank deposits in the rural
areas. But the TBAC-UPBRF study (1981) found that only 1/3 of
tota_ _esources and_borrowings are channeled into agricultural
lending; making commercial banks one of the big sources of
leakages of financialassets from the rural to the urbanareas.
This observation may also point to the minimal effect of the
creditquota policy which stipulates that _ percent of total
loanable resources be channeled to agriculture (15 percent to
•i:•
agriculture in general, I0 percent to agrarian reform
beneficiaries). The deposit retention scheme of the government,
which stipulates thSt 7_ percent of total deposits should be
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invested in the area where the deposits originated, has not
prevented ••"resourceful" banks (rural, commercial and thrift
banks) in circumventing this. As long as the rural financial
system is repressed and rural dynamism is absent, funds will
always find a way to more attractive and • less risky• projects
outside the • rural areas.
The ma_n source of low-cost loans for small farmers in the
formal system are the rural banks. Theyhavegrown in number
since the 1950s. The number of head+offices and branches of
rural banks reached 1,119 in 198_. These are spread all over the
countryside. Thus, they+ have closer contacts+ with farmer
borrowers. In the mid-seventies, over 70 percent of the total
volume of loan@ granted by rural banks were small • lo_s,+ i+e.,
_10,00Oor smaller.• But as the default rate of rural borrowers
increased sharply in the late seventies, +this trend has shifted
in the lateseventies to the low+risk medium and large borrowers.
In 1979, 57 percent of the volume of loans were more than _g,000
whereas in 1976, 75 percent of these were below _g,[000. As rural
banks grew, formal loans in the rural areas grew wi%_ respect to
informal loans. But as default ratesand arrearages +, to+-++%he
•Central Bank became rampant, a reverse trend •ensued. ++_
Rural banks have always been dependent on • Central Bank
rediscounted funds and special funds, such as the Special Time
Deposits (STDs), for their financial resources (see Table+III+l).
The attractive incentives they used to enjoy p_actically
discouraged them to mobilize their own •financial assets via rural
savings deposits or capitalization. Their loan-deposit ratio
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Table lll.•la
AVAT-LENTS OF SPECL-%L TIE :DEPOSITS (STDs) FOR
SUPERVISED C_EDIT, 1978-83, RURAL BA_KS
(p _4f11_.on )
Tot_! 1978-83 Ave. Shar
Commodi%-y 1978 1979 1980 1981 I982 1983 to _B, 5oa!
Ave. % Gr-ow-'Lh
Share KaZa (%) (1978-831
RiCea/ 91.i 8Q.2 88.8 57.0 53.7 35.8 20._ (17.0) 8.0
Corn-- 7_0 6.3 7,1 4.3 26,8 15.6 3.3 17:W 12.7
FruiTs & Vegetables 7,1 11.3 12.3 ,9.7 13.2 8.7 3.1 4.1 8.9•
Livestock & PoulZry 85.9 131.5 140.0 167.% 175.1. !54.7 42..• 13.9 13,2
Fisheri@s 7.4 13.3 5.7 4.4 7.3 18.5 2.8, 2!_5 7._.
CoTton 4.5 8.4 i!.5 10.4 8.6 3.5 2.3 (4._.) 120.2_/
Tobacco 10.5 8.3 8.6 15.1 25.9 27.0 a,.7 20.8 82.3
01:hers 52.4 33.9 i!6._. 37.3 3!.3 154.3 20.S 24.1 6.3
TOTAL 255.9 303.2 391.5 305.5 3_!.7 _29.% i00.0 !0.! a_.8
a-/Includes Maisa_=--na/Maisan 77 and corn/fmedgr_ns .oi_..ina.-,",y loans.
b--/ParticiDaZion of banks or_her than __ura!banks _a!Icwed i_ the 9roEr_mn ; hence_ da-a
include STDs by 0zher banks.
Source of basic da_: CB.
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exhibits high rates compared to other banks (see Table III._).
Policies, such as government subsidy in the form of initially
paid capital of preferred stock_ (which •was gradually removed),
cheap rediscounted funds, •and•tax ex___ptions for smaller rural
banks may have unwittingly contributed to this dependence. Thu_,
the • high default rate of farmer• borrowers ieading to high
arrearages to the Central Bank and finally the recent closure of
many rediscounting windows in the early 80's have brought most
rural banks into near collapse.
The thrift banks (and savings and loan associations) are
engaged maihly in medium and long-term financing for large-scale
I
farm operations. Being so,• their loans are securely
collateralized with real estates.
_ther specialized government banks serve•specific functions.
The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) provides supervised credit
mainly to targets of the agrarian reform program, while the
Development Bank of•• the Philippines (DBP) .engages in term
financing. There are many other specialized banks such as those
specializing on the coconut industry.
2. The InformalSector
Floro (1986) and Ferrer (1986) have recently come up
with a more detailed study about the behavior of informal
moneylenders. Whereas the lan_lord and storeowner were the main
informal• creditors before, •now palay traders, rich farmers and a
host of local moneylenders have •arisen to take their place.
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Specialization •has still to be achieved as •traders, storeowners
and lenders are oftentimes the same people. Studies from TBAC
also show the same trends (see Tab ie III.3). It seems that
linked credits •become more•and more the order of the day (see
Table IIi.4).
Floro has shown _at the most prominent lenders, namely the
input dealers, palay traders as well as• rich farmers, have
various motives for lending to sm_ll farmers. The trader-lender
is interested in the accumulation of merchant capital and
therefore acts as a typical market lender preferring more
bankable farmers with higher income and lower default risk (see
Table• III. 5). Effective interest rates are much higher for poor
farmers due to high default risks (see Table III.6). The
stipulation that farmers should buy inputs•from these traders at
a price higher than market price and/or sell their output to them
at a lower price than market price is a clear use of interlinked
markets to ensure the• sources and market for their traded
products and to be able to manipulate the prices to their
m
advantage. This power of the trader-lender is enhanced since he
owns transaction-specific assets, such as warehouses which the
/
poor farmer does not have t
Farmer-lenders, according to Floro,• have a different
motivation in lending. Collateralized loans, particularly those
with land collaterals .are their primary concern. They are
therefore more willing to lend to lower iand-sized and lower-
income farmers as long as their land is used as collaterals.
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Table _Ii. 3
DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL LO_{S OBTAINED BY FARM HOUSEHOLDS
FROM INFORMAL SOURCES, O_[S-YEAR PERIOD,
BY SOURCE OF LOAN
(In % of Informal Loans)
BCS, 1960-6! a/ TBAC, 1978-79 TBAC, 1981-82
(Rice Farming) (All Farm Types
Source (All Farm Types) In % of Informal Loans --Survey Results)No o of
Amount No. of No. of
Loans Loins Amount Loans Amount
Landlords 24.4 23°6 20.0 22.4 7.9 _ 6.1
Palay traders 12.7 b--/ ii. 3_b/ 25..,.5 27.2 24 °5 31.7
Rice millers 4.1 2.9 5,4 9.6
Store owners/other
merchants 16.6 20°7 2.6 1.5 4.9 3.9
Input dealers - - 12.4 17.6 3.0 3.2
Fu!itime moneylenders
(professional lenders) 2.7 3.5 2.0 9.7 - -
Farmers - - 29.8 24.9 17.2 12.0
Relatives 30.1 28.2 c/ c/ - -
Friends/Neighbors i.8 1.4 c/ c/ - , ! -
Loan associations/
Credit unions 0o9 i_ - -
Profe ssiona!s
practitioners - _ 7.0 7._2
O he_-"s - - / 30.1d--/
Not Reported 0.4 O. - -
Total !00.0 i00. IO0.O .......1490,0
--a/Derived'from BCS, PSSH Bulletin, Series 12, Tables 2 and 12°
b/Includes corn millers and merchants.
C/Study did not indicate number nor amount of loan by relation of &ffinity
but reported relations of farmer-borrowers with sources o_ inTormal loans, viz.
15.1 percent were relatives; 10.9 percent were neighbors and 0.4 percent, friends
(Table 63 of TBAC study_ p. 91).
d--/Includesconstruction contractors, handicraftsmen and professional
practitioners.
e/Mostly nonpaiay (e.g. copra and vegetable)e_mmodity traders; also includes
overseas workers and informal sources not categorized by economic activity.
Source: Sacay, Agabin, Tanchoco, "Small Farmer Credit Dilemma" 1985.
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Table III. 4
contractualan_ Effectlve Monthly Interest P_te8
By Type of Tle-ln Arrm_gement,'.297CommercJa_ Loans
ByArea Category, Wet Season 1983-84"_
(interest rate in percent)
Type of Marginal Area Developed Area
TI e--in Arrar_esnent
C_nt[actual Adjusted C_ntractual _uste4
Monthly Rate Noonday Rate Monthly Rate Monthly Rate
(rc) (rm) (r=) (rm)
Z. mLttnkea Loa_ 20.0 19.2 _4.6
lI. Linked Loans _ _ _ L_
A. L.i_ed to Circulation
Activities,
I. _Ired to Sell Gutput II._ 17.0, 8.4 L5.3
2. P_i_ed to Buy Inputs 13.5 18.3 191 21i
3. I_-qulre_to Pant Machinery 10.9 lld 10.8 lO.B
4. l_equlted to Act as
•Marketing Agent 8.7 9.2 6J 6.2
4.Both (I) and (2) 14.4 20.7 12.4 15.2
P_ bJ.nke_ to Productio_
Activities
I. Borrower iS Tenant 12.8 11.6 93 9.1
2. r_/ulred to Transfer
Land Rights ....
3, R_ulr_ to Bender
l,abor Service 13.B 26_i 9.2 31.9
=/
Meam,fo_ each loan type is the weighted average interest rate .Forall loans
under each category with size of Joan as wei9ht.
Souroe:Floro(1986). "
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Table llI. 5
REGRESSION RESULTSa/SHOWING •TRADER-LENDER'S P_FERENCE
FOR HIGHER-INCOME AND LOWER-RISK FARMERS
ALL HOHSEHOLDS, WET SEASON
1983-84
W
st = Co + CIYi + C2ki + C3A + u
_[he_e Wst = value of loan received by borrower i from trader-lenders;
Yi = estimated income of borrower in;
ki = borrower's p_opensity te default; and
A = dun_ny variable for area category
0 if marginal area and 1 if developed area.
All variables are in logarithmic form.
The estimated regression is as follows:
W
st = 1.739 _ + 0.584Y *'_'_:_"- 0o049k - 0o344A
(1.833) (3.77) (i_.045) (1.282)
adj R2 = 0.163
F- value (3, 86 d.f) = 6.01
a/The estimated t-statistic for the intercept suggests that we reject
the null hypothesis that the intercept is "zero at 90 percent confidence
level. The test also shows that there is a strong positive Relationship
between income level of the borrower and the lean size granted by the
trader-lender. This implies tha_ traders tend te offer bigger loans tO
farmers with higher income.
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Table III.6
Results of Least-Squares Regression Analysis
Trader-lender Loans, All F_se_ml'cs
Wet Season, 1963-84_
MODEL Dependen£ Explanatory Coefficients F-distri Adjusted
Variable Variables (t-values)_/ bution at Me_n
i
(at k-l,n-k Rz
degrees of
freedcm_
I 14.651_/ Omzstant 28.457*** 5.66*** 0.ii
(interest) (3.83) (2,86 d.f.)
Income_/ -2.181"**
(-2.90)
Area_/ 3.199
(1.53)
II 14.65_ Constant 6,932*** 3_7"* 0.05
(interest) (6.25) (2,86 d.f.)
Default
rate_/ 1!69"
(1.93)
Area_/ 1.62
(0.72)
_/ There are 97 trader-loans in total However, due to missing
values, only 99 and 89 observations are used respectively.
_/ monthly rate
_/ in natural logarithm.
_/ dummy variable whereby 0 value refers to deve!ou_ (area )
_/ superscript * refers to 10% level of significance.
"** refers to 5% level of significance.
•** refers to 1% level of significance.
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Floro shows that such loans arise because ••the land • market• is
imperfect. • Credit thus becomes a means of expanding one•'s land
or one's excess to the fruits of another person's land. Farmer-
lenders motive is• precisely this, thus his interest • rate
structure is opposite to that of the trader-lender. Lower land-
size and lower income farmers, who have high default ris k , are
given lower effective interest rates (•see Table III.7).
Farmer-lender loans are found to be the most flexible. They
accomodate loan requests at any time of the production period
and allow ro•ilo•vers•and rescheduling of loans. These easy terms
permit small farmers to accumulate enough debt so that eventually
the farmer-lender can force a land mortgage. The description of
the trader-lender's and the farmer-lender's behaviors reminds one
of the literature of predatory pricing.
Land as primary motive of the farmer lender'is not as
conclusive. Ferrer's anthropological work points to other
benefits the farmer-lender may get from lending to desperate
farmers. New "feudal" ties seem to be in the making as farmers
are made to render household and farm services(although often
with compensation) to the farmer-lender as well as to oversee his
land. The development of what Ferrer cal•Is "the debt nexus" in
the agricultural activities (particularly in rice production)
focuses on the need to study the agricultural credit system •in
conjunction with the overall technological changes, product and
facto_ markets in the rural areas as well as the shifting
relations of production and exchange there.
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Table III.7
Results of Least-Squares Regression Analysis
Farmer-Lender Loans_ All HoUseholds
Wet Season, 1983-84 _/
MCDEL Depencant Emplanatory ¢_efficients F-dis_ri A_jus%ed
Variable Varifies (t-values)_/ bution at Me=.n
(at k-l,n-k R_
degrees of
fr_)
I 19.713_/ Constant -13.482" 4.91 0.08
(interest} (-1.85) (2,96 d.f.)
Income_/ 3_975**,
(2.S5}
_J z.sz3
(0.71).
IX 19.713_ Ccmstant 18.H28"** 5.27**" 0.09
(interesn} (11.42) (2,96 d_f.)
Default
cateG/ -__320"-*
(-2.97)
Azea(;;V 3.053
(!.22)
IXX 6_33C,/ Constant 7.710*_* 4.57 0.16
(loan size} (3.66) (3,96 d,_.)
Income(./ -a_7
(-1.22)
Def_u!t_J "0-_i0"*"
rate (2.51)
._ead,/ 0.89","
(-2.s4)
_/ There are 107 farmer-lenoer loans. However, _ue to missing
values, only 99 and 89 observations are used respec_ive!y.
_ manuhly ratain natural logari_.hm.
_/ dOmu_y variable whereby 0 value refers to _eveloped (a:ea)
_/ superscript * refers to i0% level of significance, "" refers to 5%
level of significance, and -** refers to 1% level of significance.
89
The cohtroversy that rages here is important. The Ohio
State University researchers and the World Bank havepushed for
channeling funds to informal lenders because they are more
efficient and use interlinked markets to reduce transaction and
risk costs. In fact, this is already done here in te
Philippines, although to a limited, extent (see below).
Furthermore, there are signs that there have been a lowering of
interest rates in the informal sector after the introduction of
the Green Revolution technology (see Table III.8). The fall in
informal interest rates can be explained by the use of more
suppliers of loans such as the rural banks, traders, input
dealers, farmer-lenders, rice millers, storeowners, etc., who
responded to the increase in the demand for loans due to the high
input-content of the new technology. This is further verified as
studies show that interest rates are lower in areas where the
Green Revolution technology has been applied most.
But perhaps an equally important issue is that raised by
the surplus school, particularly the work of Floro. For here it
is pointed out that efficiency and equity are two different
objectives. Informal lenders may be efficient and may use
interlinked markets for this purpose. But, to use the jargon of
the transactions school in Industrial Organization ' the informal
lenders also own specific assets, such as warehouses, access to
capital markets and implicit franchises to the industrial inputs
to agriculture. Because of this, the resulting agreement between
9O
Table III.8
COMPARATIVE ANNUAL,INTEREST RATES ON FULLY-PAID
INFORMAL LOANS, VARIOUS STUDIES
Annual Average Interest Rate (%i
Informal
Study/Location Formal A. Inciuding - B. ExCluding
and yea_ covered (Nominal) zero inTeresT zero-interest
loans loans
Gapud, Nueva Eclja (1957-58) 12.0 98.0 126.8
Sacay, 18 provinces (1957-58) 12.0 82.0
TBAC (11978-79) 12.0 53.5 73.7 "
Bulacan 12.0 32_5
Cama_ines Su_ 12.0 .50.7
Isabela 12.0 83.3
TBAC, Nationwide (.1981-82.) i_3 48.2 76.1
Soumce: Sacay, Agabin and Tanchoco. Small Far_er Credit Dilemma, 1985.
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lender and borrower usually puts the borrower at a very weak
bargaining position, and thus a great portion of his welfare and
even his precious land may be lost in the process. In fact, the
process of vertical integration wherein the creditor goes into
the area of trading, milling, and selling is very similar to the
transaction costs school's explanation of the vertical
•integration process of large multinational firms (Williamson,
Teece) .
Another unexplored area, therefore, in both the theoretical
and empirical field, is the establishment of cooperatives to
answer the imperfect markets in the rural areas. Just like the
informal lenders, credit cooperatives can interlink markets,
particularly the product, credit and factor markets. Efficiency
may be achieved just as in the interlinking of markets by the
landlords and traders. But this has an added feature since small
farmers the_nselves own the cooperatives, thereby increasing their
access to institutional capital, financial and trading markets.
The history of government-inspired credit and marketing
cooperatives have been a dismal failure so far (see Castillo
[1983]). But there are various instances of private initiatives
in credit unions and cooperatives that have worked. The story of•
cooperatives In•Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are far rosier • and
more encouraging than our experience. In the main, it seems that
the essential variables that affect credit cooperatives ability
to succeed are:
i. The level of • education and organizing that is done to
instill in the farmer a sense of belongingness and
9_
loyalty tQ the institution (which translates to prompt
payment of dues and obligations, productive use of
loans, etc.).
R. The effective use of technical assistance and access to
formal institutions•
3. The link of other agrarian reforms with cooperative
institutions to ensure that the benefits of reforms will
be felt by the small farmer.
3. Transaction Costs of Formal and Informal Lenders
J
BOth private formal and informal lenders may have various
motives for lending. But the most common objective is to
maximize profits. For lenders, the profit margin is the
difference between the lending rate and the total cost of
lending. The latter may be decomposed into effective costs of
funds and transaction costs. Since a greater part of the
effective cost of funds, i.e., interest on borrowed funds or
deposits, is exogenous to the lender, attention will therefore
be focused on transaction costs.
Big banks usually shy away from small agricultural loans
because of high transaction costs. Consider for example this
representative view:
"An average loan officer can perhaps handle a portfolio of
_80 million to _i00 million pesos. If his clients are medium-
sized commercial or industrial companies with loans averagZng
about _ million, the officer would be handling between 16 to 20
accounts. To reac_ the same loan volume, for sugar producers who
average _5 hectares and who each require about _200,000 per year,
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the same loan officer• would have to handle about 400 accounts.
When one considers corn producers, who average perhaps I0
hectares and require about _0,000 per crop cycle in loans, the
officer would have to handle as many as 1,600 individual _accounts
to achieve a volume of _80 millions Clearly these numbers of
agricultural clients, to be adequately serviced, require a
greater number of staff, meaning more overhead for the bank. The
bank considering making agricultural loans therefore would either
_hy away or have to be satisfied with a lower margin per peso
loaned • due to the higher overhead." (Dominguez [198_]).
To service small clients, however, small banks apply
/
different technology which is less sophisticated than that of big
banks. For instance, they do not hire high-paying bank
managers/loan officer as big banks do. In most cases, managers
of small rural banks and informal moneylenders know almost
everybody in their locality. Moreover, economic activities are
less heterogeneous in rural areas than in urban areas. Less
efforts will therefore have to be exerted by rural lenders in
doing credit investigation. This helps bring down transaction
costs of small lenders•in the rural areas to an acceptable level.
•Saito and Villa nueva •(1981) estimated transaction costs of
•some, of• the financial institutions in the Philippines.
•.•Transaction costs were broken down into administrative costs and
defaultrisk expenses. As expected, transaction costs decline as
the size of the loan recipient increases (see Table III.9).
Among those that catered to small-scale agriculture, rural banks
appear to have the • lowest transaction costs, but this is because
of the special guarantee arrangement provided to them by the
•Central Bank which •• in •effect reduces default risk expenses.
In one of their conclusions, Saito and Viilanueva pointed out
that lending to small-scaie sector could be feasible if the
4
Table 111.9
Transaction Costs of Lending By Institution and B_
Activity and Size of Recipient (In % of
Outstanding LOan in Each Category)•
Adminis- Default
trative Risk
Costs Expenses
Cl) (2)
Small-scale agriculture:
Rural banks 3.5 2.0
Dev. Bank of the Phils. 3•.9 3.4
Private development banks 3.0 3.R
Small-scale industry:
Dev. Bank of the Phils. 3.0 2.5
Private Development
Corp. of the Phils. 3.0 •• 3.7
Private dev. banks 4.0 _.3
Large-scale industry:
•Dev. Bank of the Phils. 0.5 1.3
Private Development
Corp. of the Phils. "0.2 _.3
Commercial banks 0.4 1.7
Source_ K.A.Saito and D.P.Villanueva (1981)
9_
interest rate charged is sufficiently high tO cover these costs.
This readily fits into the framework.of GOnzales-Vega discussed
in the previous chapter. In the case of DBP which charged low
interest rate to small-scale sector, cross-s_bsidization occurred
from large - to small-scale sector. The Gonzales-Vega model
predicts that this kind of arrangement'generates a dead-weight
loss to society. In addition, the same model predicts that the
lower the interest-rate ceiling, the greater the tendency for
banks to ration small borrowers. Indeed, the tendency of
commercial banks to shy away from small agricultural loans can be
interpreted in this manner. Even among farmers, the larger ones
especial_y landowners _ and amortizing owners are given better
access to credit by rural financial institutions than smaller
ones (NEDA [1986]).
TBAC (1983) did similar analysis using data from six "good"
rural banks, and the results are more or less the same as those
obtained by Saito and Villanueva (see Table III.lO).
The transaction COSTS of informal moneylenders reflect the
real transaction costs of lending to farmers. Unlike rural
banks, informal moneylenders have simple lending procedures and
very minimal paper work. They are required to hire "qualified"
loan officer to deal with borrowers. Therefore, their
administrative costs are not artificially increased. Instead,
their flexibility allows them to reduce administrative costs.
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Table III.lO
Transaction Costs of Formal and InformalLenders
(In percent)
Formal Lenders Informal
TBAC Saito/Villanueva Lenders
Administrative Costs 4.15 3.50 4.12
Default Risk Expenses 1.06 2.00 2.97
Total Transaction Costs 5.21 5.50 7.09
a/
Based on the weighted average of the cost of supervised and
regular agricultural loans.
b_/
Refers to rural banks' lending to small-scale agriculture.
Sources: (i) TBACL A study on Selected Rural Banks Partici-
pating in the supervised Credit Programs (1983).
(2) Katrine Anderson Saito and :Delano p. Villanueva L
Transactions Costs of Credit to the Small-scale
Sector in the Philippines (1981).
(3) T_AC, AStudy on the Informal Rural Financial
Markets in Three Selected Provinces in the
Phil ippines (_i_8i__).
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Infornta± moneylenders' low administrative cost can be
outweighed by default risk expenses. It %s to be noted that
agricultural ventures have inherently higher risks. Unlike rural
banks, informal moneylenders do not have insurance or special
guarantee arrangement provided by the Central Bank for their
loans. 'They are therefore bound to Have higher default risk
expenses, thereby causing their transaction costs to be very
high. But there are other ways to reduce their default risk
expenses. One example is interlinking credit tO the factor and
product markets.
TBAC (198[) analyzed the transaction costs of informal
moneylenders (see Table III.10). Surprisingly, the actual
ad_inistrative costs incurred by informal moneylenders are almost
the same as those incurred by rural banks. The extra effort
exerted by informal moneylenderS in reducing loan defaults could
have increased their administrative costs. The actual default
risk expenses incurred by informal moneylenders are higher than
those incurred by rural banks. They must have been catering to
h_gh risk borrowers who are not normally accomodated by formal
lending institutions. However, even with these, relatively higher
default risk expenses, they are still low considering the
inherent riskiness of agricultural ventures. In fact, the
expected defaultrisk expenses of informal moneylenders was 14.6
percent which is considerably higher than actual default risk
expenses of 3 percent. This resulted in higher "extra" profits
or unusual monopoly profits for informal moneylenders.
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Whether informal moneylenders consistently overestimate the
default rate over a period of time to produce those "extra"
profits is indeed an open question. Ghate (1985) thinks that the
crop in the survey year was unexpectedly and significantly
better than usual, hence, £he big difference between expected and
actual default risk expenses. On the other hand, there se_s to
be some evidence showing that informal moneylenders enjoy
"monopoly profits. " Quinones (1982 ) and TBAC' s
A Study on the Informa ! RuralFinancial Mark_ets in Three Selected
Provinces Of the Philippines (1981) both look at the same three
provinces and estimated lenders' charges in the informal market.
Table III.ll measures the administrative cost and risk premium
that would be needed for •an informal lender to break-even (with
zero opportunity cost of capital). Note that ironically, the
"break-even" rate is higher for more "progressive" areas like
Bulacan than more "backward" ones like Isabela mainly due to
better repayment rates in Isabela.
The TBAC study calculates the annual interest rate on an
informal loan in the three provinces based on "at the time the
loan was granted," and "at the time the loan was actually paid"
(See Table III.12). "Hidden" charges were mainly underpricing
from the market price of output commodities that are used as
payment in kind.
It is a little difficult to analyze the result since it
gives an "ex-ante" estimate and an "ex-post" estimate. There
are, however some points that will have to be raised.
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Table IIIi.ll
Break-even inZeres_ charges of Private Moneylenders (PMLs)
based on full knowledge of borrrower's
repaymenZ perfor_uance
BREAK-EVEN
PROVINCE REPAYMENT ADMINISTRATIVE RISK INTERES2
RATE COST PREMIUM CHARGE*
_lacan 70.0 1.78 43.62 45.4
Isabela 83.0 4.54 21.41 26.05
Camarines Sur 76.0 5.29 32.34 37.63
*Assumes_that PML does not take into account a profit component
in detemmining h_s inte_esteharges.
SOURCE: Quinones, Benjamin. Explaining Vamiationsin Interest Rates
in Rumal Financial Markets, Unpublished Mastem's Thesis_ 1982,
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i. Quinones and the ex-ante" estimate show high informal
rates mainly due to high risk premium. But the "ex-
post" result and TBAC's own results show that repayment
comes late and as Quinones himself admits all
uncollected loans are virtually recovered after 18
months from the date of loan release. The risk Premium
that is calculated for both studies seem to be grossly
overestimated since it is based on repayment rates (see
Table III.ll). The calculation of the real cost of
risk should include only those borrowers who are
expected not to pay after 18 months, plus some
opportunity cost for the late dues.
2. The "hidden" cost of underpricing output is significant
particularly in Isabela (considered a low-income area).
This does not even include the underpricing of inputs.
In the ex-post estimate (assuming opportunity cost of
capital is 15 percent) this hidden cost and explicit
6
extra "profits" are quite high. If, as Quinones says
almost all loans are recovered after 18 months, then
the amount Of extra ,profits" is indeed high (unless
the opportunity cost of 15 percent is grossly
underestimated). The debate therefore as to whether
"monopoly profits" exist in the informal sector is far
from over. Table III.13 is from a TBAC study which
shows that a majority of informal credit (60 percent)
exceeds the borrowing cost of M-99 credit program (34.2
percent). Thirty-three percent of informal loans are
lOR
Table Ill. 13
. INDICATORS OF EXTENT OF "USURIOUS" LENDING FROM INFO_AL
SOURCES, BY VARIOUS NORMS, FULLY-PAID LOANS
(In % of .No. of Loans)
-- ,, c
" 1"957-58 1978-79
Gapud a/ TBACa /
(N,= 22_) (N = 1,260)
I, In excess of legal _ate (1_%) 71.5 72.0
If. In excess of actual lending cost 67.1 67.9
(22.1%)
;II:° In excess of anticipa_ed cost• . . •
•(36.6%) 5g:.5 57.9
IV. I_ excess Of fammem's _bozTowlnK
cost wltb Bank (3_.0%) 62.6_b/ 50_0
V. Loans with interest_ #ate
above 75% _9.0 32.7
a--/Averageinterest Tare en informal loans, excluding nonintere_
foams, is 126o 8 percent pe_ ann_.
--]_Estimated f-Peru.Gapud' s data.
C/Calculated fmom maw data, TBAC, A Study on the Informal RuPal
Financial Mamkets using .Im.260fully-paid loans,
Source: Sacay, Agabin,. Yancheco Small Fax_em Credit Dilemma, 198!
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higher than 75 percent rate of interest. Thiseven as
most analyses of the new rural financial school insists
that informal credit reduces transaction costs and risk
premium. The question is of course far fromsettled
since the formal sector's rates are highly subsidized
and does not reflect the true market rate of credit.
One thing, however, is clear. In more backward areas such
as Isabela, repayment rates are higher and loan losses lower (see
Tables III.ll and III.l_). Interest rates charged, however, are
higher making "extra profits" much stronger in Isabela. This
supports the contention that depressed areas or low income g@oups
are charged higher interest rates; but then not necessarily due
to higher risk in default. The higher interest charged in
Isabela and Camarines Sur as opposed to the more "progressive"
Bulacan may point to the possibility that informal credit is more
competitive in the latter province than in the more "backward"
areas. This means that competition among informai moneylenders
and perhaps even between formal and informal credit would exist
in the more dynamic and growing rural areas. "Monopoly profits"
may still characterize loans in the moredepressed areas.
Indeed, the issue whether the high interest rate charged by
informal moneylenders refl_cts their monopoly power Or the high
transaction costs of lending to riskier borrowers is far from
being settled. This is one area where further research is
needed.
104
Recently, a nun_er of big private banks have intensified
their lending operations in the rural areas either by opening up
more branches or buying subsidiary banks operating in the rural
areas. A study of their transaction costs for lending to
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors is certainly of
paramount importance for optimal policy intervention.
4. Rural Banks and Cost of Funds
As discussed in Chapter II, Tolentino (1986) pointed out
that the existence of small banks can be explained by the fact
that they can obtain the best returns on their investment by
remaining in banking, given the rules of the game. This seems to
be supported by the results of the TBAC studies (1983 and 1984)
on the behavior of six "good" rural banks. Non-agricultural
loans are the costliest type of loan since they are mainly
financed by deposit funds (see Table III.14). Non-supervised
agricultural loans are the second costliest type of loans since a
modest proportion of it is financed by deposits and the rest by
rediscounted funds at relatively higher rediscount
rates. Supervised loans have the least cost since almost all of
them are financed by rediscounted funds at very concessionary
rediscount rate. They yielded the highest profit margins to rural
banks. Understandably, rural banks concentrated on this type of
loan. In r983, 60 percent of the loan portfolio of six "good"
banks were supervised agricultural loans. Non-supervised
agricultural loans comprised about 30 percent. The remaining I0
percent went to non-agricultural loans. The generally tight
10B
Tabie 111.14
Cost of Lending, Returns on Lending andNet Margins of
Six "Good Rural Banks,.1983 and 1984
Agricultural Non-Agricultural
Supervised Regular
A. Total Cost
iof Lending
1983 8.60 11.50 13.60
1984 ii.8_ 13.00 20.10
I. Cost of
Funds
1983 3.50 6.10 7.40
1984 4.76 7.30 13.6_
2. Adminis-
trative
Costs
1983 4.24 3.82 3.18
1984 6.86 _.70 6.43
7. Risk
Expenses
1983 0.90 1.60 3.00
1984 0.20 - 0.01
B. Returns on
Lending
1983 i0.0 10.3 i0.50
1984 13.60 17.33 20.73
C. Net Margins
1983 1.40 (i. 20) (3. i0)
1984 1.78 0.41 0.63
Sources: (i) TBAC, A Study on Selected Rural Banks Participa-
ting in the Supervised Credit Programs (_1983).
(2) TBAC, Follow-up Report on the Six "Good" Rural
Banks Participating in the Supervised Credit
Programs (1984)
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credit situation in 1984 caused a perceptible upward change in
both the cost of funds and the transaction costs of rural banks,
but it did not change their cost structure. Hence, banks did not
also alter the composition ,of their loans. There was, however, a
scaling down of the volume of loans as a result of the reduced
rediscounted funds.
5. Interest Rate Differentials Between Formal and
Informal Loans
m , , ,,
Before the change in rediscounting policy, the interest
rate differential between the formal and informal loans was 9ery
substantial, with the latter being 4 to 7 times higher than the
former, depending of course on which survey data are being
referred to. For example, a TBAC study(1984) showed that_
informal lenders charged 76 percent per annum while rural banks
charged only 14 percent per annum because of the loan rate
ceiling on funds sourced by banks from the Central Bank. After
the change in rediscounting policy, lending rate on rediscounted
funds went up to as high as 34 percent in December 1984 _ (TBAC
[1985]). In view of the absence of information about the
informal credit market af£er the change in the rediscounting
policy, it is not known whether the interest rate differential
between the infQrmal and informal loans has remained the same,
narrowed down, or has widened, although with the interest rate
liberalization, narrowing of _ the differential is most likely
expected. If the narrowing down of interest rate differential
'_did not occur,, then perhaps:the segmentation hypothesis is still
In7
at work in the rural financial markets. This is anothe
interesting area for research.
It should be noted here that borrowers are not interested i
the nominal lending rate charged by formal and informal lenders
Rather, they are interested in access to and the effective cos
of borrowing from alternative sources. This topic will b
further discussed below.
6. Relationship Between Formal and Informal Lenders
How do formal and informal lenders view each other? Th
commonly-held view is that they are competitors, The decline i
the importance of informal credit market concomitant with th
proliferation of formal rural financial institutions in the 70
is oftentimes Cite_ as evidence to support this view. But on
has to closelM examine the emergence of rural banks befor
accepting this evidence at face value. Many local moneylender
were lured by the Central Bank to establish a bank (Saito an
/ Villanueva [1981]), so that funds that used to be directly ien
to borrowers were eventually coursed through the rural banks. I
certain cases, owners of rural banks were also found to b
informal moneylenders (TBAC [1980]). Given also the fact tha
there is tremendous excess demand for credit in the rural secto
and a considerable degree of segmentation, it is indeed difficul
to accept the view that formal and informal moneylenders ar
competitors. They could be doing some complementary roles in th
rural credi£ markets. For instance, TBAC (198_) found out tha
formal lenders extended b_gger loans meinly for productiv
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purposes, while informal moneylenders lent smaller loans
including consumption loans, probably to complement the credit
needs of borrowers that cannot be fully met by formal lenders due
#
tO the prescribed loan ceiling and other rigid regulations that
prohibit formal lenders from fully satisfying the loan demand of
borrowers. Also, the same study shows that formal lenders
provided farmers long-term loans (about 7 - IR months), while
informal lenders gave short-term loans (less than 7 months).
Perhaps, both have carved out their own niche in the rural credit
markets, sometimes complementing each other, and sometimes
operating independently of each other.
The pieces of evidence we have cited above are still
rudimentary. A study aimed at determining whether formal and
informal lenders in the rural sector are competitors or are doing
complementary roles should be done in the future in view of the
significance of the results to policy making.
The link between formal and informal moneylenders has
recently caught the attention of many researchers. There are
various channels through which they can be linked. As already
mentioned above, the rural banker/informal moneylender channel is
one of them. Some informal moneylenders borrowed from their own
bank to exploit extraordinary profit opportunities arising from
the cheap r@discounting policy of the Central Bank (Quinones
[1981]). In this case, informal moneylenders re'priced the loans
so as to reflect _heir real opportunity cost. Thus, there would
be less _ tendency for borrowers to misallocate borrowed funds.
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The same thing was observed by Cole and Park (1983) in Korea.
However, the attendant equity issue, that has been raised in this
regard is indeed unsettling. This adds more worries to those who
espouse the "surplus" approach.
Aside from the rural banker/informal moneylender channel,
Quinones has also described other channels. These are briefly
summarized in the matrix below. About half of the sample
respondents included in Quinones' study belonged to the upper two
cells. The last cell denotes absence of relationship between
formal and informal lenders.
Depositor Non-depositor
Borrower 1 2
Non-borrower 3 4
Rural financial institutions can innovate by mimicking the
behavior of informal moneylenders. However, bank regulations
prohibit them from doing so. For instance, they cannot interlink
credit with the input and output markets. Another is that they
cannot receive loan repaymentsand deposits outside the bank
premises, although this was recently resorted to by some banks to
i
improve their repayment rate in the wake of the economlc crisis
(TBAC [1984]). One innovative technique that has received
official sanction is the strengthening of the link between formal
and informal lenders, in which case the bank is the wholesale
creditor and the informal moneylender, the retail creditor. The
Grains Quedan Special Financing Program of the government and the
ii0
special credit program of the Planters Products, inc., a semi-
private firm, have these features. In this arrangement, the
financial institution is able to reduce administrative costs and
eliminates the risk of default.
Another scheme being tried by a handful of banks is the
integration of credit delivery and savings mobilization. This is
a scheme followed in the integrated Rural Financing Program
(IRF). The IRF Technical Committee selected ten rural banks to
be conduits of IRF funds. The loan repayment rate and the
results of savings mobilization have been very impressive
(Tumbali [1985]). However, the criteria used in selecting pilot
banks seem to be biased towards those banks Which are mainly
catering to 'Bankable" clients. The experiments could have been
more useful if a wider variety of rural banks, ranging from
strong to weak banks, wer_ included.
One common denominator in these schemes is that they are
government-inspired and are heavily dependent on government
financial support. One has yetto examine innovative techniques
which are genuinely devised by rural banks themselves and do not
involve substantial government subsidies. As the government
phases out its subsidies, the experience of these innovative
banks can perhaps serve as a guidepost.
As mentioned at the outset, studies on rural credit focus on
agricultural credit. In view of the growing importance of non-
agricultural activities as a source of rural incomes, future
studies should cover both agricultural and non-agricultural
iii
lending. Perhaps, possibilities for portfolio diversification
on the part of lenders and borrower_ can be examined in these
stud ies.
Savings mobilization by formal lenders is one area not well
discussed in the literature. This is understandable since most
banks, especially those engaged in agricultural lending, were
very much dependent on Central Bank rediscounted funds. With the
freeing of the interest rate and the Change in rediscounting
policy, savings mobilization will become an important activity of
rural financial institutions. Studies should be made to examine
innovative techniques applied by some rural financial
institutions. Certainly, some banks have already made some
adjustments in their lending and savings mobilization policies to
adapt to the new policy environment.
Finally, the behavior of other types of formal lenders, like
thrift banks and branches of commercial banks operating in the
rural areas, should be studied. The study may focus on financial
intermed iat ion costs (i .e., costs incurred by lenders in
servicing deposits and other funds, and in handling loan
transactions) of various types of banks operating in the rural
areas is called for. Perhaps, the model of Cuevas and Graham
(1983) can be applied here to test some hypotheses that have
direct bearing on financial policy. In addition, it would be
worthwhile to see whether lenders really compete with each other
or they operate in segmented markets.
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B. Savinq in the Philippines and in the Rural Sector
This section reviews empirical studies on saving behavior in
the Philippines. Earlier, Tan (1980) lamented the lack of
studies on saving behavior in the Philippines and in the rural
sector. Since then, a few studies have appeared in the
literature. Unfortunately, however, the recent literature on
saving behavior did not put to restsome of the important issues
raised by earlier studies. These unsettled issues will be
pointed out in the course of the review.
This section is divided into three parts. The first part
reviews studies dealing with the determinants of aggregate
household national saving rate. The second part discusses
results of studies on financial Saving. The third and last part
reviews studies which focus on saving in the rural sector.
I. Persoqal/Household Saving Rate
¢
Net domestic savings in the national income accounts is just
the difference between total income and total consumption during
a particular reference period, say a year. It may come from
three main groups, namely households or individuals, corporations
and government. In view of the main thrust of this paper,
household or personal saving rate will be given more importance.
The reason is that financial innovations will have greater impact
on household saving than on corporate or government saving.
Table III.15 presents the composition of net domestic
savings in the Philippines for the period 1970-85. The ratio of
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Table III.15
Net Domestic Savings, 1970 - 85
(In _M at Current Prices)
Total Net Net Domestic Personal
Domestic Persons Corpo- Govern- Savings Savings
Savings rations ment GNP GNP
(4) (4)
1970 5,067 2,916 1,142 1,009 12.4 7.1
(100.0) (57.6) (22.5) (19.9)
197S 17,882 11,074 3,185 3,623 15.6 9.7
(100..0) (61.9) (17.8) (20.3)
1980 43,772 15,280 14,_24 13,968 16.6 5.8
(i00.0) (34.9) (33.2) (31.9)
1985 44,844 8,090 12,076 24-,678 7.4 1.4
(100.0) (18.0) (26.9) (55.1)
7
Note: Figures in parenthesis are percent of total net domestic savings.
Source: National Income Accounts, NEDA (various years).
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net domestic saviDgs to GNP had been slowly rising. But it
dropped precipituously in 1985 ks a result of the economic crisis
that started during the early part of the 80s. Historically,
household savings comprised a major portion of total domestic
savings. This pattern was broken in the 80s when the share of
corporate and government savings surpassed that of household
savings. About this period, the ratio of personal savings to GNP
also declined. Note that in the early 80s, the Philippines
encountered economic crisis. Indeed, the burden of the economic
crisis fell more heavily on households.
Data from the national income accounts do not tell us which
households are saving or dissaving. Such information is provided
by the Family Income and Expenditures Survey (FIES). This survey
is conducted rather less frequently: 1961, 1965, 1971 and 1985.
Note that data on household savings generated by FIES are not
directly comparable with those derived from the n_tional income
accounts. In the FIES, the sample units refer to families.
Private non-profit and unincorporated institutional households
are not included in the sample.
Table III.16 gives the saving rates of various income
classes. The figures are based on the 1985 FIES preliminary
report. Dissaving occurs among families whose average annual
income is below _15,000. Dissavers comprise about 34 percent of
the entire sample. As expected, the saving rate increases as
family income increases.
llg
Table III. 16
Family Saving Rates by Income Classes, 198%
Income Classes Philippines Urban Rural
Under R,O00 -0.32 -0.78 -0.21
2,000 - 3,999 -0.36 -0.86 -0.30
4,000 - 5,999 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22
6,000 - 7,999 -0.14 -0.17 -0.14
8,000 - 9,000 .-0.08 -0.12 -0.07
i0,000 - 14,999 -0.02 -0.07 -0.01
15,000 - 19,999 0.03 -0.02 0.04
20,000 - 29,999 0.05 0.02 0.07
30,000 - 39,999 0.i0 0.08 0.12
40,000 - 59,999 0.13 O.ll 0.16
60,000 - 99,999 0.17 0.15 0.23
i00,000 - 249,999 0.24 0.21 0.36
2_0,000 - 499,999 0.32 0.33 0.24
500,000 and over 0.65 0.64 0.80
Total 0.13 0.16 0.I0
Total No. of Families 95,663 36,024 %9,639
Source of Basic Data: NCSO 1985 Fimily Income •and Expen_ditures
Survey, Philippines (Preliminary Report)
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In view of our interest in rural savings, we have
disaggregated the saving rates of urban and rural households.
Dissaving occurs among urban families whose average annual income
falls below _20,000. For rural families, dissaving occurs if the
average annual family income is below _15,000. The differential
cut-off income class could be due to the relatively high cost of
living in urban areas compared to that in rural areas. Note,
however, that about 45 percent of the rural families were
dissaving compared to only 28 percent of the urban families.
One empirical regularity that can be observed from Table
III.16 is that the saving rate of rural households is higher than
that of urban households belonging to the same income bracket
(except the income bracket _250,000 - _499,999). The same thing
has been observed in India. Indeed, this has a far reaching
implication. Improving rural incomes will have greater positive
effect on overall saving rate than improving u.rban incomes.
Thus, policies aimed at improving rural incomes should be pursued
more vigorously. This conclusion should however be taken with
great caution. So far, there is no theoretical explanation why
the saving rate is higher for rural households than for urban
households. This area certainlyneeds more research to determine
factors that make the differential saving rates.
Now to studies on the determinants of personal saving
rate. That income determines personal saving rate has
been generally agreed upon. The controversy lies mainly on
whether the personal/household saving rate is responsive to
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interest rate. . This is a very crucial policy issue because if
the interest rate has a positive effect on the saving rate, then
a high interest rate policy would be justified to increase the
saving rate, The results of these studies are summarized in
Table III.17. Some studies using poole_ time series data are
included here because they include t_e Philippines in the sample.
Invar£ably, the studies include inco,ne and interest rate
variables as determinants of personal saving rate. Note that the
data on personal savings used in these studies come from the
national income accounts. They were derived using the residual
method. The FIES househol_ saving data would have been ideal for
these studies, however, su£[iciently long time series data are
not available because the surveys were conducte_ less frequently.
The earliest work on the determinants of personal saving
rate is that o_ Williamson (1968). Individual and pooled time
series data of five countries were analyzed in the study. The
results snow that real personal income per capita has a
significant positive effect on real personal savings per capita,
while real rate o£ interest does not have any effect on the
same variable. T_e results have been verified by the studies of
Van Atta (1971), Me3ia (1979) and Tan (1984). (Tan's study which
used semestral data, yielded the poorest results. Even income
was found to have no significant effect on personal savings.)
Interestingly, the Van Atta study covered the period when the
market rates of interest were considered below the interest-rate
ceilings, while the Tan study covered the period when the market
rates of interest were thought to be way above the interest-rate
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Table 111.17.
Ilmdts, _f Studies I_i_ [stinted, Pmsmul Swiu_Fen_im
Author(s) Year Period Type of bfinition of Imdemmkmt
Published Covered Data Saving Rate Vm._ables
Millimmon 1968 1950 -64 , Imlividual ileal pe,_._l h Ileal Peyotl
countries and savings per i_ 0er
Pooled tim capita, capita (S)
_q-leslnnual
(Countriest _. RNI Rate of
Burm_ Jam_ interest (J_)
Phil ipgi_ssw
Taimn).
Van ntta 1971 1947 - 67 Tim mwin- Real peesoul 1. _ml diupouble
amwal savi_s i_ae (S)
•- 2. Real rate of
intermt o_
uvimgs deposit (NS)
Nejia 1979.. Time Ire'iN- Savinlls ratio h _aiMl interest
aNmal rate iNS)
2. J_l i_erut
rate iNS)
Bm.k_e 1980 1_ - 77 Ties series- Real personal 1. Rsal diwo_ble
• annual savings per i_m iS)
capita. _. Nosi_l ties
ck_oositrate (S)
3. J_tA tim deposit
rate iS)
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Table IlL 17 (co.t'd)
_ho_(s) Year Peeiod Type of Defiaitio_ of INle_mMimt
Published Coveted I)ata Saving Rate Variables
Taa 19e5 1970 - 8_ Tim swiss- 1. National' 1. 6ross Natioyml
seuest_sl savim]s peoduct (NS)
ratio 2. Real eatbof
intarnt o_
.oee,-year tim
_,_osit ira)
3, N,sm. of b.a_tm
of fiMncial
t_t itqt ions (NS).
2. Psr,sonal 1, Gross _d_/o_l
Savi_s Peodeet (NS}
_atio t. Rsal eate of iMe-
eest on om-_ar
tim Osoosits iNS)
3. Huron.of b.a_ht.s
of financial
inst itutiows (U}
_B 1985 1961..- 03 Pooled tim 6ross _tional* I. bte of _v_th in
sovies-a__.i Savi_ ratio eeal 6NP.
(Co,.tries: P.. Reel _te of
6a_ladnh t Intwist o_ o_-
9urn, China, ymertim dnosit
HongY_ng,Ihdiai (S)
Indonesia,South 3. heal population
•Koreatl_laysis, m' _I lwamch
Nepal_ pukista_ of OUosltory
Phi Iippimm inst itut ions.
Singal]o_I Sri-
La.ka),
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•Table I11.17 (con(id)-
Author(e) Yesr Period Typeof bfinition of : |N_.,p_
I_bltlhed C_vm_d kta " _ving hte VriiOles
6iovannini 1565 1562 - 72 Pooled time Domestic 1. Rate of grmKh
reties-annual uvi_ in real 61@ (8)
,. (Countrimis ratio P- Rml _te of inte-
Bur_ Indiab rut on orrlnNe
South_ tins dep_it ()iS)
Palay_ia,
Philippine_
Simjajxx_
Taimn)
1_ - 75 Pooled tim i)oeestic t. Pate-of _h
(larger aries-artful lavino in mi 6t_o (S)
smpl_ (Cmmtries: ratio 2, Ibalrateof iMe-
period) Duma, India, rest o_ orryer
" Sosth Korea, tim im_it (16)
_laysia,
Philippines,.
Singapore,
Taimn)
Note:. S_e studies have other independent variables not included in the table abovL S -
statistical.ly significant; NS-not statistically eiptificant.
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ceilings. This seems to indicate that Williamson's findings were
robust. This is indeed disturbing to those who believe that
financial liberalization can greatly improve the saving rate in
LDCs.
Burkner (1980) re-examined the saving function in the
Philippines. He used a longer time period, 1950-77, which
included the years when the usury legislation was not operative
and the years when it placed an effective limit on interest rate
charged. Burkner used the rate of interest on time deposits
instead of the rate of interest on savings deposits which Van
Atta used. Tan used the rate of interest on time deposits in her
study, but she used semestral data. Burkner's results show that
an increase in the interest rate level, either in nominal or in
real terms, has a significant positive effect on the level of.
personal savings. This finding contradicts the results provided
by the studies mentioned earlier. It seems that results of
testing the hypothesis regarding the interest-rate elasticity of
personal saving rate are sensitive to the length of the data
series, the interest rate to be used and to the type of time
series data, i.e., whether semestral or annual.
Fry (1978), a strong supporter of the financial
liberalization approach advanced by McKinnon, tested a saving
function using pooled time series data of seven Asian countries,
including the Philippines, for the period 1962 -72. The study
has been expanded to linciude a total of fourteen Asian countries
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covering the period 1961 - 83. The results are incorporated in
the ADB (198_) report. BecauSe of the similarity of the Fry and
ADB studies, only the results of the latter are reported in Table
Ill.17. To reduce the problem of comparability of data series
among sample countries, gross domestic savings were used in the
ADB study. In general, results support the financial
liberalization view that higher real deposit rates of interest
directly raise the national saving rate. Increased accessibility
of depository institution branches in rural areas has similar
effect on the national saving rate. However, the magnitudes Of
the effect of these variables on national saving rate are
relatively small.
Recently, Giovannini (198_) verified the results of Fry's
study. His conclusions could apply to ADB's study as well. He
argued that the empirical success of the high interest-rate
elasticity hypothesis can be traced down to the presence of cases
of financial reforms in the sample. He then re-estimated Fry's
model but excluded Korea's 1967 and 1968 observations. The
reason for their exclusion is that the observations from the two
years following the Korean financial reform of 196% have
disproportionately large influence on the estimated parameters.
Giovannini's results have confirmed his suspicion that wit.h the
exclusion of the two observations, interest rate has no
significant effect on the saving rate. He tried to check whether
his results are robust by lengthening the data series from 196_ -
72 to 1962 - 79. The same results hold with the enlarged sample
size.
I_3
The conflicting results of the studies reviewed above
suggest • that the issue regarding the impact of an increase in
interest rates on •total savings still remains unsettled, at least
in the Philippines. In view of•the significance of the saving
function in policy making, more studies are called for. These
studies should sort out those factors that produce inconsistent
results. In addition, a study should be made to explain the
differential saving rates between rural and urban households
Delonging to the same income bracket.
2. Financial Saving
There are various forms of financial instruments with
varying yield, risk, maturity, and degree of liquidity. Among
them are cash, deposit instruments offered by banks, stock, bonds
and insurance Claims. The •bonds and equities markets are not
•well[ developed in the Philippines (see Lamberte [1985]). Thus,
•aside from cash •, only bank deposits remain an important financial
instrument in the country. A sustained and significant rise in
bank deposits is an indication of the success in financial
intermediation.
The banking system in the Philippines has been dominated by
commercial banks. Although there are only 34 commercial banks,
three-fourths of the total assets of the•banking system belong to
them. In contrast, the Rural Banking System, which consists of
about one thousand rural banks spread all over the country, owns
only 2 percent of the total assets of the banking system,
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Is financial intermediation a success in the Philippines?
The figures in Table III.18-provide an unequivocal negative
answer. The share of bank deposits to total assets of the
banking system has been declining since 1960. In 1984, deposits
comprised• only 40• percent of the total assets, down from 58
percent in 1960. It appears that intermediation of savings has
been weakening. This has occurred despite the phenomenal growth
of banking institutions during•the same period. Studies which
examined this issue were unanimous in pointing out Central Bank
policy as the culprit for the failure in financial
intermediation. In the first place, interest rates were
controlled. In addition, the Central Bank provided liquidity
credits to banks at very low rediscount rate. This made Central
Bank funds a lot cheaper than deposit funds. Thus, most banks
were transformed into mere conduits of Central Bank funds.
Several studies have examined the determinants of financial
saving. For lack of time series data on household financial
savings, bank deposits were used by these studies as proxy for
household financial savings. The weakness of•this proxy is that
it includes corporate, institutional households, and government
deposits which are held mainly for transactions purposes. The
results of these studies are sunlnarized in Table III.19. Almost
invariably, -income has a significant positive effect on financial
saving. Van Atta (1971) applied the "interest-rate elasticity"
approach and• found that nominal rate of interest on savings
deposits has a significant and positive effect on total sawings
i_.5
Table III.18
Share of Deposits to Total Assets,
Banking System 19_5 - 1984
Year %
1960 58
1965 50
1970 46
1975 34
1980 3_
1984 39
Source: Central Bank Statistical Bulletin, various years.
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Table llIo 19
Re_lts of ludies I_idl Es4imted a Financial .qaviq FunCtion
|luthor(s; Year Period Typeof Definitio_of INJepL_
Published Cover_J Data Savi,gRate Variables
VlmArts 1971 1947- 67 Tim series- TotalSavings I. Nationali_,me (S)
annual Deposits
(savi_s_im+ 2. Nominal rate of
postal depo- interest o.
sits) savings Ot_osit 1 (S)
9urlmer 19_ 196511978 Cross-sectim Total Deposits 1. Ikmbevof offices
1975, 1977 of comer- (all deposits) of each buk (S)
cial banks
Sicat 1984 197@-81 Tim series- Real fina_ial 1. Real regioeel gross
areml . savi_ (savings national product (S)
(regional) +tim de1_osits)2. _eightedtell
iwt_-r_-itra e (S/_B)
3. Regioul density of
banking i_titution
Table III.19 (cont'd)
J_sth_(s) Year " Period TF_ of I}efinitioe of IMepmdm_
Published Cov_ed Data Saving Rate Variables +
Tan I_ 1971 - 82 Tim ser/ss- I. _ I. Smestr_l real gross •
semestral Mtio_l product (_}
8. Real rate of
interest on
one.ear ties
de_itd (NS)
3. _ of offices
of financial
institutio_ (_).
2. Tim + - sam vaeiables aM
' 9avings ' fi_inos as above -
o_osits/
_P
IN 1961 -63 Pooled ties Rate of change 1. Rate of _ in
Sm-ies-am_l in per capita Per capita real
(Countries: real mmey peema_m_ income (S}
Bmngledeshw holdings (_1) 2. Real rate of inte-
Bursa, _ina, rest m one
Hcn_j(ordjlIndi_ ties deposits (S}
Indonesia_ South
Kom_ Halaysia,
Ik_a 11 Pakistan1
Philippinesl
Singapore, Sri-
La,_a)
Mote: S = statistically significant; MS= not ststistieally significant
deposits. This finding is supported by ADB's (198_) results.
The ADB model used pooled time series data of 14 Asian countries,
rate of change in per capita real money holdings (M3) as the
dependen% variable, and real rate of interest on one-year time
deposits as one of the explanatory variables.
Tan (1984) estimated a financial saving function using
semestral data for the period 1970-8_. Both the "interest - rate
elasticity" approach and "institution-elasticity" approach were
incorporated in the model. The alternative dependent variables
were M2/GNP and the (time plus savings deposits)/GNP. Semestral
real GNP, real rate of interest on one-year time deposits, and
number of offices of financial institutions were the explanatory
variables. The results were disappointing. None of the
explanatory variables has a significant effect on financial
saving. This may be taken as a rejection of both the "interest-
rate elasticity" and the "institution-elasticity" hypotheses.
Sicat (1984) tried three specifications of the financial
saving function. These were of linear, semi-logarithmic and
double-logrithmic forms using annual time series data covering
the period 1970-81. The results generallysupport the findings
of Tan. Sicat further tested his model using regional data.
With regard to the "interest-rate elasticity" hypothesis, the
results were mixed. For some regions, a significant positive
relationship between regional real financial saving and real rate
of interest exists, while for others, the relationship is not
significant. With reqard to the "institution-elasticity"
12.9
n_pothesis, almost all regions show an insignificant relationship
between regional real financial saving and regional banking
densities.
The results of Van Atta and those of Tan and Sicat seem to
be contradictory with one another. However, one must keep in
mind that the Van Atta study used time series data when the
interest-rate ceilings were virtually inoperative, while the Tan
and Sicat studies used time series data when the interest-rate
ceilings became effective. Between 1970-82, the real rate of
interest on time deposits was either negative or very low. Thus,
savers were not attracted to deposit instruments. This was
aggravated by the seeming lack of interest on the part of banks
to mobilize savings. The reason is that Central Bank funds were
a lot cheaper than deposit funds. The profit opportunities
arising from the favorable rediscounting policy Of the Central
Bank could have induced an unwanted proliferation of banking
institutions. This could partly explain why the "institution
elasticity" hypothesis is rejected.
The other reason for the rejection of the institution
elasticity hypothesis could be due to specification _ error.
Burkner (1980) pointed out that the increase in the branch
network is highly correlated with income. The Tan and Sicat
studies included both explanatory variables in their models.
Interestingly, the ADB study did not include the accesibility
variable in its financial saving function, although it was
included in its national saving function. In order to exclude
the influence of income, Burkner regressed total bank deposits
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with the number of bank offices using cross-sectiondata for the
years 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1977. His results confirm the
"institution-elasticity" hypothesis. He combined the •time
series-cross section data for 196_ and 1970 together and 1970 and
1975 together and did separate runs. He found that the
elasticity coefficient has been declining. In particular, the
opening of one additional office during the period 196% to 1970
led to additional deposits of _7 million in total deposits
whereas during the period 1970 to 197_, it would add only _3.44
million in total deposits. Both Burkner and Sicat pointed out
that the increase in •the number of offices especially in the 70s
was not accompanied by a more even regional distribution of
offices. Thus, accessibility was not widely spread to rural
areas although a phenomenal growth in branch network had
occurred. This is hardly appealing to rural folks who have fewer
investment alternatives for their surplus funds.
The main lesson that can be drawn from the results discussed
above is that theuse of single equation model to test the income
elasticity, interest-rate elasticity and institution-elasticity
hypotheses is not warranted. Perhaps, simultaneous equation
model can be explored by future studies.
Using his "financial instrument" approach, _ Burkner ('1980)
also examined the impact of other characteristics of financial
instruments other than yield and accessibility on the financial
saving rate. Concentrating on bank deposits, he noted that the
risk of deposits due to bank closure is real. However, the
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deposit insurance scheme which covered about 98 percent of •all
depositors, especially small ones, has considerably reduced the
risk due to bank failure.
With regard to information, •majority of the people were
found to be aware of the •existence of banks •and the deposits they
offer. However, small depositors do" •not have access to high-
yielding financial instruments due to the minimum deposit
requirements. Only big depositors, who do not need the
information•dr_ive, respond to interest rate changes. Therefore,
the observed increase •in the volume of •deposits towards the
second half •of the 7Os could not be • due to •the vigorous
informetion drive launched by the government, •but rather due to
other factors, such as high interest rate, expansion of branch
network and improvement in the standard of living.
Product variation is still wanting in the deposit
instruments offered by banks. Some financial instruments, like •
education trust plans that include insurance •coverage, special
credit terms, etc., hawe recently emerged, but they are
accessible only to large savers because of the high minimum
investment requirement.
3. Saving in the Rural Sector
There are at least two excellent studies dealing with the
pattern and determinants of household saving in the rural sector.
These are the TBAC-UPBRF (1979) and the TBAC-UPBRF (1981)
studies. Both extracted information from farm households
13_.
themselves. The TBAC-UPBRF (1979) study analyzed data from a
sample of 1,215 farm households. The survey was conducted in
1977. On the other hand, the TBAC'UPBRF (1981) utilized the
BAECON farm record keeping data of 127 respondents over a three
year period, 19.76 - 1978. The operational aspect of the BAECON
farm record keeping project is discussed in Rodriguez e__t all
(1979). Some of the salient points of these two studies have
been incorporated in Sacay et al. (1985).
The TBAC-UPBRF (1981) study provides very detailed saving
patterns of farm households. The income class below which
dissaving occurred _had been rising from the _2,001 - 3,000 in
1976 to the _5,001-7,500 income bracket in 1978. Interestingly,
the proportion of households who had negative savings had been
increasing from 24 percen% to 37 percent durfng the same period.
The average propensity to save (APS) ranged from 13 to 18
percent.
Looking at savings by tenure groups, the results show that
amortizing owners have the highest APS (between 27 to 38
percent), followed by full owners (see Table III.RO). As
expected, share tenants have the lowest APS. The APS was
obseryed to increase with farm size (see Table III.21). This is
to be expected since household income increases with the size of
landholdings.
A Simple Keynesian model was fitted to the cross-section
data. The value of the marginal propensity to save (MPS) ranges
between .R4 and .50. The unusually high MPS for 1978 could be due
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Table III. 20
Average Propensity Save by Tenure Group
Tenure Group 1976 1977 1978
i. Share tenant 13.4 8.5 0_6
2. Leasehold - 19.9 i0.2
3. Amortizing Owner P.8.1 35.6 26.9
4. Full Owner P.I.I 16.8 ]9._
5. Combination 18.8 2.0.2 15. I
TOTAL SAMPLE 13.5 18.4 14.1
Source: TBAC-UPBRF(1981)
Table III.2i
Average Propensity to Save and Farm Size
(In percent)
Farm Size 1976 1977 1978
(has.)
0 - 1.0 3.5 9.7 -
i.i - 2.0 4.6 27.8 0.6
2.1 - 3.0 16.3 19.0 14.2
3.1 - 4.0 17.7 29.4 25.0
4.1 - 18.0 9.9 21.8
Source : TBAC-UPBRF (1981 )
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tO the good harvest in that year. The independent variable,
household income, was disaggregated into agricultural and non-
•agricultural income. Agricultural income constitutes _3, 57, and
60 percent of • total income for the years 1976 to 1978,
respectively. Results show that the MPS out of agricultural
income is higher than the MPS out of non-agricultural income.
The probable reason given was that income from non, agricultural
activities is usually liquid, and therefore ready to spend.
The permanent income hypothesis was also tested using the
same data set. The findings consistently indicate that the MPS
out of transitory income is higher than the MPS out of permanent
income.
Other explanatory variables included in the model did not
perform as expected. Specifically, •interest rate did not have a
statistically significant effect on household saving. This
result should not be taken as an outright rejection of the
"interest-rate elasticity" hypothesis. In the first place, the
interest rate used which is the weighted average interest rate on
the loans taken out by each respondent may not necessarily
represent the return on saving. It is a variable that most
likely affects the borrower. Moreover, cross-section data would
not yield @nough variability in interest rate •across sample
units, especially if the rate is administratively fixed. Note
that in 1977, the deposit and loan rates were still
administratively fixed by the Central Bank. In short, it is very
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hard to arrive at _efinitive conclusion about the "interest-rate
elasticity" hypothesis if _the data used are cross-section.
The TBAC-UPBRF (1979) study examined the saving behavior of
farm households in a much broader •context than the TBAC-
UPBRF(1981) study. Aside from testing the Keynesian hypothesis,
the Permanent Income hypothesis, and the "interest-rate
elasticity" hypothesis as was done in the TBAC-UPBRF (1981)
L
study, the TBAC-UPBRF (1979) study also investigated the impact
of attitudinal factors on household saving behavlor. The most
interesting result is that APS is positively correlated with the
desire tO purchase seeds and/or fertilizers_ _ This may reflect
the greater role of self-financing in the rural areas. Other
motives for saving, such as for emergencies, children's
education, old age, etc., which are usually mentioned as the
primary motives for saving are not correlated with the APS.-
Aside from analyzing household saving behavior in general,
both studies also examined the pattern and determinants of
financial saving. The TBAC-UPBRF (1981) study noted that
financial assets accounted for a mere 2 percent of total assets.
Financial assets consisted only of cash, bank deposits and
loans/receivables. Bank deposits accounted _or about 40 percent
of total financial assets. However, only 24 to 30 percenf of
total farm "hohseholds had bank deposits in any given year.
Although it was revealed that high incOme farm households tend to
save money with the bank. Nonetheless, a significant proportion
of low-income farm households were found to have positive
balances with the bank.
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The ,interest-rate elasticity" hypothesis was tested by
regressing bank deposit balances of farm-households with income,
interest rate (again, proxied by the weighted average loan rate)
and other explanatory variables. Only income was found to have a
significant positive effect on bank depositbalances. Again, this
cannot be taken as an outright rejection of the "interest-rate
elasticity" hypothesis for the same reasons cited above.
The TBAC-UPBRF (1979) went further by examining the effect
of non-economic and attitudinal factors on the level of bank
deposits. It is revealed that a significant proportion of farm
households were ignorant of the true functions of financial
institutions. Specifically, many farm households did not know
that financial institutioDs in their locality also offer deposit
instruments aside from lending. This is in bontrast with what
Burkner (1980) claimed. Average educational level of household
was found to be strongly associated with the level of bank
deposits.. Interestingly, those who have larger degree of
confidence in the banking syst_n tend to have higher level of
bank deposits.
One of the strengths of the TBAC-UPBRF (1979) study is that
it was able to cross-check the perceptions of farm households
regarding saving with those of rural bankers. Rural bankers
pointed out increasing income levels as the most important
determinant of the level of bank deposits, followed by
promotional activities of banks and safety of deposits and/or
stability of the bank in that order. Note that only 5 percent of
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the total responses mentioned interest rate as an important
determinant. Caution should, be exercised in taking this as a
support for rejecting the "interest-rate elasticity" approach.
it should be noted that during the survey, interest-rate ceilings
on deposits were still in place. Since bankers could not alter
the interest rate on deposits, they therefore looked for non-
price mechanisms to attract deposits. This could be one of the
reasons for the low response rate.
Most rural bankers felt that the promotional scheme devised
by the government to inculcate saving habit among school children
would have no immediate impact on savings. Such program would
have short-run effect if it were addressed instead to farm
households.
The "institution-elasticity" hypothesis was indirectly
alluded to in the TBAC-UPBRE (1979) study. The role of rural
Q
financial institutions and credit union !_ in raising financ%al
saving was analyzed. The general impressidh that one can get
from the results of the said study is that the presence of these
financial institutions in the rural areas has hardly raised
financial savings of farm households. The "forced saving
schemes" showed potential for raising financial deposits, but the
implementation scheme still leaves much to be desired.
The two studies discussed above have provided us a wealth of
information regarding saving in the rural areas. As pointed out
by Sacay et al (198_), "savings potential not only exists in
rural areas; a majority of farmers, in fact, do save." However,
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most of these savings are held in phYsiCal form, while only a
little in financial form.
Sacay et al. do not believe that higher rates on savings and
time deposits would increase financial saving rate. To them, the
empirical evidence rejecting the "interest-rate elasticity"
hypothesis seem to be convincing. However, the pieces •of
empirical evidence • they have cited have not gone unchallenged.
There is no need to discuss them here again since they were
already thoroughly discussed earlier. It may suffice to say that
the issue regarding the responsiveness of saving, in general, and
financial saving, in particular to changes in interest rate is
far from being settled.
There is great potential for mobilizing financial savings in
the rhral areas so long as the price for saving in financial
terms is right. Receipts and disbursements are not usually
synchronized especially among farmers. Specifically, receipts
usually exceed disbursement during harvest season, and the
reverse is true during planting season. Although at the end of •
the • year, some farmers become net dissavers, surpluses can
however be realized during certain months of the •year. These
s_rpluses• can•be transformed into financial savings if financial
institutions offer financial instruments whose features suit the
farmers' preferences and are accessible tO them. Otherwise,
farmers hang on to physical assets, like rice inventory.
Perhaps, Burkner's "financial instrument" approach can be applied
to induce surplus units to save in financial form.
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The possibilitY of mobilizing savings of farmers is shown in
the TBAC-UPBRF (1979) study. When asked in what months they are
likely to save, a significant proportion of farmer-respondents
pointed out the months of October, November, and December (see
Table III.RR). These are harvest months, Interestingly,
variations can be observed in the choices of months when farmer-
respondents were classified by province. This shows the
potential for moving surpluses from one area to anotheD in the
rural sector. This is a role that can be efficiently played by
financial institutions.
The TBAC-UPBRF (1981) could haMe given us a more detailed
information on cash flow of farm households, perhaps on a monthly
basis. However, only the net position of farm-households at the
end of the year was analyzed. It might be worthwhile to go back
to the data and analyze the monthly cash flow of farm-households.
This would give us a better understanding of the saving behavior
of farm-households.
studies on saving behavior in the rural sector concentrated
on farm households. However, non-farm enterprises/households in
the rural areas are as important as farm households. And yet,
their saving behavior has not been analyzed. This certainly does
not give us a good picture of the saving pattern in 'the
rural sector_ Note that the cash flow pattern of non-farm
households could differ from that of farm-households with whom
they have forward andbackward linkages. As Meyer and Alicbusan
(1984) pointed out, heterogeneity among households in the rural
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Table III.22
Months ParTna_sare Likely tD Save__
t t _ !
, TOTAL , _TNA ,
j_ ,.sA,MPLZ t. ECIJA _, B_VL_3 , ILOIL0
........_ / ,,_ , ....p_,, -
' Yes ' 9.5 ' !2.2 ' _.0 ' 8,2
r v - ,_. ._ - = T-- • v T ' L'_ J •
Jantmz_. ' No ' 80.5 ' 87.8 ' 96.O ' 91.8
......... V- Y "_ "' _ _ v _ _ ,_ ...... v _ =
' Yes ' 7.2 ' 5.9 ' 7.1 ' 9.2
'r" ....... , _- _ V _ _ v '- _ .
Fetrxm_.4 ' No ' 92.8 ' 94.i ' 92.8 _ 80.8
_,_.... ' _ _,.... _v " .... T ...... • .... " ; --I : "
#
Yes ' 15.6 ' 12.2 ' 33.8 ' 11.9
" • .._ • =n ......
' No . ' •84.4 ' 87.8 ' 66.2 ' 88.I
' Yes ' 19.9 ' 21r.6 ' 38.4 ' 3.7
April T-- .......-r"...... i _ .... " .....
' NO ' 80.1 ' 75._ ' 61.6 r 96.8
......._ .... _ , .... _4.... -__ .... F
' Yes ' 8.6 ' 9.1 ' Ii.I ' 6.7
...._ ,--_ , ,May _ -,
' t4b ' 9] .).t ' 90.9 ' 88.9 ' 93.3
"'-"T '_t ' _ ' ,........ _ ,
' Yes ' L_.O " 4.6 ' 5,6 ' 2,5June ............. -,-------
' No ' 96.0 ' 95.4 ' 9_.4 ' 97.5
....... T ? v..... _-_ v "_'-"'"
' Yes ' 1.3 ' 1.3 ' 3.0 ' _.5
July _..... , ,_ _ • ---= , _ - • _--,-,
' NO ' 98.7 ' 98.7 ' 97.0 ' 9").5
' Yes ' 3.1 , ' 2.8. ' 8.1 ' 1.2
AUgUS% , _ ,_ _ ,
' No ' 96.9 ' 97.2 ' 91.9 ' 98.2
' Yes ' 8.9 ' 5.9 ' 2q .2 ' 6.0September -v. ., _ ........... _ "_ "¢ •
' _b ' 91 .I ' 94.I ' 75.8 ' 9L_.0
T _ 1-- .... " -"--'-'-""T "_ T
z
• i Yes _ 27.2 ' 12.4 ' 30.8 ' It8.1
Oc_b_ _; _ ..... r- ...... , ,:
' NO ' 72.8 ' 87.6 ' 69.2 ' 51.9
.... _ .... --"-'--_...... _T 't _ : "' _v •_"_""
' ' 20.7 ' ' 'NOvember Yes • 36.5 35.9 16 .q.
"7, r'--.... _T ,
' No ' 70.3 ' 63.5 _ 64.i _" 83.6"
T v r_,-_'-_-_ _'I "_--
' -Yea ' 31_.9 ' 49.7 _ 9.6 ' _4.8
' , _t_Deck. _ , -_....... ._ _ .... , .....
' NO ' 65.1 ' 50.3 ' 90.4 ' 75.2
Source: TBAC-UPBRF (1979).
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areas (in the sense that they have different economic activities,
and hence, different cash flow pattern) could provide
opportunities for financial intermediation even in the same
locality. Thus, future studies on saving behavior in the rural
sector should include as much as possible both farm and nonfarm
enterprises/households. Financial institutions can more easily
produce those kinds of financial instruments suggested by Burkner
if given adequate information about the potentials of rural
households to save.
Financial liberalization and correct financial policies may
improve the financial savingspicture, but part of the problem is
the impoverished situation of many areas which discourages the
rise of financial services. Policies to increase agricultural
incomes and to promote rural dynamism may be necessary because:
I) this will encourage financial institutions to proliferate and
compete for farmers' savings and 2) increased monetization will
occur as incomes increase. The development of cash crops will
favor financial savings over other types of assets.
As empirical evidenceshow, increased incomeswill mean
increased total savings. This is indeed vital because I) even if
the rural poor do save, a sizeable portion of them are dissavers,
and 2) most data show that the higher the incomes group, the
higher the saving rate. This o£ course is _xpected as part of
some kind of Engel's Law.
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C. Behayior of Borrowers in the RUral Sector
The low income position of most of our farmers may explain
why the formal sector has always lagged behind the informal
s_ctor as a source of credit to the small farmers. Table III.23
shows most studies indicate that farmer-borrowers have always
preferred informal sources of credit except during the period of
the M-99 program in the mid-seventies.
This preference for informal sources of credit, and perhaps,
the formal sector's aversion to lending to small farmers, is a
reflection of the depressed incomes and lack of dynamism in the
rural areas. The TBAC, Small Farm Indebtedness Survey (SFIS,
1984) reveals that total dropouts from the formal system
accounted for 60 percent of all farmers with any formal credit
experience. Around one-third of the total number of respondents
have availed of formal loans, but in 1981-82, only i0 percent
were still availing of formal loans. Share tenants ranked first
among the dropouts and proportionately more dropouts are small
farmer operators.
It should be noted that many of the dropouts pointed
4
to high arrearages as the single most important reason for
dropping oUt. The section on M-99 will detail the main causes of
the high defaults in the formal sector. Other compiaints such as
burdensome requirements and delayed releases also figure
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Table Ill. 23
SUMMARY OF STUDIES INDICATING EXTENT OF ,BORROWING FROM
• U _a/FORMAL AND INFORMAL SO RCES=
, , ±
1954,55 de Guzman (1957) 2,411 loans 12.0 88.0
1957-58 Gapud (1958) 256 _loans 10.0 90.0
1957-58 Sacay (1961) 916 loans 13.0 87.0
1960-61 BCS (1963) 1,679,000 loans 7.8 92.2
1957-70 Mangahas (1975) 151 borrowers 11..9 88.1
1970-71, Mangahas (1975) 297 borrowers 20.9 79.1
1959-70 Almario (1970) 138 loans 37.7 62.3
1969-70 Balago_ (1974) 134 boz_owe_s •21.6 78._
1973 DA (1974) 620 loans 51.3 48.7
19_3-74 PCARR-Baecon (1974) 3,30_ loans 92.2 7.8
1974 Cigaral (1977) 421 borTowers 94.0 6.0
1975-76 DA
Iloilo (Feb. 1977) 341 loans 82.7 17.3
Iloc0s (Jan. 1977) 703 loans 87.8 32.4
Zamboanga (April 1977 _ 551 loans 74.6 25.4
1976 DA (1975) 268 f_ers 17.2 82.8
1977 UPBRF (1977) •1,079 loans 36.9 63.I
1977 DA (1977) 405 rammers 5.2 94.8
1977 TBAC (1978) 655 borTowers 25.8 74.2
1978 DA (1978) 338 farmers 3.8 96.2
1978 T:BAC (1981) 2 ,ii0 loans 17.4 82.6
1979-80 NIA-SGV (1980) 299 far_ers 20.0 80.0
1981'82 TBAC (1984) 871,600 loans 40.2 59.8
626,300. farmers 34.0 -_-bl 58.7 b--/
• - " - " " " " Z'
a/Data compamability is limited by diffel-ences in samplinEo
b/some 7.3,percen_ of the born."owe_-responden_s tapped both the formal and
informal c_edit sources.
Source: Sacay, Agabin and Tanehoco. Small Farmer Credit Dile_a, 1985.
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prominently. All these point to the lack of suitability of the
present formal system to the needs o_ small farmers. The policy
implications here are clear: i) macro policies should be adopted
to improve incomes of farmers; and 2) changes in the banking
policies of the formal sector should be introduced to answer the
needs of the small farmers.
One of the adjustments the formal system would have to do is
to accomodate small-sized loans. Table III.24 shows that in the
1981-82 survey, informal loans is far better in servicing small
loans (_50-999) which comprise practically half the number of
all loans. The big demand for small-sized loans gives informal
loans a distinct advantage.
Table III.25 also shows that a bigger chunk of loans are for
production. Household expenses comprise the next most important
use of credit fund. Again, the flexibility of the informal
credit system allows it to serve more of the household need of
the small farmer than the formal sector.
The priority that farmer-borrowers put on informal credit
services can be seen in Table iII.26. Informal credit has a
higher repayment rate, and a highec percentage of fully paid
borroweres on matured loans. Borrowers from the informal sector,
however, has a higher past-due ratio than in the formal sector.
This means that arrears in informal credit extends through a
longer period. The higher repayment rate in the informal system
reflects also the effects of interlinked markets and better
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'tab.' e 111 ..14
DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS, BY SIZE, BY CREDIT SOURCE,
ALL REGIONS, CROP YEAR 1981i82
Formal Informal All Loans
Loan Size Number % Dis_ri- N_ber % Distri- Number % Dis_ri-
Classes (_) of Loans bunion of Loans bution of Loans bution
50 - 999 115 17,3 913 62.5 1,_28 48.4
1,000 - 1,999 210 31.6 270 18.5 480 22.6
2,000 - 2,999 ll8 b 17.7 ll3 7.7 231 i0.8
3,000 - 5,999 145 21.8 2!7 8.7 272 12.8
6,000 - 9,000 46 6.9 25 1.7 71 3.3
i0,000 and above 31 4.7 13 0.9 4_ •2.1
Tozal 665_/ 100.0 i_461 b/ 100.0 2._126 i00.0
Average
Sfze (_)_'an 3,642 1,228 1,983
a/Excludes 3. formal loans with unspecified amount.
b/Excludes 2 informal loans with unspecified amount.
C/RepomZed averaKes ad.jusZed for missing values.
Source: "TBAC_ Small Farm Indebtedness Sumvey, June 1986.
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Table III.25
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION'AND AVERAGE LOAN
SIZE, BY PURPOSE, BY CREDIT SOURCE,
ALL REGIONS, CROP YEAR 1981-82
, ,,,,
Formal Informal All Goans
Loan Purpose Pemcent Average Percent Average Percent'- AvemageDistri- Loan Disrri- Loan Dis1_i- Loan
bution Size (F) bution S_ze (_) bution Size (_)
Purely production
expense 73.8 2,819 56.2 I _472 61.7 1,976
Purely household . .
expense 4.5 2,210 22_3 72! 16.7 8q6
Purchase of farm
equipment/
invesi_nent 9.5 8,445 4.7 I_98 6.2 4,814
Frocessing of •
produce 0.2 4,000 0.I _00 0.1 2,150
Investment in other
busin¢=s 1.5 7,527 2.0 _73 1.9. 2,_13
Household expense/
t "farm investment 0.5 _8,_67 0.6 22 0.5 12,708
Production expense
with.fb_v_n
investment 3.6 3.6@4 2.1 V72 2.6 2,021
Production and
households
expenses 4.2 2,961 5.9 .1,_33 '5.4 ' %_733
Others _1..6 1,925 2.3 1,_02 2..1 1,.533
Don't know 0.5 5,!30 3.8 _32 2.8 "1,007
Total 100,0 z/ 3,642 I00.0 b,_ 10.0.0 1,983 '
|
J
_/Excludes 3 formal loans with unspecified amount.
_/Excludes 2 infot_aal loans with unspecified am@unt.
148,,
Table III.26
PROPORTION OF FULLY PAID BORROWERS_ AVERAGE REPAYMENT RATE
AND PAST DUE RATIO, BY CREDIT SOURCE,
CROP YEAR 1981-82
Credit S_rce
Formal Informal Total
No. of borrowers 598e-/ 1,15_ / 1.699
No. of borrowers with matured loans a/ 355 747 1_I11
% fully paid 56.1 81.3 73.1
% wiZh past due _3,9 18.7 26.9
Ave. repaymen_ rate_/(%) 67.5 87.2 77.8
b/
Ave. past due ratio-- (%) 30.0 48.0 32.9
For CY I_o_-o_ loans only 1!.9 22.2 13 8
For loans prior _o CY 1981-82 only 50.6 95..2 56.1
a/
Ave. _nount Past due-- (_persOn) 1.:060 512 801
a/Refers to matured CY 1981-82 loans only.
b/Unless otherwise classified_ refers to all outstanding loans0
as of end CY 198!-82 regardless of dates when the mespondents borrowed.
C/Includes 58 mixed b_,rowers.
No_e: See Annex Table ii for the regional breakdoa_.
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collection efforts brought about by personal contacts between
lender and borrower.
It has been shown in many studies (including the SFIS) that
formal borrowers are those with the higher income levels. Within
the formal system, it is shown (as in the section concerning the
M-99) that more of the lower-income farmers are the defaulters.
But the above information complicates the picture. The informal
borrowers now have lower incomes and smaller land sizes but they
have better repayraent rates than their counterparts in the formal
sector. This, therefore, accounts for the SFIS result which
shows that for the formal and informal sectors taken together,
there is no difference in the repayment rates of large and small
farmers. It can also account for the SFIS observation that
_armers in other cropland areas (which use more of informal
loans) performed better in terms of repayment than their
counterparts in paddy-irrigated areas (which use relatively more
o£ formal loans).
TBAC (1981) has studied 34 farmers for one crop-season
(February-July, 1979) employing intensive record-keeping. The
results show clearly thatsurplus and borrowings have monthly
patterns which policy makers should be aware of. Tables III.27a,
III.27b, and III.27c show the past surplus (deficit) monthly
income, expenses and surplus (deficit) of the respondents broken
down into leaseholders, ful_ owners and CLT holders. Tables
III.28a to III.28c show similar figures for farms below 1.5
hectares, farms from 1.5 hectares to 3 hectares, and farms above
150
Table Ill. 27a
AVERAGE INCOME AND EXPENSE PLOW OF A LEASEHOLDE_
Febru_y March April May' June _uly
Carry-over Balance 290 -1,085 -1,386 873 1,750 2,277
Total Income 453 523 1,268 5,52_ 2,317 3,905
Total Expense 1,828 824 755 2,901 1,790 1,272
Balance -1,085 -1,386 -873 1,750 2,277 4_Sl0
Table III. 27b
AVERAGE INCOME AND EXPENSE OF A FULL OWNER
February March Apmil May June JU!5_
Carry-over Balance 804 190 -243 -201 3,q69 4,q35
Total Income 1,127 873 1,117 6,642 2,78£ 2,817.
Total Expense 1,841 1,306 1,07S 2,£72 1,823 1,5!£
Balance 190 "-2q3 -201 3,469 4,435 5,533
Table III. 27c
AVEF_&GE INCOME AND EXPENSE FLOW OF A CLT
HOLDER
February March April May June July
Carry-over Balance 2,263 615 -180 -257 2.,010 2,426
Total Income 690 292 885 4,778 2,230 8,788
.Total Expense 2,338 1,087 962 2,511 1,814 1,953
Balance 615 -180 -257 2 ,.010 2 ,_26 g1261
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Table IIl. 28a
AVERAGE INCOME AND EXPENSE FLOW FOR FARMS
BELOW i. 5 HECTARES
February March April May June July
Cart-y-over Balance 554 -372 -683 -723 2,5.99 2,216
Total Income 467 405 803 5,470 1,208 2,998
Total Expense 1,393 716 843 2,148 1,591 1,127
Balance 372 -683 -723 2,599 2,216 4,087
Table llI. 28b
AVERAGE INCOME AND EXPENSE FLOW FOR FAR/_
1.5 to 3.0 HECTARES
•. February March.. •April May June July
Carry-over Balance 860 -288 -1,181 -586 2,423 2,966
Total Income 344 541 i,,400 5_306 1,811 3,900
Total Expense 1,992 934 805 2,297 1,268 ]',352
Balance -788 -1,181 -586 2,423 2,966 5,514
Table iii.28c
AVERAGE INCOME AND EXPENSE FLOW FOR FARMS
ABOVE 3.0 _CTARES
-.. ._
February March April May June July
Carry-0ve_ Balance 1,779 1,373 816 596 3,314 6,143
Total Income 1,653 591 698 6,103 4,437 9,345
Total Expense 2,058 1,148 918 3,385 1,608 2,130
Balance 1,373 816 596 3,314 6,143 13•,358
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3 hectares. For all types of farmers • (except those with more
than 3 hectares for all months and for •full owners and CLT
holders' position in Februray, the planting and growing months
(February-April) are Oelicit months. Harves_ months (May-July)
are surplus months. The level• of _borrowings made reflects more
or less the surplus or deficit pQsition of the farmers. The
biggest borrowings are made in February, the planting season;
borrowings decline after this even if deficits increase. It is a
fact that• most informal lenders (particularly palay, traders)
provide credit funds during the start of the planting season so
that the biggest borrowings are made during this time. Harvest
time shows the smallest level of borrowings with some slight
increase in the last month of July perhaps timed in preparation
for the next planting season.
The same stu:_y also studies repayment patterns and capacity
to pay the far_n_L-s. Figures III.l to III.3 sho W the graphs for
repayment, cumulative current loan outs tandzing and total
borrowings for leaseholders, full owners and CLT holders,
respectively. The graphs show clearly that borrowings are
highest during the planting season and lowest duri'ng the harvest
season. The repayment scheme has an opposite patter_ and is
concentrated during the harvestseason.
As to the capacity to repay the debt, the study shows that
carry-over obligations comprise a significant amount about 75
percent of the total borrowings made during the season. The
study also shows that based on net income, _all farmers in all
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categories will not be able to pay•back their total obligations
due (including carry-over Obligations). But if net flow is used,
that • is including additional borrowings versus outstanding loans
that will mature, t%ley will be able to pay the loan. This
observation can perhaps explain why repayment rates in both
formal and informal systems are adequately high while past due
_atios are also high.
These observations seems to point to the strong need for
borrowings particularly in "deficit months" (particularly in
rice •areas). This contradicts some studies (particularly those
covering wide areas of the country) which show that a significant
•portion of respondents are non-borrowers (either formal and
i,l£ormal sources). In particular, the TBAC Small Farm
Indebtedness Survey (SFIS [1986]) reports that 72 percent of the
respondents covering 1981,82 said they were non-borrowers. Non-
borrowing was exacerbated by the fact that many who came from
credit system, notably M-99 dropouts, decided not to borrow
again•. In the SFIS this comprised more than 60 percent of
dropouts from the M-99 Program and total formal system dropouts.
The "trauma" of the formal credit system seems to have some
b_aring here, especially since majority of the non-borrowers said
they do not want to borrow (i .e. non-borrowing was their
preference and not due to the lack of access to any credit
system).
154
The NEDA StudY (1986) also finds that 52.5 percent of rura].
families do not wish to borrow. However, only Ii.7 percent of
these non-bor t-owers }lave Other. sources for _inanc ing tileLc
agricultural production. A key to the reason for their non-
borrowing is the fact that 94.2 per.cent of those who have never
borrowed would pr.efec interest rates below 15 percent (which is
lower than existing credit programs and most informal lenders'
rates). A large percentage of •farmers borrowers mention freedom
•from debt as a primary goal in the future.
This phenomenon simply points to the fact that credit for
small farmers is looked upon by them as a necessary evil that, if
possible, should• be avoi_led. Tl_is is completely contrary to the
motive of the "healthy" borrower who incurs a debt in order to
invest in physical or working capital with the expectations of
generating higher prokits and income. The credit system for the
poor and depressed rural areas will never thrive and prosper in
such an environment.
More evidence of this behavior can be seen in "Should the
State Run Mang Pedro's Farm?" Crop failures • and loan default
drove the. farmer in the' study to drop out from any credit market.
He continued using the new HYV technology and increased the
frequency of his cred it availments once his production and
income recovered.
Is institutional cheap credit really cheap to farmers? It
•should be recalled that what really matters to borrowers is the
effective •cost of borrowing •which includes the basic interest
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rate £or the amount borrowed, regulated fees or contributions,
and transaction costs.
TBAC, in a Review o_£_su_e_vised A_ricultural Credit Programs
done in January 1981 tried to calculate the borrowing costs for
_ar_ers in the formallMasagana-99- Rrogram. Table III.29 shows
TBAC's estimates for 1981. The borrowing cost includes fees for
crop insurance premium and the Barrio Savings Fund. Transaction
cost was estimated to be 6 percent and includes transportation
costs, meal expenses, "facilitator" expenses and others. After
accounting for everything, the credit does not become cheap
(supporting Esguerra's (1981) claim that the subsidy is "mainly on
defaulted loans) and discounted rates is as high as 34.2
percent. It should be noted that risk premium is not explicitly
included in the calculations. It is not clear whether this is
more or less than the various fees for the samahang Nayon.
Perhaps it is assumed that this is covered by the various fees
for the Samahang Nayon. If Esguerra is correct;that is -- that
the interest subsidy is more or less offset by the various fees
to the Samahang Nayon, then the 34.2 percent will not include the
risk premium. The interest rate that should be charged to
accomodate risk will be much higher than 34.2 percent.
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Table III._9
_TI};AT_D ':_OSTOF _O_4_i_GFOR SMALL _A_ERS
(_ PeP Annum)
Interest at Matum£ty Interest Discounted
R!ce.Fa*naer, Non-Rice Rice Farmer Non-Rice
SN Non-SN Far_ner SN Non-SN Farmer
MemSer Member Mer_er Member
._ , . t
Interest Rate 12.0_ 12.0_ 12.0, 15.38 i,.28 13.6,
BSF 6.67 - - 7.69 - -
Crop Insurance ., .,_ ,.17 - 5.13 _.76 -
Sub-Total _3.15 16.21 12. O. 28.20 19.O_ 13.6,
Transactions Cost 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
TOTAL 29.15 22.21 118.0. 3.. 20 25.0:" 19.6_
,.c
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Chapter IV
MACROECONOMIC POLICY ENVIRONMENT AND •INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first
section discusses the overall policy environment in the
Philippines and its influence on the • rural economy. The second
section reviews the • institutional framework operating in the
Philippine financial system with • special focus on the rural
financSal markets. The third and last section deals with
specific policies that directly impinge on the workings of the
rural, financial markets.
A. Macrgecoqom_ _ Policff Environment
The growth and effectiveness of the rural financial markets
(RFMs) depend to a large extent on• the policy environment within
which they operate. In the Philippines, as i_ also the case in
Many LDCs, the overall policy environment has not been conducive
to the growth of the rural sector. The RFMs do not operate in a
vacuum_ When rural enterprises are penalized by existing
measures, th@ RFMs are also indirectly penalized. Countervailing
policies that artificially make rural financial institutions
•viable cannot make them effective in pushing or dragging the real
sector of the rural economy when the growth of the latter is
severely constrained by unfavorable policies.
In _ the last three decades, the Philippines has initiated
several changes in its economic development strategy. Import
Ig8
_ubstitution policy was prominent during the period 1947 - 69.
Development strategy was then heavily biased in favor of the
National Capital Region. Export promotion policy was earnestly
started in 1970. About the same time, spatial dimension of
development was taken into consideration, and the various
development plans prepared by government embodied this concern
(see Pernia et al. [1983]). In the 80s, the interest shifted
towards liberalization of the economy. Thus, the first major
£ariff reform program took effect in January 1981 and will be
[
completed over a period of five years. Financial reforms were
also initiated.
Despite these changes, however, the policy biases against
the rural sector in general and agriculture in particular have
Virtually remained intact. The policy biases against agriculture
ace extensively discussed in the "Agenda for Action for the
Philippine Rural Sector" (1986). Some of these policies will be
discussed below.
One macroeconomic price for agriculture and agricultural
trade is the exchange rate. The government has consistently
pursued an overvalued domestic currency. Ranis (1986) estimated
the current overvaluation of the peso to be at the level of 25 to
30 percent. Indeed, "this overvaluation represents a 25 to 30
percent tax on exporters, far greater than the burden of the
agricultural export taxes which have just been removed." In
other words, farmers receive fewer pesos for every dollar they
earn through exports of agricultural produc_s, notwithstanding
the zero export tax. Since a greater proportion of the
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exportabies are agricuL_urai pt-oducts, the adverse eC[ects o[
curref_cy overvaluation falls ;[Lore heavily •o,] the agricultural
sector (In£al 11985]). At the other end, the agricultural sector
has 6o face stiffer co,npet itio_ from i!nPorted agricultural
products (e.g., yellow coo;L) whose prices • are e[fectively lowered
by the overvaluation of the [Jeso.
The import tariff and expo/t tax structures have also placed
i
greater burden on agriculture and agricultural tra(/e. This has
continued even after the tariff re£or_l program (TRY). Table
IV.l, presents a cotnparison ot the average e£fective p_otec£ion
rates (EPRs) of a_riculture and manufacturing. Me(_alla (1986)
noted that the tariff reform program has succeeded in
substantially reducing the EPRs from 24 to 12 percent. However,
the EPRs have remained the same in relative terms after the TRP.
Specifically, the exportable and primary and agricultural ssctors
are stiil penalized although to a lesser extent after the TRP.
The rural/regional development thrust initiated in the 7Us
has produced very limited desirable results. •Many industries
still tended to locate in National Capital Region and Central
Industrial Region where social overhead capital is mostly
concentrated (see Pernia et al [1983]). Indeed, the absence o£
social overhead capital in most of the rural areas is immediately
felt once one goes to areas just a few kilometers away •from urban
centers. The •decision regarding where to place social overhead
capital was very much influenced by the industrial policy of the
160
Table IV.l
AVERAGE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION RATES (EPR$)
(In Percent)
1979 198g
(Pre-TRP) (Post-TRP)
All Sectors 24 12
Export ab les -3 - 3
Impor tab les 44 9.5
Primary and Agriculture 1 -i
Manufacturing 40 ' 9.3
Export ab i es 1 l
Impor tab les _0 33
Source: Medalla (1986).
16].
government. Naturally, other services, e.g., communication, put
up by the iJrivate sector have to follow.
In summary, the macroeconomic polic ies pursued by the
government have literally made •agricultural enterprises
unprofitable and in no way have supported rural development Of
course, the government has long recognized this. But instead of
,]haloing those policy biases against agriculture, the government
initiated policies aimed at offsetting the adverse effects of
those policies mentioned above on agriculture. One such policy
is the cheap credit policy (details of this policy are discussed
below). However, David (1982)pointed out that the interest rate
subsidy 6o agriculture failed to correct the policy bias against
agriculture. "Assuming that interest rate policy has meant a
cos_ of borrowing differential of 6 per cent in favor of
agriculture, the effective subsidy rate amounts to only 1
percent. Even if interest rate differential is increased two or
three times in magnitude, it is clear that the interest rate
subsidy will not alter significantly the unfavorable incentive
structure in agriculture vis-a-vis non-agriculture created by
price policies." Moreover, the fixing of the interest rate which
was done in the past hurt agriculture more than the other sectors
because it failed to take into account the greater risk and
higher transaction costs of agricultural lending (Intal [1985]).
Thus, most big banks shied away from agricultural lending. The
result was that the share of formal agricultural loans to total
loans granted declined in the last decade despite the massive
subsidized credit programs initiated in _the 70s. Aside from
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this, •the cheap • credit policy has impaired the growth of the
rural financial markets (David [198_.]).
The present government has recently initiated reforias in
various fronts to achieve economic recovery in the short-run and
sustained growth• in the _ong-run. The reforms are en_odied in
the official document entitled, "Policy Agenda for People-Powered
I|
Development (1986). Essentially, the government is adopting an
employment-or iented, rural-based development strategy in the
medium-term. This. is in direct contrast to the previous
development strategies which greatly emphasized
industrialization. An important feature in this •new development
strategy is the removal of policy biases against the rural sector
in general and agriculture•in particular. •In addition, the
orovision of social overhead capital will be shifted towards the
rural sector. Post-harvest facilities will be given due
importance. •All these would reduce• the transaction costs-of
rural pr0ducers/savers and lenders.. •Under this new environment,
the RFMs are expected to perform better. They can respond •
quickly and strongly to nonfinancial market signals since these
signals are •genuine ones.
The success of this new development strategy depends on £he
will and determination of the government and on its abili£y to
stand firm to this new commitment without being swayed _. by
special groupswhose interest runs•counter to the new development
strategy. It also depends on the way it concretizes the new
package of policies into programs and the managerial talents it
163
can pull together to i_nplelaent the various programs.
B. Institutional Framework
The workings of the•RFMs is very much conditioned by the
institutional framework operating in the Philippine financial
system. It may be worthwhile to review •this institutional
framework.
Before the . establishment of the Central Bank in 1949,
several banks had already been operating in the country (see
Table IV.2). Some of them were authorized to issue currency
notes. Note that only few of them were Filipino-owned or
government-owned.
Almost all banks concentrated in trade financing. This is,
of course° a familiar feature of the banking system in any
colony, like the Philippines. To the extent that most of the
tradables were agricultural products, such as abaca, _ugar,
tobacco and copra, it •can therefore be said that banks indirectly
helped promote agriculture. But their concentration in Manila
did not do much to develop the rural financial markets.•
As early •as the turn of the 20th century, the government
made several attempts to develop the rural • financial markets.
The government-owned First Agricultural Bank was _established in
1908 (Lirio [1986]). •It accepted deposits, but specialized in
secured agricultural loans.
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Table IV. P.
BANKS OPERATING BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
CENTRAL BANK OF THEPHILIPPINES (1949)
Name of Bank Ownership
A Commercial Bank
i. Bank of the Philippine Islands Ecclesiast_.ca]
_. China Banking Corporation Chinese
3. Peoples Bank and Trust C_. _aerican
4. Philippine Bank of Co,mnerce Filipino
5. Philippine Bank of Communications Chinese
6. Philippine Trust Company Ecclesiastical
7. Philippine National Bank Goverr_ment
B. Savings Bank
I. Monte de Piedad Eccles_.astical
_. Philippine Postal Savings Bank Government
3. Banco Hipotecario de Filipinas Filipino
C. Agricultural Bank
Agricultural and Industrial Bank Government
D. Foreign Branches
i_ The Chartered Bank of India,
Australia, and China British
_. The Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation British
3. Mokohama Specie Bank Japanese
4. National City Bank of New York American
5. Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. Japanese
6. Nederlandsch _ndische Handelsbank Dutch
7. The Bank of America, NT and SA American
Source: Lirio (1986).
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It was later on absorbed by the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) which was established in 1916. Then in 1935, the
government-owned Agricultural and Industrial Bank was created.
The granting of long-term agricultural loans was transferred from
PNB to this bank. But in 1947, it was absorbed by the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, the predecessor of the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
The agricultural sector was given an added push with the
passage of the Rural Credit Law Act (191_) and the Cooperative
Marketing Law (1927).
To mobilize savings in the rural areas, the Postal Savings
Bank was created in 1904. All post offices in the provinces were
considered branches of this bank. Thus, banking was brought to
the rural sector for the first time. The Postal Savings Bank
lasted up to 197_ when it became irrelevant due to the presence
of rural banks in the countryside.
The colonial nature of the economy actually made commerce
and trade a profitable venture. So, private banks oriented
themselves to these mostly urban economic activities. The
relative neglect of agricultural and long-term credit by private
banks prompted the government to directly intervene in the
financial markets by creating its own specialized banks. Direct
government intervention _s thus not new in the Philippine
f_nancial system. But the creation of a specialized agricultural
bank and its subsequent absorption by another bank portrays the
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difficulty encountered by the government in financially
supporting the agricultural sector.
The establishment of the Central Bank ushered in new era for
the Philippine financial system. In view of the underdevelopment
of t_e ecorlo,ny, it was deemed proper to have a development -
oriented central bank. Thus, aside from its traditional
objectives, the Central Bank was mandated to promote rising level
of production, employment, and real income (see Table IV.3).
Strong coordination between the Central Bank and the executive
branch of the government was to be maintained by including
government officials in the Monetary Board.
The policy instruments of the Central Bank were not used to
affect the overall monetary and credit climate of the economy.
Changes in rediscount rates and reserve requirement ratios were
less frequent. Moreover, open market operations of the Central
Bank were virtually inoperative due to the absence of marketable
securities. This is due to the fact that the government was
reluctant to pay competitive rates to their securities (Tan
[1980]). The only reason why banks hold government securities
was because of the sweeteners attached to thegn, like reserve
eligibility.
The Central Bank vigorously pursued its selective credit
policy. It created specialized banks through which
credit to favored sectors can be channeled. Because of the urban
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Table IV. 3
THE PHILIPPINE CENTRAL BANK
The 1949 CB The 1972 CB
I, Broad Policy I. Maintain monetary I. ~ the same -
Objectives stability.
_. Preserve interna- _. - the sa_e -
national value of
the peso _.nto other
freely convertible
currencies.
3. Pror_ote rising 3. To foster
level of produc- monetary,
tion, employment, credit and
and real income exchange
conditions
conducive to
a balance and
sustainable
growth of the
economy.
II. Traditional i. Sole responsi- I. - basically
Functions bility of _urrency the same -
issue.
_. Holds and manages
•the reserves of
the banking system
3. Discharges banking
services for the
governments and for
the commercial
banks.
4. Manages the coun-
try's international
reserves.
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Table IV.3 (cont'd)
The 1949 CB The 1972 CB
III. Organizational Seven members: Seven members
Structure
i - Governor i - Governor
(appointed by (appointed )
the president) 1 - Ministry of
1 - Secretary of of Finance
Finance 1 - NEDA
1 - DBP Governor i - BOI
[ - PNB Pre§ident 3 - Private
3 - Private Sector Sector Repre-
representatives sentatives
(appointed) (appointed)
IV. Scope of The Monetary Board The Central Bank
Control controls not only has been given a
co_mnercial banks, wider scope of
but all banking authority to over-
institutions, with see not only the
the exception of monetary and
insurance compa- banking system
nies. It has both but also the
supervisory and entire financial
policy powers, and credit system.
V. Policy Tools i. Quantitative - Basically
Controls: the same -
All monetary &
credit climate
of the country
by tightening
or easing the
availability of
credit
(a) Open market
operations
(b) Rediscount
rate changes
(c) Varying
reserve
ratios
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Table IV.3 (cont'd)
The 1949 CB The 197_ CB
_. Selective - Basically
Controls: Have the same -
deliberate
allocative
effect
(a) differential
rediscount rates
for special
projects of
government to
promote deve-
lopment.
(b) differential
deposit rates
and reserve
ratio among
banks.
(c) creation of
specialized
banks thru
which credit
to key sectors
can be channeled.
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bias of private banks, a habi% that was i.nculcated during the
colonial period, the Central Bank established rural banks. They
were to be owned by the private sector. However, the interest
rate ceilings that did not take into account the inherent
riskiness of agricultural loans made rural banks a less
attractive investlnent alternative. To encohrage potential
investors to go into rural banking, the government provided the
rural• banks substantial government subsidies. They were given
extraordinary number of tax exer%ptions and privileges which are
still being retained today. Interestingly, smaller rural banks
get more tax exemptions and privileges than bigger ones. The
Central Bank matched every peso•put up by owners of rural banks
as equity. These were placed in preferred shares which earned
only _. percent per annum. This subsidy has recently been phased
out. The reserve ratios applied to deposit liabilities were
lower for rural banks than for colm_lercial banks. This is an
added competitive edge to small rural banks over the commercial
banks which can exploit economies of scale due to their size.
This policy still exists today, although it is be_ng gradually
phased out.
The rediscounting policy of the Central Bank also reflected
its bias towa sds priority sectors. Specifically, rural banks
were charged lower rediscount rates than comMerc%al banks. This
was intended tO develop the rural banking system and increase the
flow of funds to the rura_]_ areas.
Major f%nancia] refor_s were effected _n 197_. The refo_:ns
included the overhaul of the Central Bank (see Table IV.3). The
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stabilization role was given prominence over the developmental
role of the Central Bank. It was recognized that economic growth
is the main responsibility of the regular government agencies,
not that of the Central Bank alone. The supervisory function of
the Central Bank has been broadened to include not only the
monetary and banking syst_m but also the entire financial and
credit _ystem.
Strong coordination between the Central Bank and the
executive branch of the government is being maintained. However,
the DBP Governor and PNB President were replaced by the NEDA
Director General and BOI Chairman as members of the Monetary
Board to avoid the conflict of interest between the regulator and
the regulated one. Today, the Budget Minister is made a member
of the Monetary Board to further strengthen the coordination.
This was done despite clamor from various sectors to make the
Central Bank a truly independent one. So far, the experience in
the past was that the Central Bank was made subservient to the
whims and caprices of the political leadership (PIDS [1986_).
Despite the radical change in the policy objectives of the
Central Bank, specifically in its avowed policy to make itself a
lender of last resort rather than a lender of first resort as
happened before 197_, the Central Bank still continued its
selective credit control. This is one glaring example of
inconsistency between policy a_d actual practice. This was even
blown out of proportion when both the Central Bank and the
various government agencies launched a number of special credit
17_
programs. Table IV.4 presents a seemingly endless list of
agricultural credit programs. The prescribed maximum lending
rates for these programs which ranged between 3 to 17 were
substantially below the market rates. A good number of them
allowed rediscounting with the Central Bank.
Special credit programs seemed to be in vogue in the 70s.
Even international funding agencies like, the World Bank _nd ADB,
joined the bandwagon by supporting a substannial number of credit
programs (see Table IV.4). Both the Central Bank and •various
non-financial government agencies were directly involved in
managing special credit programs using rural financial
institutions as conduits. They prodded rural financial
institutions, especially the rural banks, tosupport their credit
programs by offering them attractive spread between the cost of
funds and the maximum lending rate (see Table IV._ for an
illustration). This literally hindered the development of rural
financial institutions as they became overly dependent on these
low cost funds. In fact, performance of the rur_l banking system
in terms of mobilizing savings was better before the 70s than
after the 70s (see Lamberte [198_]).
•The agricultural credit programs were originated from and
implemented by various government agencies. The impressive
number of government agencies involved shows that these credit
programs were in the main uncoordinated. Even non-banking
government entities were directly involved in lending. This has
indeed blurred the distinction between loans and outright fisca±
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Table r_T.4
SU_.,,_{YLIST OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT PROSRAMS, BY SOURCE
OF. FUND CATBGORY
PROGRAM YEAR YEAR NO,OF IMPLEMENTING LENDING LOANSGRANTED REPAYMENT
IMPLEMENTEDPROJ. YEARSIN AGENCY CHANNEL(S) AMOUNTISHARE RATE(X)
AGMT OPERATION (PR)
TERMINATED
I, Gover_en_ ;unded_ith
CBRediscounting(GFR)
t. M-99 1973 12 RAFINFAC PNB,RBs,LBP 5807.6 48,11 82.3
2. Cotton F=nancingProgram 1974 11 PCC,CB-GESIII RB%TRB,LB_ 88.0 0.73 77.7
Thrift Banks(TBs)
3. CB-MECSSupervised.
ExperiencedEducation
Program t974 11 MECS,CB-SE8]IZ 3,3 0.03 98.2
4. Gulayansa Kalusugan 1975 10 NFAC RBs 62.0 0.51 80.4
5, DakahangBarangay 972,2 8,05 n.a.
a. Fattening 1978 7 BAI,CB-SESIII RBs
b. Coy/Calf 1981 4 BA[,CB-SESIII RBs
6, Biyayan90agat 1979 6 BFAR RBs,DBP,PNB 101.7 0.84 25,0
7. SupervisedCredit for
OrchardCrops 1982 3 C_-SESIII RBs 3E.1 0.30 n.a.
8. Maisagana 1982 _ HAF/NFAC PNB,RBs,LBP 192.3 1.59 E2,1
9. Pukyutan0 8arangay 1982 3 CB-SE8111 RBs
10. kaIabav n9 Barangay 1983 2 BAI,CD-SE8III RBs,TBs 3.7 0.03 n.a.
11, GFSME 1984 1 KKK-PCA,CB, Accredited 149.5 1.24
Accredited Financia]
Banks Institutions
SOS-TOTAL 7416.4 61.44
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P_OGRAM YEAR YEAR NO.OF IMPLEMENT!MS LENDING L_ANSGRANTEDREPAYMENT
IMPLEMENTEDPROJ YEARSIN AGENCY CHANNEL(Si AMOUNT%SHARERATE(%)
AGMT OPERATION (PM)
TERMINATED
II. GovernmentFunded,No
Rediscountingbut
AdministeredbyCB (6FNR)
A. Domestic
I. IAFVirginia/Burley
TobaccoFinancing
Program 1976 9 PVTA,CB-SESIll RBs,SLAs 112.6 0.93 87.4
2. SARF 1978 7 MAF RB%PNB,LBP 106.6 0.88 6G.6
3. KASAKA 1982 3 CB,MAF/NFAC RBs G.O 0.05 n.a.
4. IRF" 1983 2 CS,HAF/NFAC RBs 5.5 0.04 97.4
5. IRPP 1984 I MAF/NFAC NFA,Input 336.4 2.79 32.2
Suppliers
(Cyanamid)
G. ECPAP 1984 1 • MAFINFAC PND,RB%LBP 193.0 1.60 GO.3
PPI,Cyanamid
7. KKK 1982 3 HHS PNB,DBP,LBP 833.7 E.90 n.a.
SUB-TOTAL 1593.8 13.20
B. FOREIGNSOURCE8
1. MARSecondRural
Oev't. LandResettlement
Project 1978 7 MAF,MAF,MLGCD RBs,CRDs,SLA_24.3 0.20 n.a.
HPH,MPN.NOH_
CS,NFAtNIA
2. CMP 1979 G BCOD RBs 42.9 0.36 n.a.
3. FourthCD-18RDRural
Credit Project 1979 G CB RBs 681.1 5.64 n.a.
4. AquacultureD velopment
Project 1984 1990 1 CD,MAF,BFAR RBs 8.2 0.07 n.a.
_"D-TOTAL 756.5 6.27
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PRO6RAM YEAR YEAR NO,OF IMPLEHENTIN6 LENDIN6 LOANSGRANTED REPAYIIENT
IMPLEMENTEDPRO3 YEARSIN ABENCY CHANNEL(S) AMOUNT%SHARE RATE(%)
AGMT OPERATION (PM)
TERMINATED
III, GovernmentFundedbut
Administeredand/or
Channeledthrough
OtherBanks(GFOD)
A. DomesticSources
1. PagkainngBayan 1973 12 Exec.Committee,PN8 2h7 0.18 41.4
NationalAdvisory
CounciIwMinistry
of Finance,NFA,
NAF,NAR,BEDt
BAEconpProv'I.
andCity Gov'ts,
2. KKK-LocaIBovernment1982 3 Ministryof Loc. PN8 1E4.3 1,35 27.0
SpecialFundProgra_ Eov'ts.,HHS
SUB-TOTAL 186.0 1.54
B, ForeignSources
h AgrarianReformIEDP 1978 7 LBP,NAR,ML6CD, LBP,DBP 179.3 1.48 39.3
NAF,D_
2. DBP'IBRDSnal|hoIders
TreeFarming 1978 DBP DBP 40.E 0.34
3. SmallF_rserDev't.
Field ActionProject
(BAO-FAO-ASSAR@)1979 E LBPIHAR LBP 2.9 0.02
4. SNSP 1979 G BCOD CRBslPN8 5.8 0.05
5. ThirdLivestockand
FisheryOev't. Proj. 1990 1984 5 DBP DBP 547.0 4.53
G, LagunadeBayFishpen LagunaLake
DevelopmentProject 1979 G Oev'tAuthority BBP 67.1 0.55
SUB-TOTAL 1614.7,13.38,
*Includesthe DBP-IBRDLivestockDev't. Project, the DBP-IBRDFishpondandMarineProJect,andthe
RehabititationProgramof FishingIndustryinthePkilippines,
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PROGRAM_ YEAR YEAR NO.OF IMPLENENTIN6 LENDIN6 LOANS6RANTEO R_AYRIZNT
IMPLEMENTEDPROJ YEARSIN AGENCY CHANNEL(S) AMOUNTX_ARE RATE(X)
,A8HT OPERATION (_)
TERNINATED
IV.._overnmentFundedbutAdministered
and/orChanneledthroughNon-bank
Institutions(BFNB)
A. DomesticSources
i. PTASupervisedFarm
Credit Assistance 1975 10 PTA PTA 10.3 0.08 EO,7
2, Sugar WOrker'sFund 1982 3 HOLE BRN 1.7 0.01
3, BRW-RPBLivelihood
Prg. for SugarWorkers1983 2 HOLEjRPB BRN 1,3 0.11
4, CBLF 1973 12 COLFIHAF CBLFIMAF 147,0 1.22 1E,4
5, HARLoanAssistance
Program NAR NAR 0,4 (0.00_
SUB-TOTAL 160,7 1,33
B. ForeignSources
1, ,FSDCIrrigation System/
Infrastructure Dev't.1975 10 FSDC FSDC _8,8 0,49 39,9
2, FSOCKAISAEnterprise
Development 1980 5 FSDC FSDC 24B,2 2,0S
3. AITTP 1983 2 TRC TRC 36,4 0.30 100,0
SUB-TOTAL 343,4 2,SO
6_ANBTOTAL 12071.5tO0,O0
Source:NationalEconomicDevelopmentAuthority(198G),
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';ab!e Y.'o5
GROSS SPREADS BETWEEN COST OF FUND AND LENDING RATES, AGRICULTURAL CKEIDT
PROGRAMS IN THE PB/L_PPINES, AS OF JUNE 30, 1986
(In Percent Per Annum)
Pure Cost Prescribed Gross
Name of Program of Fund a/ Lending Margin
to Channel-' Rate to Bank
(Note: STD funded programs not
rediscountable since
" November 1985 )
Purely-Locally Funded
A. Crops
M-99 _'/ 3 15 12
IRPP 3 (6 _/ 15 12. (9)
Malsagana 3 15 12
ECP 3 (6 _/ 15 12
GSK * 3 15 12
Supervised Credit for
Omchamd Cmops 3 15 12
National Soybeans Pmoduction
P1_gram 3 (6_ / 15 12 (9)
Cotton Financing ProEmam _. 6 15 12
IAF Tobacco Financing 3 12 9
PTA Supervised Farm Cmedit
Assistance 3 6-9 3-6
National Roo_c_ops ProductiQn 3 (6_ / 15 12 (9)
B. Livestock
Kalabaw nE Baranga_ 3 15 12
Bakahang Bamangay (Fattening/
Cow/Calf) * 3 15 12
Kambingang Bamangay _ 3 15 12
C. Fisheries
Biyayang Dagat _ 3 12 9
C15% for approval)
FSDC: CARE direct lend/n_ I I0 -
(capital outlay)
4
(working capital)
Taal Lake Development Program direct lend/m E 16 -
Laguna Lake Coopemative direct lending 14 -
£. coopera_.ive Development
CDLF-d-/ i0 (thru CRBs) 15 5
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E. Others
KKK direct lending e--/ 12 -
CB-MECs Sup. Exp. Educ'l.
Program 3 12 9
Pagkain ng Bayan direct le_Dding 10-16 -
KASAKA none _! 12 -
IRF 3 12 9
16
(emergency loans ) -
Quedan Financing 12,75, Variable -
GFSME Variable_g/ 17 -
FSDC's Programs
I_igation Sysxem/ 6 -
Infrastructure Development direct lending (PIP/$WIP)
Interest-free
(CiP)
°Adaptive Farm Technology direct lending g -
(.farm animal)
12
(farm mechanization)
OGasifier/Woodlot Project direct lending 12
OKAISA-Agro Industries Projects direct lending 12
(fixed assets,
trading capital)
6
(opemating capital)
II. With External Assistance
• h/
SNSP none-- 3
(fa_m/bodega/office
equipment )
8
(marketing loan)
CMP _ (short-ter_) 9 5
(shoz_t-_er_)
5 (long-term 8 3
(long-term)
Palawan IAD Project 7 14 7
AITTF 3 . 8.75 5.75
ALF Varia51 i/ market rates
First Aquaculture i0.5 17 6o5
Development -Pro_j ecT (including 3%
service charge)
Northern Palawan Fisheries
Development Project direct landing 12 -
Laguna de Bay Fishpen
Development Project 7,7 15-21, 7.3-13 o3
: - .• i L , , J ,, ,, nL _ . .--
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*STD funded programs eligible for rediscounting up to November 29, 1985 only
(CB Circular 1986)o However, banks can rediscount loans under these pmograms if they
_se their own funds as s_arter_ funds.
a-/This represents STD rates for CB-adminis_ered programs, while --'orforeign-funded
programs char_neled thru other banks, this r_-fers to the in_e__esz rate paid by imolementin_
bank to fund source.
b/Cost of fund under direJct agency assistance scheme/direct bank Zending scheme is
3 percent, while under a rrader-miller/end-o_se.-/inDut supplier assistance scheme, cost of
_ar.d is 8 oercent inclusive of service charges of agent bank.
c/
-- FSDC taps KAISAs to !end to small fishe_-man-farmers and _ll! rime small fishermen.
Az
_ CDLF loans if _anted direct to bor__owers costs 15 percent per annum, but if
channeled _hru C-_Bs, l0 percent per annum.
=/
_" G0vernmenzal banks are utilized as disbursing agents only fo_ a fee.
_/._Bs get commissions instead.
:/
= 3anks Lend their own funds_ interest subsidy provided to banks by GFSME.
h--/C._Bsare used as disbursin_ a_ents at no cost.
i--/Ra_e is !2.3 oe__cent per annum effective July I, 1986.
Sources: CB-SES [II_ ?SDC, LLDA, BFAR, CDLF, MAF,_lanning Services, MFAC, CS-fLC_ _AF-LDA
BCOD, GFEME, TRC..
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subsidy/transfers. Loans, no matter how low their interestrates
are, have to be repaid, whereas fiscal subsidies/transfers need
not be repaid. It is not then surprising that the repayment
rates Of almost all these special agricultural credit programs
have been dismal (see Table IV.4). Thus, in terms of repayment
rate, it can be said that these credit programs have met a
crashing failure. And a greatmajority of rural financial
institutions which heavily depended on these credit programs have
been dragged dowD.
The output and equity impacts of these credit programs are
given less attention by researchers, except in the case of
Ma@agana-99 which is discussed in greater detail below. It is
not clear from results of existing studies whether formal credit
is really the overriding bottleneck in agricultural product. In
fact, only the agricultural sector posted a positive growth rate
in the last two years despite the severe credit squeeze that hurt
the agricultural sector more than other sectors. However, the
equity impact of these subsidized Credit programs is even more
unsettling. Neri and Llanto (-1985) found that low-income farmer-
borrowers who accounted for as much as 73 percent of total number
of loans were given only 32 percent of total amount of subsidized
loans granted, whereas the high-income farmer-borrowers
accounting for 27 percent of the total number of loans granted
availed themselves of 68 percent of the £otal amount of
subsidized loans granted. Thus, they concluded that the
"financial system has apparently been subsidizing large scale
farmers whoqualify for subsidized loans although they canafford
to pay thereal cost of financialresources. In effect, there
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was a real income transfer to high income farmers from small
income farmers..." All these seem to refute the "traditional
view" of farm credit.
The Central Bank opened many red iscounting windows to
support the special credit programs. This policy, of course,
impinge on certain macroeconomic variables. From 1949 to 1972,
the ratio of outstanding rediscounts to domestic liquidity
averaged only 9 percent while the annual inflation rate averaged
6 percent. But during the period 1973-82, when special credit
programs proliferated, the averag e ratio of outstanding
rediscounts to domestic liquidity went up to 13 percent. The
average annual inflation rate likewise increased to 14 percent
during the same period. Indeed, this result challenges those who
claim that selective credit control has nothing to do with
liquidity and/or inflation.
.%
As for Masagana-99 (M-99), it is so far the most abitious
A
credit program that was introduced in the seventies together with
tile land reform package and Green Revolution technology. The
program covered around 48 percent of the total financing of the
programs listed in Table IV.4. The amount of total subsidy borne
by the government has been estimated to be anywhere between a low
of _1.2 billion (TBAC [1981]) to _2.1 billion (Herdt and Gonzales
[1981]). The benefits reaped have been estimated to be between
_1.7 billion (Herdt and Gonzal_s [198i])and _4.7 billion (TBAC
[1981 ] ).
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The extent to which M-99 contributed to self-sufficiency in
rice and the adoption of a more productive technology will be
debatea for sometime to come. Some clai_a that adoption of the
technology started in the late sixties and would have become
prevalent even without the program. But a more realistic
assessment would be that the new technology is highly capital-
intensive and input-dependent and for it to be_ widely accepted
some form of subsidy will have to be given. The main question
therefore is whether credit subsidy had contributed its share to
the goal of self-sufficiency in rice. Sacay et al. (1985) seem
to suggest that direct subsidies, particularly fertilizer
subsidies, mighthave better impact than credit subsidies.
Herdt and Gonzales came up with their estimates of the
breakdown of subsidies of the program for 1973-1979. This
includes some "hidden"subsidies such as the market price subsidy
and the losses due to defaulted loans. The estimate of credit
subsidy is close to the estimates of Esguerra (1981) of around
_946.6 million even if both differ substantially in the way the
figures were derived. Since the credit subsidy is the major
component of the total subsidy of the program, one question to be
asked is : Was it worth it? Based on whether it did give
rise to the initial adoption of the technology and towards ....self-
sufficiency in rice, perhaps the problem will never be resolved.
But there definitely, would be more concrete answers to the
d"
following tWO questions. These questions are: i) Is the credit
s%rbsidy program a viable one that can be sustained over the long-
i
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run without depleting the Treasury? and 2) Is the credit subsidy
program successful in redistcibuting income and/or wealth to the
small farmer?
There has been a dearth ot literature on the first question.
Looking at the way the program was implemented, it seems that the
long-run viability of the M-99 program is questionable. Table
IV.6 shows the depletion over time of the number of small farmers
borrowing in the program. The total farmers covered by the
program at its peak covered 36.4 percent of the small rice
farmers ana 47.2 percent o£ the potential rice farmers. By 1980,
the actual coverage has fallen to 3.7 peccent of the total small
rice farslers and 4.8 percent o_ the potential farmers.
The move of farmers away trom subsidized institutional
creait derives mainly from high default rates that have made them
ineligiDle for most loans from the formal credit system. Many
farmers have also expressed reservations at the rigid and high
transaction costs (paperwork, delay in disbursement of funds,
restriction to the uses of loan funds, etc.) of such types of
credit which Offsets partly the low-interest features of the
loans. Thus, there is a shift from informal to formal sources of
credit from the fifties and sixties to the mid-seventies, and a
shift back to informal sources starting in the second half of the
seventies. It must be noted, however, that most of these studies
are biased towards rice-producing areas whichwas the sector
affected most by the M-99 program. The shift therefore to the
formal credit system in the seventies may be overestimated for
the entire agricultural sector.
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Table _.6
NUMBER OF BORROWERS OF M-99, BY CROP YEAR
1973/74-1982/83
Crop Year Wet Season Dr/ Season
.... i
1973/74 400,342 234_965
1974/75 528,747 355.716
1975/76 303_5£0 154_215
19.76/77 142_696 89,198
1977/78 139_600 91_120
1978/79 120,404 88,188
1979./80 117,986 70,11£
19.80/81 82,586 72,053
i981/82 ' 6£,402 46_596
1982/83 68,822 39,600
So_ce: TBAC Files.
w,
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Table IV. 7
LO_S FOR RICE PRODUCTION, PNB AND RBs
As of December 31, 1982
(_M)
3-year Period
1974-76 1977-79 1980-82
Rural Banks
M-99 1,2629.2 631.4 458.9
Regular 1,031.5 1,699.9 1,956.8
Total 2,300.7 2,33i.3 2,415.7
Philippine National Bank
M-99 1,347.0 562.7 44_.8
Regular 508.6 57.7 244.1
Total 1,850.6 620.4 688.9
Total
M-99 2,616.2 1,194..1 903.7
Regular 1,535.1 1,757.6 2,200.9
Total q,151.3 2,951.7 3,104.6
Source: Sacay, Agabin and Tanchoco. Small Farmer Credit Dilemma, 1985.
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The gover_iment 'has also found it difficult to sustain the
credit subsidy program of M-99. Table IV.7 s!1ows that rice
production loans have shifted from the M-99 crr_dit loans to
regular agricultural loans. This is particularly true in the
case of rural banks.
Although repayment rate is still respectable at 82 percent,
the fall[ in the volume of loans in t_le latter pa_t of the
seventies and early eighties and farmers' difficulty in paying
fJast due loans have made the past due ratio a very high 84
percent. Since an estimated 70 to 90 percent of all borrowers
have dropped out of the program, the losses of much of the past
due loans is a substantial cost to the govern_nent and to
taxpayers.
The single most important issue thatputs in the •entire
viability of the p_ogra,n is the issue of loan defaults. It is
therefore •important that the reasons for defaults are discussed
to see how policy can be improved to tackle this problem. Most
of the studies on credit for the M-99 program devote their
attent ion mainly on this point. Table IV.8 summarizes the
various studies and the various significant reasons of default.
Except for Sacay (1966) and Quinones (1982), most of the studies
concentrated on (or have a large part of £heir respondents from)
cite-producing areas where the M-99 is strongest.
Many of the Stu_lies found multicollinearity problems in the
explanatory variables. Karim (1976) shows that the Pearson
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Table IV. 8
SUMMARY OF FACTORS AFFECTING LO_2_ DELINQUENCY
Factors Studies where Cited a/
FARMER-RELATED FACTORS
i. low income/poverty/poor : Sacay, O.J. (1961, NFAC-SGV (1975), PCARR-
Baecon (1975), TBAC (1975), TBAC (1976),
SSD-DA (1977)_ Karim, A. (1976), Best, B.A.
(1977), Matienzo, K. (1977), TBAC (1982).
2. low volume of nroduce sold : TBAC (1976), Octavio, G.G. (1975),
Matienzo, R. (i977).
3. level of indebtedness : Sacay, O.J. (1961), PCARR-Baecon (1975),
TBAC (1976.), Best, B.A. (1977).
4. misapplication of loan : Sacay, O.J. (1961), NFAC-SGV (1975), PCARR-
proceeds/sales proceeds Baecon (1975), TBAC (1975), TBAC (1976),
SSD-DA (1977), Octavio, G.G. (1975),
TBAC (1982).
5. negative attitude toward : Sacay, O.J. (1961), NFAC-SGV (1975), PCARR-
credit/dole-out mentality Baecon (1975), TBAC (1975), Octavio, G.G.
(1975), Karim A. (1976), Best, B.A. (1977).
6. unfavorable attitude toward : PCARR-Baecon (1975), Octavio, G.G. (1975),
Best, B.A. (1977), TBAC (1982).
7. low educational attainment : Karim, A. (1976)
8. tenurial status : Sacay, O.J. (!961)
9. household size : Oetavio, G.G. (!975)
BANK-RELATED FACTORS
i. bank experience and : Octavio, G.G. (1975), Best, B.A. (1977)
management
2. inaccurate loan information : Sacay, O.J. (1961)
3. inadequate collection policies: Sacay, O.J. (1961), NFAC-SGV (]975),
PCARR-Baecon (1975), Octavio, G.G. (1975)
4. delayed release of loans : Sacay, O.J. (.1961)
5. lack of supervision : Sacay, O.J. (1961)_ Karim, A. (1976)
6. double fSn_ncing of borrowers : NFAC-SGV (1975)
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Table IV.8 (Cont'd.)
Factors Studies where Cited a/
PROGRAM IMPLEMENTQRS
i. inefficient technicians : NFAC-SGV (1975), Octavio, G.G. (1975),
Best, B.A, (1977).
2. lack of incentives to pay : Best, B.A. (1977)
3. "selda" system : TBAC (1976), SSD-DA (1977), Octavio, G.G. (1975i
4. unfavomable policy environment: TBAC (1975)
5. unavailability of ir_igat ion
water : Octavio, G.G. (1975)
OUTSIDE THE CONTROL OF PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS
i. calamities : NFAC-SGV (1975)_ PCARR-Baecon (1975),
TBAC (1975), TBAC (1978), SSD-DA (1977),
Octavio, G.G, (1975), TBAC (1982).
2. farm size : Sacay, O.J. (1961), Best, B.A. (1977),
Matienzo, R. (1977)
3. high p_ices of inputs : Matienzo, R. (1977)
4. low market prices of pmoduce : SSD-DA (1977), Octavio, G.G. (1975)
a/see references.
Source: Sacay, Agabin and Tanchoco. Small Farmer Credit Dilemma, 1985.
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coefficients among the explanatory variables are high. In
general, one consistent indicator of repayment is income and
related variables (such as farm size, volume of produce, level of
indebtedness, educational and tenurial status and household
size). Even other variables may be related to income. The dole-
out mentalitymay affect depressed areas more substantially.
Bank experience and management, loan information and collection
policies as well as technical supervision may be much better in
more progressive and higher income areas and so on. it is
therefore quite difficult to separate out the true causes of
defaults and their magnitudes.
But it is clear that the capacity to pay is the single most
important factor in explaining loan default. Any subsidized and
supervised credit program will ha_e to make sure that their
target borrowers can pay back the loan. Another important factor
is the incentives and motivation that are given to the farmer to
pay his loan properly. The dole-out mentality and simple
pragmatism may work against the viability of a subsidized credit
program. Bruce Best (1977) simulates a hypothetical situation
and shows that a farmer who does not pay his loan will be better
off than one who regularly pays his loan (assuming that the
unpaid original loan is recovered through higher production and
can be "rolled over" into the next periods). The best position
is a" farmer who pays his loan in the beginning until_ such time as
he can avail of a large amount" of loan. After he gets this, he
can default. Bank managementand experience, the efficiency in
disbursement of loans and adequate collection and technical
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supervision policies are the next set of important variables.
The repayment rate seems to be worse for supervised credit
borrowe_:_ and Dorrower_ without collateral compared to ordinary
credit borrowers with collateral (Sacay et alo [1985] ).
All or the arguments given above support the new view that
heavily criticizes the traditional appcoach. To the new scnoo£,
depen<_ing heavily on credit subsidy is self defeating because
eventually it •will still be the more viable farmers, the more
viable enterprises that will _etain theic credit line.
Furthermore, credit is fungible. If it is forced to be put in
unprofitable activities, ways and means will be found to siphon
funds off to more profitable ventures or to consumption s_ending,
whichever yields a higher utility. Thus, a situation arises
wherein the target borrowers - the small farmers - will lose
access to credit, and funds will be spent on items other than for
agricultural production, the complete antithesis of the original
intent of subsidized credit.
This perception goes back to the question raised earlier.
Did the M-99 actually improve equity by providing subsidies to
the small farmer?
Perhaps the most extensive study that has been done on this
area is that by Esguerra (1981). He cites two main types of
credit subsidy. One is the intended subsidy that is, the amount
of subsidy the government" provides so that the _armer borrower
will pay a lower,than-market interest rate for his loan. The
second is •the unintended subsidy, which is actually losses in
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unpaid loans which the farmer will never payback and so becomes
a subsicjy to him.
_v_it_]respect to the intended subsidy, Esguefra claims that
tl%e service charges and the compulsory fees for the Barrio
,Savings Fund and the Barrl0 Guarantee Fund will offset whatever
inten(]e(1 subsidy (difference between the market interest rate and
the subsidized rate) was given. Furthermore he claims that
transaction costs are usually higher for smaller farmers since
f
they have to return more often to secure a loan (thus incurring
higher transportation costs) and they also incur higher
unwarranted charges due to lack of experience.
Thus, for Esguerra, the main form of credit subsidy given to
the farmer is the subsidy in the form of defaulted loans. The
question therefore branches into who availed of most of the
detaulted loans?
Table IV.9 shows that at the height of the M-99 program in
1974, 72 percent of the total volume of formal credit went £o
farmers with more than 5 hectares of land. Assuming (quite
strongly) that M-99 followed the same pattern as the features of
formal credits, Esguerra concludes that most of the M-99 credit
did not go to small farmers. Even if the default rate of small
farmers was higher than that of the big farmers, it will have to
be two and a half times bigger in order for the small farmer to
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Table IV. 9
DISTRIBUTION OF FORMAL CREDIT BY FARM SIZE,
PHILIPPINES, 1974
Farm Size Percent Share Percent Share to
(In hectares) to _/ Total Volume
Total Farms of _/
Formal Credit--
< 1 14 0
1 - 3 47 19
3 - _ 24 8
> 5 i5 7_.
Source: Esguerra (1981)
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equal the subsidy (tJlrough de£aulted loans) given to the big
farmer (since the latter got almost 80 percent of the vo[ume of
loans). £]sguerra does not believe tha_ the.default rate of small
farmers Ks this much bigger titan the big farmers. Thus, his
conclusion is that big farmecs got more of the credit subsidy.
David (1983) also adds that the M-99 program favors irrigated
rice farms which are in general the richer farmS. Studies by
Panganiban (1979) and Ca_ete (1981) show that M-99 participants
have signif ica_itly higher i'ncomes and yields than
nonparticipants. But this is a chicken-or-egg problem: M-99
supporters claim that it is precisely because of the program that
the incomes and yields of participants have increased. Esguerra
further claims that the formal financial institutions,
particularly rural banks, have benefited from the subsidized
cred it particularly since pieces of evidence show that
rediscounting availments had exceeded loans granted.
Tile M-99 program, therefore, Which is a heavily subsidized
program, may have used taxpayers' money to finance mainly big
farmers projects and rural banks' hidden profits. Given that the
tax revenue is highly regressive (based on indirect taxation) and
falls heavily on the low income groups in both urban and rural
areas, the M-99 program may indeed have been a regressive program
in terms of equity distribution. If money increases were used to
generate funds for the uncovered budget deficit, the low fixed
income groups may bear an" unproportional share of the burden of
"inflationary taxation".
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In a more general level, if credit subsi(Jy was used to
introduce the Green Revolution technology, many studies (among
them Ferret [1986] and Panganiban [1979] )point to the fact the
increased yield in production is offset by higher capital
.investments and input requir_.ments for the small farmer so that
there is no general improvement in the economic welfare of the
L_oor farmers (particularly the smaller ones, the lessees and
share tenants) . Inasmuch as urban consumers benefit from
increased food production, the credit subsidy of M-99 and, more
importantly, industrial price policies biased against
agriculture, provide mechanisms of redistributing income from
rural to urban areas.
Finally, apart from equity, some authors notably Feder
(1983) point to the "trauma" ti_at small farmers may have
experienced after the program has been "forced" upon •them. The
necessity of credit with technical and• managerial supervision
could have given many a farmer some difficulties in adjustment.
The policy of the "selda system" has transformed a plan that was
supposed to cultivate group support among farmers into complaints
about having to shoulder somebody else's debt and brought on the
rise of "fake" seldas just so that loans can be gotten.
Panganiban also points to complaints about the rigid nature of
the loans (in Jaen, Nueva Ecija) wherein loans were disbursed 45
percent in cash 55 percent in seedlings, fertilizers, and•
pesticides. The farmers maintalneG that the 45 percent cash loan
is not enough to pay for other farm production costs (e.g. labor
and tractor costs, irrigation fees). The lack of flexibility
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that the farmer is given in allocating the loan fund has resulted
perhaps in higher defaults and i.n the practice of selling part of
the 55 percent share of the loan for cash. As one farmer in the
study said: "Bakit binib_.gyan ng pautang ang bukid ngun_.t and
nag tratrab aho, wala" ? (Why does the gove$:_ment g ive credit
support only to the farm but none to tillers?)
A TBAC study (1976) also" found that many farmers were
willing to make partiai repayment but were not allowed by rucal
banks. All these point to the fact that the farmers have reacted
negatively to the cigid, formal impersonal transactions that
dominate institutional credit-. Could it be a wonder then that
many farmers felt no tinge of regret when they dropped out of M-
99?
Esguerra' s work and the new school of rural financial
markets have shed light on the assessment of the M-99 program.
Subsidized credit, especially on a massive scale as that of M-99,
may not be sustained for long if the formal credit system would
be used as the conduit of cheap funds. Farmers have been-
classified into four categories, (i) those already operating as
reasonably profitable commercial enterprises with access to
e
commercial credit, (2) those with the potential to become
profitable commercial enterprises if access to technology, inputs
and markets at fair prices were possible, (3) those with the
potential to become commercially viable but need special
incentives - subsidies -.during unspecified periods of time, (4).
those with such poor resources that improved access to existing
./
or even new technology would not provide a viable farm enterprise
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capable of supporting the farming unit without permanent
subs id y".
The target of any subsidy program shoul_ be those in
categories (2) and (3). But it seems even now when the Green
Technology has beenwidely used, that majority of farmers still
belong to category (4). The TBAC-UPBRF study shows that 65
percent of farmers fell Delow a threshold income of _5,000 a year
and 50 percent of peasants are dissavers. The NEDA Poverty study
reports that, in 1985, 71.7 percent of peasant families fell
under the category of class C (their own categorization) which
indicates a perennial deficit (see Table IV. II). Another 13
percent falls under the category of class B which indicates an
income just enough for subsistence level. Only 15.3 percent fell
under class A which would be the potential viable customers of
the rural banking system.
This all points to the fact that to solve the rural credit
dilemma, the best policies would be those that will ensure the
increased incomes and well-being of the majority that is in
catego#y (4) or class C. Only when the majority of farms become
viable enterprises will rural credit (even without subsidies)
become stable and dynamic.
This means that subsidies to the rural areas should be given
in terms of direct subsidies to production. Government and
private initiatives in infrastructure building (irrigation seems
to be one very direct method of increasin_ farm yields) and in
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Table IV.IO
TYPES AND NUMBER OF FAMILIES BY FINANCING
CLASS CHARACTERISTICS
No. of Percent
Financing Class Type of Families Families Distri-
Characteristics (Thousands) button
Financing Class A: 170.4 15.3
p24,000, and over
- credit-worthy - Families in Non-
Agriculture : with
Entrepreneurial
Drofits and salaries
329.7 !3.0Financing Class B: .,_
F12,000 - plT,000
- with subsistence saving.$ - Entrepreneurial plus
subsistence plus
-_25% probability of surplus salary: crops
- need rural development fishing, forestry
po!._cie_ ,_m induce
additional farm invest-
ments, improv e farming
profitability
Financing Class C:
Less than P!.2_O00
- income deficit
lo p6,000 - Pll,O00 i. Entrepreneurial with 1,473.6, _ 56..6
family subsistence :
= 10% chance of income crops, fishing,
surpl_s , ' forestry
- need rural develop- - purely salary:
men_ _policies to non-agriculture
increase employment - purely entre-
of family members./ preneurial
increase incomes liveitock and
poultry
2. Below _6P__O000 2.. Those withouz economic - 38.7 15,!
" W-e[fare;ClienZele activity, strictly
family subsistence
' activities,, purely
entrepreneuri_l with- •
out subsiszence
activities in crops,
fishing and forestry
2,360.2 i00.0
;_umce: Chapter 4, NEDA Poverty Study, 1986
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research and development for agricultural production should be
continued and expanded; agricultural and price policies that do
not discriminate against agriculture should be implemented
immediately. The _ encouragement of off-farm e/aployment and
multicropping arrangements will spur higher income and reduce
risks of default.
Perhaps more painful structural changes will have to be
implemented. Esguerra points to the fact that one big drain in
income for the farmer (and which could make a difference in the
viability of the farm) is land rent. We can add that the under-
pricing of palay prices by the traders and the overpricing of
fertilizers and pesticides by input dealers (oftentimes in
interlinked market transactions discussed later) are also a big
drain in the farmer's income. All this leads to the Conclusion
that a comprehensive agrarian reform program should be planned
and executed to make a majority of farmers viable and reduce
their default risks. Structural reforms may be painful but one
should not ignore them in the list of policy recommendations.
C. Specific Policies Directly Related to RFMs
This section discusses the _aplications of certain policies
on the workings of the RFMs. ROdriguez's (1986) compendium of
major policies affecting the RFMs of selected Asian countries is
one of the best sources of information.
Financial liberalization is the general policy being pursued
by the government. Interest rates on deposits and loans of all
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maturities have been floated. Treasury bills, the prime
government securities, are now being auctioned while CB bills are
slowly being phased Out. The rediscounting policy of the Central
Bank has been restructured. Selective credit control already
became a thing in the past. Today, there is only one rediscount
rate which is market-oriented. The discussion below will focus
on the remaining controversial policies directly related to RFMs.
i. Bank Entry and Branchin@. There is a dearth of literature
on bank entry and branching. In the Philippines, there is
no such thing as free entry into banking. 'There is only
free exit. Since 1972, the Central Bank has been
enc0uragir_g branching. The reforms in 1980 has further
pushed this policy forward by allowing unit banks, like
rural banks, to acquire branches. However, current
branching regulations seem to go the other way.
The prescribed minimum paid-in capital for thrift banks
opera%ing outside Metro Manila is _i0 M while for rural
banks, _500,000. If they wish to open up branches in
certain areas, they have to purchase for each branch special
5-year government securities, the mitt%mum amount of which
depends on the service area where the branch is going to be
located. For thrift banks, the schedule is as follows:
a) Service Area I ,
(Heavily overbranched areas) _20 M
b) Service Area II
(Overbranched areas) 2_ M
C) Service Area III
(Ideally branched areas.) i0 M
2OO
d) Service Area IV
(Under branched areas) 5 M
e) Service Area V
(Encouraged)
Rural banks are required to purchase special five-year
government securities worth _500,000 for each branch opened.
In addition, they are not allowed to put+ up branches in
Service Areas I and II.
These regulations are indeed onerous especially to
rural financial institutions. A rural bank wanting to open
a branch in Service Area IV will have to raise _500,000 to
start with. This means that the branch will have to-be at
least as big as the main officeL Definitely, only few rural
banks can comply with it.
Since the interest rate on the +special government
securities is usually lower than the. interest rate on
secured loans, then the interest rate differential can be
treated as an additional license fee. Most of the time,
however, the interest rate differential reaches i0 percent
per annum+.. This means that a rural bank has to pay a
iicense fee of _0,000 annually for each branch it operatesL
This is indeed an exhorbitant license fee. This could be
one of the main reasons why banks are reluctant to open up
or acquire branches in rural-areas.
The requirement to purcase a minimum amount of special
government securities for each branch opened is indeed a
form of entry barrier that in effect appropriates rents to
banks or branches of banks alreddy operating in a certain
locality. Moreover, the criteria used to determine whether
a locality is cons_,dered underbranched or overbranched seem
to favor inefficient banks. Localities are classified into
Service Areas I to V according to the following criteria:
(i) the density of banking units as of end of calendar year,
and (_.) the trend of deposits within the area during the
last three consecutive calendar years preceding the date of
application. If the depos'its growth is low, then the
locality will most likely be classified under Service Areas
I and If. It is known, however, that growth of deposits
depends on a number of factors. One is growth of the real
sector in the locality. Another is the efficiency of
j
financial institutions in mobilizing savings. A locality _
served by inefficient banks or branches would surely be
experiencing low deposit growth even if the real sector is
growing fast. Inefficient banks will have no incentive to
_pr_ve savings mobilization since it would just make entry
easy for others.
The situation would certainly change if bank entry is
more liberal. Perhaps, an ordinary uniform license fee
could replace the requirement to purchase a minimum amount
of special government securities for each branch opened.
Patten and Kern (1986) are even more emphatic in this
regard. They point out that the idea that there is Over-
branching is the same as sayinq that there is too much
competition, which is not the case especially in rural
areas. They also point out that the "economies-of-scale"
approach to banking in the countryside should be re-
examined, lest the rural areas end up wit_ banks serving
only big clients. In the rural areas,, a full-sized branch
bank complete wS_th all banking facilities and personnel may
not be necessary. What may be needed would be 2 , 3
persons, a desk, and a chair. They may not open for 5 days
a week and eight hours a day since transactions are less
frequent as in the urban areas, and mostly they are
seasonal. This kind of flexibility would allow banks to
reduce transaction costs and thereby offer banking services
to small depositors/borrowers in the rural areas. Perhaps,
the experience of Philippine Commercial and International
Bank (PCIB) with their money shop operations is worthwhile
studying.
_. Loan Quota schemes. There are actually two credit quota
schemes in the Philippines. One is the sectoral loan quota
scheme or the agricultural loan scheme and the other is the
geographic loan quota scheme or the deposit retention
scheme. So far, much attention has been devoted to the
former.
(a) The Agricultural Loan Quota Scheme. This scheme was
des igned to augment funds for agricultural lending by
mandating all banking institutions to set aside _.5 percent
of their net incremental loanable funds for agricultural
lending, i0 percent of which is to be lent to agrarias
2O3
reform beneficiaries and 15 percent for general agricultural
lending. As pointed out by several studies, namely TBAC
(1985) and Lamberte and Bautista (1986) among others, this
scheme had very little impact on the flow of credit to the
agricultural sector. Most urban-based banks Which do not
have the capability to lend to the agricultural sector
complied with the requirement by buying eligible government
securities.
T_he current discussions on the agricultural loan quota
scheme are going in two opposite directions. One side
focuses on how it could be made more effective.
Institutional innovations, like having a lead bank which can
issue securities eligible for the agricultural quota, are
being proposed. The contention here is that the policy is
appropriate but the implementation is defective. The other
side argues that the policy itself is defective and only
results in unduly penalizing non-agricultural borrowers.
Its continuation would then be inconsistent with the current
liberalization efforts and the overall direction of making
policies neutral to all sectors. The policy environment
being proposed does away with the biases against
agriculture. This is expected to improve the profitability
of agriculture. Thus, more credit is expected to flow into
the agricultural sector despite the removal of the
agricultural loan quota scheme.
The analysis on this issue has so far been descriptive.
More rigorous studies looking at the micro- and macro- level
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implications of the agricultural loan quota scheme are
therefore necessary to put quantitative support to the
different arguments. At the micro level, the impact of the
scheme on bank profitability and loan • pricing should be
examined. At the macro level, its impact on economio
activity • should be studied. Here, a full-blown
macroeconometric model is _required.
b) Deposit Retention. Sche_m_e. This regulation requires all
branches and extension offices of commercial banks and
thrift banks operating outside of Metro Manila to allot at
least 75 percent of the total deposits generated in a
particular region or servicearea for investment in the same
area'. The intention of this scheme is to prevent the flow
of resources from rural to urban areas. Curiously enough,
it implicitly accepts that investments in urban areas are
more attractive than in rural areas. It was already
mentioned above thatthe scheme was ineffective, i.e., banks
were still able to divert funds to urban areas. But much
[
more than this, the scheme has some undesirable effects.
._ Plainly, the regulation is a form of financial
repression that penalizes banks, borrowers and savers alike.
Under this environment, the RFMs will never attain its full
potentials despite the financial reforms already initiated.
Consider, for example, a predominantly rice-p_roducing
region. Farmers' demand for credit and supply of deposit
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funds are seasonal. During harvest season, farme[s receive
cashwell in excess of their requirements for the immediate
period. Of course, they will • haveseveral choices with
regard to what to do with their surplus funds. One is to
lend their surplus funds to banks•provided the deposit rates
are at•tractive enough. However, banks cannot offer them
higher deposit rates. The reason is very simple. During
harvest seas•on, the demand for credit is usually low while
the Supply of deposit funds is high. since banks are
required to lend 75 percent of total deposits to the same
locality even if the demand for credit is low, they will
have to offer loans at bargain rates to stimulate demand.
They may even resort to financing less worthy projects just
to fulfill the requirement. Naturally, low ef'fective yields
on these •assets will be passed on to savers in terms of
lower deposit •rates. Potential depositors :respond by
•looking for alternative outlets. But in the'rural areas,
there are only few alternatives. One is cash which is less
attractive during inflationary period. The o_her is
unproductive physical assets •, a hedge against inflation. AS
long as banks are constrained to offer to savers financial
- .. .!,
instrumentsw!th competitive rates, they• will never be able
, L
to mobilize funds more effectivelY.
Duri,g planting 'season, demand for credit Increases.
But banks will have difficulty in meeting the demand since
they can transfer only a limited, amount from other branches
with excess funds. The excess demand for funds exert apward
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pressure on lending rates. In the end, borrowers will have
to content th_nselves with higher •interest cost.
Indeed, one who As a net saver in one period and a net
borrower in another period will be doubly penalized.
The situation would be different if there is no deposit
retention regulation. Banks can position thei_ branches in
different localities or regions such that the increase risk
in the demand for credit in one locality can be supported by
the increase in deposit funds in another locality. In this
case, banks can offer attractive deposit rates to Surplus
units and lower lending rates to borrowers.•
m
The same conclusion can be derived if the analysis is
extended to the case where one locality or region is a
perennial surplus unit while the other is a prennial deficit
unit. If unhampered, banks can mobilize and allocate funds
much •more efficiently. _ Thus, to develop the•RFMs, it is
necessary to re-examine •the deposit retention regular.ion.
The concern often expressed by authorities that 'with
the abolition of the deposit retention scheme, funds would
just flow from the rural areas to urban areas would indeed
become real if policies• that artifically make •agriculture
and other rural activities unprofitable whi_e making
manufacturing and other urban activities artificially
•profitable and if financia I repression are eontinued. As
already mentioned above, the government is committed towards
_07
undoing those policy biases. Hence, the deposit retention
scheme will be rendered superfluous.
Again, stud ies are required to provide empirical
content to the diEferent views on this issue. Specifically,
the impact of this scheme on bank competition in general and
savings t,obilization and lending activities of branches of
commercial banks in particular should be examined.
3. Interlinkin@ of Markets
The new school of rural finance is correct in
cciticizing the "supply side" approach to rural finance.
CrecJit subsidies can never be the main policy in creating
I j
rural growth and dynamism. There should be a program
package including macro policies and structural reforms
(among them the prope r financial policies and institutions)
which will ensure the vitality of the rural areas and would
. ensure that most farmers would be bankable. Only then will
_ _o_mal credit system thrive.
But structural reforms and macro policies may take some
time to accomplish or the positive effects may have a long
time lag. What is to be done in the meantime?
The previous chapters have shown that inforntal loans
have fared much better in delivering financial credit to the
small farmers. Should the informal sector therefore be
developed and expanded by consciously allocating more funds
to the informal lender? It seems that informal lenders seem
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tO be embarking on profitable ventures which the formal
!
system can share. Or should the formal sector instead be
allowed to branch out of pure banking activities to go into
trading, marketing and distribution activities to compete
with informal lenders.
The latter policy has been suggested due tO the fact
that interl ink i.ng of markets seem to make lend ing
profitable. The current banking regulations do not allow
formal financial institutions to interlink creditwith input
and output markets. However, the mimicking of informal
lenders by the formal sector will most likely legitimize
informal lending since in actual fact, many informal lenders
are already connected to rural banks, aside from being
informal creditors, traders, millers, etc.
The twin policies of chanelling formal credit to
informal lenders or allowing .the merging of formal and.
informal lenders by expanding banks" activities will enhance
the present situation of interlinked markets. If one views
this. phenomenon as contributing to efficiency and to
chanelling credit, to the small farmers, this will lead to
improving rural productivity and output, and the policies
should be adopted.
But _the _Burplus school has come up with 'legitimate
questions concerning equity in the rural areas. The theory
of interlinked markets and the transaction cost schoois can
help in the discussion.
209
Precisely, informal lenders find it profitable to go
into credit delivery because interlinked credit provides
means of coping with ilsperfect markets.
The entire trading process in the rural areas require
high t_ansactioni_dosts due to bad transportation system,
lack of warehouses and milling facilities near the
production areas.• Unstable production conditions and the
lack of crop insurance schemes imposes much uncertainty
on the traders' supply of agricultural crops.
Thus, the absence of adequate financial credit to the
farmer is used as a mechanism to answer these •-imperfections
in the trading markets. Linking the two markets will result
in farmers getting credit ana the traders getting a
relatively sure supply of cheap agricultural output (and
some more profits to boot from the interest and prlclng of
products).
So far the picture loo'ks good. If one, however,
examines the relationships closer, one may discern some
inequities that may arise. First.of all, traders usually
have information about market prices which the• farmers do
not have. More impQrtantly, the traders possess
transaction-specific assets which strengthen their
bargaining power. Figure IV.I is lifted from Floro's (1986)
paper. It can be seen that traders with access to
transportation, milling, storage, wholesale •and retail
outlets as well as credit funds would have much stronger
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Source: Floro(198_6.).
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bargaining strength compared to the small farmer. It has
been noted • that informal loans have a lower risk and an
administrative cost close to that of the formal sector. The
possibility of "extra" profits in the rural areas is
enhanced as agents with transaction-specific assets can
charge a return for the ownership of •these specific assets.
The practice o_ underpricing palay output and overpricing
input costs would be due more to asymmetric information
access and specific-asset ownership rather than risk payment
(especially since informal loans have low default rates).
The transaction cost school can explain the rationale of
vertical integration wherein market imperfections encourage
institutions to take over many economic activities. Thus,
there are many instances wherein creditors, traders,
millers, warehouse owners, storebwners and even landlords
are • one and the same people. If the government is to
legitimize this, would it turn a blind eye to the
uncterpricing of output and the overpricing of inputs? For
surely, this is partly what makes informal lending
profitable.
The lending by farmer-lenders are not that different.
The imperfection in the land and labor markets may encourage
richer farmers with access to credit funds to go into market
•interlinkage to gain access to land and cheap labor. The
sorting or screeing phenomena wherein nobody would want to
lend out to the poorest of farmers again create an advantage
to the farmer-lenders. Since land and labor markets are
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imperfect, land and •cheap labor may be attained through
credit interlinkage witl]out any market clearance.
This "inequitable•" relationship perhaps explains the
farmers' aversion to •borrowing. The Widesprea d phenomenon
of non-borrowing discusseG earlier (and the farmers'
explicit wish "not to•borrow" ) should call attention to
the "trauma'" they feel towards formal and informal credit.
Although, it is possible that. farmers did not wish to borrow
simply because they know that nobody would accomodate them
anylnore due to their non-repayment of previous loans - a
case of self-selection process.
It is perhaps time•for the Philippines to follow the
path of many succesful countries (such as Japan, Korea,
Taiwan, France) in _eveloping credit and marketing
cooperatives for farmers. Today is the most. opportune time
to do this especially snce. the proposed Constitution
explicitly encourages the development of cooperatives
throughout the •country.
Cooperatives and credit unions, once successful, can go
into market interlinkages just like the informal lenders.
But unlike the informal lending system, there is no unequal
relationship due to asymmetric information access _ and
ownership of • _transaction-specific assets. The farmers
themselves own and control the credit unions and marketing
arms. They therefore gain access to credit and marketing
which increases their bargaining strength- Vis-a-vis
213
landlords, traders and rich• farmers.
Shoddy experience with government-imposed cooperatives
should not discourage farmers to organize themselves into
associations and unions that will lead them towards self-
reliance. This has been the successful experience of many
countries. Of course, this strategy also calls for
government help and support in terms of providing the right•
institutional network and control as well as technical
assistance and support for market outlets.
Indeed, it is worthwhile to studythe experience of
cooperative rural banks which Currently integrate lending
with input and output markets. Apart from looking at
efficiency, the study should also examine equity issues
where a few are still able to control the cooperative.
Here, the mechanisms for control and sharing of benefits
may be different from an ordinary rural bank and may be
advantageous or disadvantageous to ordinary members. The
analysis can be further enriched• if a comparison will be
made between the performance of cooperative rural banks and
other financial institutions (e.g., rural banks, branches of
commercial banks) operating in the rural areas•
The other complementary approach is to allow more
competition in the rural areas. Once interlinking of
markets is perceived by many as profitable, many are
expected to enter the• market. The form of organization
would be secondary to thedecision to enter the market.
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This is wl]er_-eel,try ba1$_;ie.rs oc erltry /egulations neecl to be
I iberal ized.
4.  ehatttt_ tat_i.o, rural, : anks
The dis_lal pli£11"It ,,_£ the rural banking system
(RBS) has currently received greater attention _co_rl the
public. About 80 [)ercent o£ the 877 rural banks ac<_. in
a financial bind (£BA_'c [1986])'. This _s not the [:irst
time that the RBS suffered financial difl_iculties. The
huge rediscounting arr.earages piled up by many rural
banks in 1980 had prompted the Central Bank to
introduce rehabilitation measures for rural banks.
There seems to be a general agreement tilat
erroneous policies, such - as cheap rediscour_ting
policies, special credit programs, liberal past due
ratio rules, and laxity in 'bank supervision, have
unwittingly undermined the health of many rural banks.
But the economic crisis in 1983 has certainly
compounded their present problem. Even banks located
in urban centers', especially small ones, were not
spared Of the crisis.
Several studies have examined the plight o£ the
RBS and have also proposed certain rehabilitation
schemes. Among Others are Lamberte (1985), Bajada
.(1986)i TBAC (1986), Lamberte and Bautista (1986), RBAP
(1986) and Patten and Kern (19_86). There is agreement
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o,l the need1 to rel_abilitate the rural banking system.
[_tr-astc,jctures are already in place and to do away
with them wout<l be snore costly, not to mention its
deL)ilitating effect on the rural people's confidence in
tile banking syste,n. Majority favor selective
rehabilitation to weed out badly or unprofessionally
managed rural banks from the system. This does not
necessacily mean that a locality whose rural bank is
close_l wi It not be serv_-d by a bank. With the
acco;npanyi,_g proposed deregulation scheme, new entrants
_Lay be allowed to operate. In areas, where a full-
s ized bank cannot operate profitably, perhaps an
exte,_sion o£fice may be opened to serve the community
E
2-3 days a week as suggested by Patten and Kern.
So;he proposals are also advanced to strengthen
rural banks. One proposal is to encourage commercial
banks to have formal tie-ups or management contracts
with rural banks for a limited period or until such
time the rural bank is completely rehabilitated and has
gained sufficient management skill. Still another
proposal is to adopt a mod if led form of area of
responsibility system employed in India to improve the
J
rural financial markets. That is, a commercial banks
men be given sole franchise to operate in a certain
area, say a province, for a specific period.
Implicitly, rural banks will be directly under the
responsibility of a commercial bank.
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The views regarding the specific measures to be
adQpted to rehabilitate and strengthen rural banks are
indeed diverse. It means that more discussions are
Needed to arrive at the best rehabilitation scheme.
Perhaps, agree,nent on basic p_inciples and assumptions
cegarding the policy environme,lt for the ne×£ ten years
should be arrived at ficst. Some indicative figures on
costs and benefits will also be needed.
The Central Bank has a big role to play in any
rehabilitation scheine that may be adopted. But it has
to redirect its energy. As suggested by Patten and
Kern, it should intervene at the bank level, not at the
borrower level. That is, it should concentrate on bank
supervision and provide training program to improve the
quality of management of rural banks, and should not
tell banks whom and where to lend. It should also
relinquish its cesponsibility to manage certain credit
programs. The Central Bank as an institution is not
designed to assume this responsibility. The current
problem with the ALF program should be enough to
convince authorities. Funds of the various credit
programs managed by the Central Bank including those
managed by non-banking govenment entities may be
consolidated and placed under the responsibility of
another agency.
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Chapter V
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESEARCH AGENDA
This last chapter is divided into two sections. The first
section d iscusses some pol icy recommendations based on the
research materials reviewed above. The agenda for future
research o11 rural finance are presented in the second section.
A. P0_Iic y Recommendations
There is no intent here to present a comprehensive policy
agenda for the improvement of the entire economy or of the rural
sector. Those w_o are interested in comprehensive agenda may
consult the following two documents: "Economic Recovery and Long
Run Growth: Agenda for Refor,ls" PIDS[1986]) and "Agenda for
ACtion _or the Philippine Rural Sector" (PIDS-CPDS[1986]). Some
of the commentaries on these two documents appeared in leading
newspapers. Others were circulated in mimeograph form. One
notable commentary is that of Ranis entitled: "The Economics of
the Aquino Government: Policy Agenda, Actions and Prospects"
(1986).
The objective of recommending some policies in this paper is
very modest, that is, to strengthen the rural financial markets
(RFMs). _trengthening the RFMs means making them efficient
mobilizers of savings and allocators of funds. Thus, the policy
recommendations are not only intended to improve the credit
delivery system in the rural areas, but they are also aimed at
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improving the other function of RFMs - that of mobilizing
savings. It should however be noted that strenthening the RFMs
is not an end in itself. Rather, it is only one of tl]e means of
truly developing the rural sector.
i. Macroeconomic Policy Environment
This is one area where more reforms are needed. Just by
making macroeconomic policies neutral to all sectors of the
economy _ould have already greater positive impact on the rural
and agricultural sector. In this regard, the overvaluation of
the peso which usually hurts agriculture more than other sectors
must be avoided. The present estimate of the overvaluation of
the peso more than offsets the gains derived from the removal of
export taxes on agricultural exports.
Trade policies must likewise be re-examined. In 1984, the
domestic price of urea was 100 percent higher than the the border
price. The quantitive restrictions allowed a few domestic firms
to charge higher prices for fertilizer. This is unfortunate
since the cost of fertilizer has the biggest share in the total
production cost of farmers. Liberalizing the importation of
fertilizer and other farm implements, such as hand tractors, is
essential in reducing the cost of producing agricultural
products. In this connection, farmer-cooperatives may be allowed
to directly import fertilizers and other farm implements. In the
same manner, protection given to local producers of road vehicles
and tires _must be removed because it has unnecessarily increased
the price of transport vehicles. The high transport cost
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currently absorbed by farmers/entrepreneurs is partly due to
this.
The inadequacy and/or lack of farm-to-market roads in most
parts o_ the rural areas is also one factor making rural
enterprises unprofitable. This is where the infrastructure
program of the government needs some re£ocusing. For instance,
there is greater social and economic value in building more farm-
to-market roads and ports £aci[ities in the rural areas than
building another LRT in Metro Manila.
The implementation of genuine a,d comprehensive land reform'
the encouragement of multicropping arrangements, the setting up
of institutional and physical infrastructures that will increase
agricultural productivity (e.g., irrigation systems, honest and
efficient local governments) and a sensible price stabilization
policy all contribute to rural development and dynamism that will
be conducive to the healthy growth of a rural credit system.
2. Government's Planning and Administrative Machineries
The government's planning and administrative machineries at
the regional and provincial level must be strengthened. Socio-
economic characteristics substantially vary from one region to
another, and national planning bodies located in Metro Manila
usually do not take this into consideration in their planning
exercises. Policies and programs formulated at the regional and
provincial levels would be more effective and responsive than
those Prepared at the national level. The reason being that most
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of those would come from residents who are more knowledgeable
of their locality than several bureaucrats holding office in
Metro Manila. Citizens_would be more interested in policy making
and planning if they have a relatively inexpensive government
machinery.
The presence of licensing boards • at •the regional and
provincial levels will greatly help potential entrepreneurs,
espcially exporters. Currently,. exporters residing in the
provinces are intimidated by the high transaction costs of
obtaining a license permit from government agencies located in
Metro Manila. The regional and provincial offices should also be
tasked with collecting and disseminating vital economic
information, especially information on prices of commodities
predominantly produced and/or consumed by residents.
Social services should likewise be extended to the rural
areas. For example, if government health services were available
in the rural areas, then farmers would not borrow anymore from
the informal moneylenders to pay for relatively expensive health
services provided by private institutions/individuals. Thus,
borrowing will De limited to productive purposes.
3. Monetary and Credit Policies
The freely floating interest rate, the uniform and market-
oriented rediscount rate and the gradual withdrawal of CB bills
w_ich partly caused disintermediation in the last two years are
steps in the right direction. Stud ies reviewed aboge have
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pointed out that subsidized credit did not have a Visible
I
contribution for the adoption of new technology.
Entrepreneurs/farmers adopt new technology if theythink that it
is profitable. Moreover, subsidized credit is not at all cheap
to borrowers. Aside from this, it favors only big, low-land
irrigated farms, while losses from subsidized credit programs due
to loan defaults have to be borne by all taxpayers, including
those who were denied access to cheap credit. The interest rate
subsidy to agriculture even failed to offset the incentive
structure that was biased against agriculture. The best approach
is still to change the incentive structure itself. The cheap
credit policy has only succeeded in impairing the growth of rural
financial markets. Delivering subsidized credit to the rural
sector was looked upon as the main function of rural financial
institutions.
Having a uniform rediscount rate is indeed a welcome
development. This means that the Central Bank will not anymore
dictate torural financial institutions on where, whom and how
much to lend per project. It can instead focus on its
stabilization and bank supervision functions. But one
question is how to determine the rediscount rate. The
rediscount rate should not be based on the weighted average of
time deposit and MRR90 rates but rather on the rate offered to
prime borrowers (maybe a little lower than the prime rate). If
the rediscount rate were based on the weighted average of time
deposit and MRR90 rates, then rediscounted funds would still look
very attractive to banks since they do not have to put up
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reserves against them, unlike in the case of deposit funds. This
#
would just makebanks continue depending on the Central Bank for
red iscounte_i funds, while savers continue to miss the
opportunities offered by a well-functioning financial market.
The Central Bank is not designed to manage special credit
programs. Unlike an ordinary bank, its staff is not trained to
evaluate individual loan requests. Therefore, it should stop
managing credit programs.
4. Banking Policies and Regulations
This is now the opportune time to push more reforms in the
banking system. The policy of stressing on bank size, rather
than bank competition, needs to be re-examined. There is no
Clear indication that profitability is largely determined by
size. A study shows that medium-sized private commercial banks
also enjoyed higher profits. The emphasis on size would just
hurt the rural, agricultural sector. Big banks tend to
accomodate only big accounts, and small accounts in the rural
sector will be left out in this setting.
The policy of disallowing new entrants into the banking
system is detrimental to the development of the financial system.
New entrants usually bring in innovative techniques, otherwise
they cannot survive the competition put up by existing banks.
Likewise, existing banks have to stay in competitive form in
order to survive the growing competition. This is one factor
that puts dynamism into the banking system.
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Liberal bank entry and branching are certainiybeneficial to
the rural areas which are currently starved of banking .services
due to the failures of many rural banks. In some instances,
rural banks failed because oE mismanagement, and potentially
good clients may completely leave the banking system if no
alternative bank in the same locality is available to them. It
should be noted that many rural banks have emerged because o£ tl]e
incentive structure provided them. Witl_ the new policy
environment mentioned above, it. would be quite ha_d for many
rural banks to internalize new banking habits, whereas new
entrants enter the market with the notion that rural banking
itself is profitable, not that subsidies make rural banks
profitable. While entry is liberalized, the Central Bank should
strengthen its supervisory function so that bank failures can
be minimized.
Some rural banks want to increase their equity. But the
ceiling on equity participation by each stockholder has sometimes
undermined t_is effort. The intention of putting a ceiling on
equity participation is to avoid undue concentration of wealth,
especially if most of the profits derived come from government
subsidies. This is meritorious so long as only one bank is
allowed per town. But with liberal bank entry and the phasing
out of subsidies, the ceiling on equity participation becomes
unnecessary.
There is more merit in giving banks greater flexibility to
operate branches in the rural areas. The minimum branch size, or
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the requirement to buy government securities the amount of which
depends on whether the service area applied for is overbranched
or underbranched needs to be re-examined. It seems that the
Current regulation might result in the creation of bigger but
relatively fewer bank branches in the rural areas serving very
few bigger clients. Currently, it is deemed cheaper to buy
existing banks in the rural areas than to open a new branch.
While there are merits to this, its main drawback is that it
stifles competition since the high entry cost technically deters
potential entrants from entering the market. Branches may not
nessarily operate five days a week depending on the demand for
their services. In this case, the same staff can be transferred
from one branch to another, thereby reducing administrative
costs.
Loan quota schemes, i.e., the agricultural loan quota and
deposit retention schemes, should be removed not because they are
ineffective, but because they violate sound banking principles.
Under these schemes, banks are compelled to hold low-yielding
assets, which consequently impair their ability to mobilize
funds. Although some banks are able to circumvent these
regulations, there are dead-weight losses incurred in
circumventing them.
5. Credit and Marketing Cooperatives
Experience _ with government-imposed eooperative movement
has not been that pleasant, but it should not deter us from
225
taking a second look at it. A number of countries are successful
in their cooperative movement. The advantage with cooperatives
is that they can go into interlinking just like the informal
lenders. So. they can reduce administrative and risk costs. But
the similarity ends here. With cooperatives, there is no unequal
relationship between lender and borrower arising from asymmetric
information access and ownership of transaction-specific assets
since the farmers or borrowers themselves own and control the
cooperative bank an_ marketing arms. Of course, this strategy
calls for government help and support in terms of providing the
right institutional network and control as well as technical
assistance and 6upport for _narket outlets. But the error of
providing cooperatives with cheap funds to entice farmecs and
other individuals to join the movement should never be repeate_/.
Also, membership to cooperatives should be open to any interested
individuals in the community, not only to bona fide farmers.
6. Rehabilitation of Rural Banks
This is one area where a clear policy statement is urgently
needed. The longer a decision is made regarding what to do
with failing rural banks, the .lore uncertain the health of the
rural financial system will be. For example, a strong rural bank
may assume that all arrearages with the Central Bank will be
condoned, and therefore it starts delaying payments for its
borrowings from the Central Bank. If its assumption turns out to
be wrong, then it is just unnecessarily putting itself in a
6
difficult situation. A weak bank may have the same expectations,
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and therefore it does not exert any effort to introduce changes
or innovations. In the meantime, those rural banks which are
good candidates for rehabilitation continue to suffer, and they
might reach a stage where they are already beyond repair.
It is therefore necessary that the Central Bank immediately
declare a selective bank rehab[litatibn policy. This is to
i,ni_ress U_on banks that not all of them will De rehabilitated.
As a _irst step, the Central Bank has to conduct a thorough bank
examination to l)e completed within two months. Independent
auditing firms and coml,ercial banks interested in buying rural
o
banks may be contracted to help the Central Bank in examining the
status of rural banks. Rural banks involved in fraud should
immediately be closed. While bank examination is ongoing, a
specific rehabilitation scheme should be devised. As a general
principle, the rehabilitation scheme should be anchored on the
new policy environment. That is, rural banks can survive without
enjoying preferential treatement from the Central Bank.
B. Research Agenda
There is currently a tremendous interest in rural financial
markets research. Interestingly, many of the proposed
researches attempt to address some of the research gaps
identified in the previous chapters. Some of them have in fact
benefitted from the preliminary draft of this review. We will
E irst highlight the objectives of major research efforts which
are going to be launched shortly and then suggest additional
research topics.
227
i. Major Research Efforts
(a) The CBP/WB - Sponsored Research Project: "Strategies
for Expansion of Banking Services in the Rural Areas."
This is perhaps the most ambitious research
project in rural finance. The expected output of this
project is a set of "recommendations for monetary and
regulatory measures including short term and longer
term implementation programs to rectifycurrent short
fall and inadequacies, and to promote development of a
sound and financially viable banking and financial
services in the rural areas." The research project
includes the following specific areas (see the
document= "Request for Proposal,, CBP [1986] for more
details):
(i) Banking Operations (unit and Branch Banks)
(i) To review and evaluate the organizational
structure and manpOwer, and assess their ade-
quacy in performance of current operations;
(2) To examine the scope and limitations of the
types of financial services offered and
assess the procedures adopted to carry out
various banking transactions;
(3) To assess the nature, scope and quality of
supervision and technical assistance provided
by regional and head offices;
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(4) To assess the adequacy of internal control
and management on overall operation and
particularly in ensuring the quality of loans
and other investments, including deposit and
other cash operations; and
(5) To evaluate the policies and procedures
involved in bank planning and budgeting,
promotion and banking services, technical
assistance and community relations.
(ii) Legal and Regulatory Framework
(i) To review existing laws, banking regulations,
circulars and other government policies
affecting branch/unit banking operations;
(_) To document the changing regulatory milieu
during the past years as it pertains to
banking _ctivity. Among other items, this
should include reserve requirements, interest
rate regulations on deposits and loans,
rediscount policies, branch banking
regulations, lending quotas, restrictions on
portfolio diversification, the composition of
liability, capital subscription, tax
regulations, andsupervision regulations;
_9
(3) TO determine the incidence of hhe impact of
these regulations in different banking
enti£ies, there2_ y explaining the role of
policy measures in the structure, conduct and
performance of the banking system;
(4) To •identify the new regulatory environment
that has resulted from the evolving
deregulation measures recently embarked upon •
by the Central Bank and government; and
(%) To forecast the probable influence and impact
of these new regulations on the evaluation of
the banking sector servicing clientele
outside major metropolitan areas;
(iii) Other Possible-Considerations
(i) TO evaluate training facilities, plans and
programs for staff development in all phases
of branch/unit operations ;
•(2 ) To identify and examine the role of
supporting institutions (e •g • Ministry of
Agriculture and Food, National Food and
Agriculture Council, National Food Authority,
Philippines Crop Insurance Corporation, etc. )
in the areas .of lending, supervision,
technical assistance and collection, with the
ob jective of improving coordination and
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harnessing services available from such
institutiOns.
(3) To assess the role of non-bank and other non-
institutional financial intermediaries in
relation to the expansion of rural credit
delivery system and other forms of financial
services.
(4) Recent trends whereby larger banks invest in
the equity of smaller banks and merging of
rural banks may • warrant further
investigation.
One can immediately observe that the study focuses only
on the formal sector. This is understandable since the
Central Bank which is the main sponsor of the study has
direct responsibility only on the formal sector. It might
however be useful to comment that the limited time alloted
for the entire study, which is five months, may compel the
research agency which is going to carry •out the research
undertaking to treat rigorously only • a few objectives.
(b)• The Ohio State University (OSU) and Philippine
Institute for Development Studies (PIDS ) Sponsored
Study on Comparative Bank Studies in Rural Areas.
The overall objective of this study is to examine
the comparative performance of rural banks (RBs) 'and
branches of private co_unercial banks (PKBs). It seeks
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to provide answers to the following specific questions:
(see Graham [1986] for more details):
(i) To what extent does the PKB branch activity in a
given rural area complement or substitute for the
RB activity?;
(_.) To what extent and in what ways does the hehavior
and performance of the PKB branches influence the
behavior and performance of the RBs and vice-versa
in the same overlapping market area?
(3) To what extent does the indirect "downstream" on-
lending through informal networks (i. e., input
suppliers, product buyers, processors,
moneylenders, larger farmers, etc...) occur with a
greater multiplier effect t_rough liquidity
channelled through PKB branches vs. the RBs?
(4) To what extent may the PKB branches and RBs be
servicing different (or similar) informal lending
networks on-lending to a different set of (or the
same) final borrowers?
(5) To what extent are there different levels and
incidence of lending costs (i.e., non-interest
operational costs) for PKBs and RBs in servicing
their rural clientele?
(6) To what extent is t:he regulatory and supervisory
environment (..from the Central Bank [CB]) different
232
from the PKBbranches and RBs? And to what extent
does the regulatory environment play an
instrumental role in explaining their comparative
performance, either in terms of influencing the
operational costs of lending or risk exposure,
among other features?
(7) To what extent could a change in the CB
regulations governing RB behavior (e.g., allowing
more portfolio diversification, different capital
subscription regulations, internal operational
procedures and reporting regulations, etc.),
allowing them more freedom to act like a small
commercial bank, improve their financial
performance and viability?
(8) To what extent could a new set of incentives
induce PKBsand their branches to serve a wider
range of lower income rural clientele?
(c) The Technical Board for Agricultural Credit (TBAC),
Ohio State University (OSU) and Philippine Institute
for Development Studies (PIDS) Sponsored Study on Rural
Savings Mobilization.
This study will focus on savings mobilization in
the rural sector, an issue which is grossly neglected
by past studies. Rural banks are the main financial
institutions included in this study (see Tolentino
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[ 1986] _or more de_ails) . The specific questions
addressed by this study are the following:
(i) What factor or factors determine the number and
level of savings deposit accounts held by a rural
bank?
(2) Which factor or factors are the most influential
determinants of the level of savings deposits held
by a given rural bank?
(3) What factors lie behind the differential (if any)
ability of rural banks in deposit mobilization, as
&
compared to the operations of commercial banks?
(4) To what extent are savings deposit accounts
interest-elastic or service-elastic?
(5) To what extent are the savers served by a given
rural bank affected by "money illusion", or
respond to nominal, or not real, interest rates?
(6 ) What specific strategies may rural bankers
implement to accelerate to growth of the number
and level of accounts their respective banks hold?
(7). Which specific activities mentioned in no. 6 have
the greatest effects on the deposit mobilization
effects of rural banks?
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The entire study will be carried out in two stages.
The first stage makes use of balance sheets and income
statements of rural banks to answer some of the key
questions outlined above. The second stage uses
experimental design. Data on deposit status and performance
of selected rural banks before and after they implement
specific schemes to increase the level of deposits. The
same approach will be applied in analyzing saving behavior
of households located in the service areas of selected rural
banks. This is going to be the first in-depth study on
savings mob ilization utilizing simultaneously information
collected from rural banks and from the communities served
by the rural banks.
This study will be implemented by TBAC with some
support from OSU and PIDS.
(d) The ADB-Sponsored Research on Informal Credit Markets.
This researc_ project aims to provide a better
understanding of the behavior of the informal credit
markets, both urban and rural. It intends to cover
many important areas, as may be gathered from the
following indicative terms of reference for the study
(see Ghate [19863 for more details):
(I) Estimating more accurately than existing estimates
the size of the informal sector, both rural and
urb an.
_.3_
(_) Trends in size, and factors contributing to the
growth or contraction of the informal sector in
the short and long term, (such as financial
"repression" or liberalization in the formal
sector, growth of the volume of formal sector
credit, growth of urban informal enterprises,
growth in the demand for consumption credit,
remittances from workers abroad received through
non-banking channels, etc.).
(3) Establishing the major structure of the informal
sector; its segmentation and sub-markets, each
with its own size, sources and uses of funds,
market participants, interest rates, documentary
instruments, linkages with each other, and with
the formal sector. In particular, a
classification of markets into homogenous borrower
groups/borrowing purposes with a view to assessing
the existing role and potential contribution of
the informal sector in meeting them.
(4) The policy and legal environment (usury laws, debt
moratoria, registration requirements, restrictions
on deposit taking, etc.).
(_) The savings mobilization role of informal credit
markets. An analysis of the sources and uses of
funds to assess the net additive contribution of
ICMs to savings, by offering savers a higher
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return than formal sector institutions. The role•
of Roscas (known as "paluwagan" in the
Philippines) in mobilizing household savings in
particular. The impact on the saving mobilization
role of the informal sector by restrictions placed
on deposit taking on NBFIs and other informal
intermediaries.
(6) The allocative efficiency role of the informal
sector credit; its private and social
productivity, and in particular the extent to
which it alleviates inefficiencies that st_n from
too tightly or inappropriately controlled credit
allocation by the formal sector.
(7) The equity impact of ICMs .in making credit
available to small borrowers, (the small
enterprise sector, marginal farmers, women
entrepreneurs, etc.).
(8) The role of informal credit in me_.ing consumption
needs.
(9) The efficacy of monetary policy, creditpolicy and
selective credit controls in the presence of an
informal sector.
(i_) Interaction between formal and informal credit and
the extent to which they are substitutes or
co,nplementary.
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(ii_ Channels of linkage between formal and informal
sectors (e.g. trade credit, access by informal
lenders to thebanks).
(i_) The informal sector and depositor security. The
incidence of fraud and "failures" as compared to
that in the formal sector.
(13) Interest rate formation in the informal sector.
The relative importance of (i) transactions costs,
(ii) risk premia, (iii) cost of funds and (iv)
monopolistic (or obligopolistic) profits stemming
from market power.
(14) Trends in interest rates. How they compare with
f_rmal sector rates when "hidden" costs in the
former and borrower transactions costs in the
latter are included. The relationship between
interest rates, collateral, the purpose, size and
duration of loans, and borrower and lender type.
(i_) Where monopoly profits exist, the feasibility and
design of policy action to engender more
I
competitive conditions (e.g. through more
effective competition from the formal sector,
changes in the legal environment, encouraging new
informal entrants through refinancing facilities,
etc.)
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(16) A documenting of the many advantages of informal
credit as a source of possible innovations in the
formal sector.
(17) Regarding transactions costs and risk premia, the
behavioral characteristics, practices, and
mechanisms through which informational links are
formed and maintained with borrowers, and debt
service ensured, with their advantages and
disadvantages. In particular the importance of
interlinkage of transactions in credit with those
in land-lease, labor and product markets. The
extend to which interlinkage is taking different
forms (e.g. the increasing importance of input-
dealers and output traders with land reform and
the co_nercialization of agriculture). Is the
dearth of, and control over, credit, used to
obtain more favorable terms in other markets, or
is the existence of contracts in other markets an
enabling condition for credit transactions too,
serving to increase the availability of credit and
perhaps even lowering its costs?
8
(18) Where competitive conditions exist, but the
opportunity cost of funds is high, the
feasibility and design of refinancing schemes to
reduce the cost of funds and take advantage of the
lower transactions costs of informal lenders
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(whether on account interlinkage or otherwise) by
using them as retailers of credit.
(19) An optimal legal and policy environment towards
the informal sector.
The Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS)
and the Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) are going to
implement this Study. Some of the aspects mentioned in the
terms of reference will not be rigorously treated in view of
the budget and time constraint. As an approach towards
meeting most of the objectives, the study is b_oken up into
five major topics:
(i) Monetary and credit policies and the response of
banks to the challenge put up by the informal
moneylenders.
(ii) Overall scope of the informal credit markets: the
urban sector.
(iii) The response of the informal credit market to new
market opportunities: a case history of the
overse_s employment boom.
(iv) Interaction of the informal and formal credit
markets in the development of therural sector:
comparative case histories of traditional and cash
crops.
v) Market conditions within the informal credit
market and linkages to the formal credit market: a
design for a system of economic monitoring.
2. Additional Research Topics
(a) Market Segmentation in the Rural Areas
It has become fashionable to say that the financial
markets in the rural areas are highly segmented. And yet,
there is no study analyzing in greater detail the extent and
causes of financial market segmentation. Are they due to
imperfections inherent in a rural economy or to financial
policies and regulations? Different causes of segmentation
certainly require different policy prescriptions. Knowing
the extent of segmentation will more or .less tell us the
amount of policy actions required to deal with the
segmentation problems.
It might be useful to start with a detailed description
of the financial markets in a certain area or region. Then,
a model o{ financial market segmentation has to be devised
and tested. Modelling the financial market segmentation is
one area grossly neglected in rural finance. Perhaps, the
empirical model developed by Acharya and Madhur (1983) can
be a useful starting point.
The study may be enriched by complementing the usual
economic analytical approach with anthropological approach.
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(b) Other Formal Lenders in the Rural Areas
Past studies on rural finance focused on the rural
banks. The proposed studies discussed above will include
branches of commercial banks, aside from rural banks. But
these are not the only formal financial institutions
operating in the rural areas. Registered credit unions
numbering more than one thousand also operate in the rural
areas. Some of them are attached to social action centers
of the Catholic/Protestant Church, while others operate
independently. They are small but their presence in a small
community is quite significant. They operate like a rural
bank, buttheir deposit mobilization and lending operations
are limited to their members only. As of this moment, they
are outside the control of the Central Bank. In view of the
problems encountered by many rural banks, the growth
potentials of these credit unions should be explored. Here
is where a study about the performance of credit unions and
impact of some regulations on their behavior is badly
needed. To date, no scholarly study on credit unions has
been made.
Another group of formal financial institutions
operating in the rural areas is the cooperative rural banks
(CRBs). Presently, there are _9 operating in as many
provinces. Previous studies lumped them together with rural
banks. This is;hardly justifiable on at least two grounds.
First, CRBs are controlled by member cooperatives, whereas
_4R
RBs are owned by individuals or a few families. Secondly,
it is institutionally and functionally linked to Sa/nahang
Nayon and Area Marketing Cooperative, a classic case of
market interlinking. This feature is at least legally
absent in rural banks. Thus, efficiency may be achieved by
CRBs just is in the interl inki.ng of markets by the
landlords and traders. But this has an added feature since
smatl fa cruets _ themselves own the cooperaives, thereby
increasing their access to institutional capital, financial
and trading markets. Thus, it is worthwhile to have a stud M
more focused on the CRBs.
The study may include a comparative analysis of the
performance of CRBs and other types of rural financial
institutions and the advantages/disadvantages in having them
operate under the Rural Banking Act. A comparison of the
benefits (in terms of higher income) derived by a CRB member
and a borrower from an ordinary rural bank or from an
informal lender is extremely useful to shed light on equity
issues. ..
(c) Transaction Costs and Market Interlink
It has been mentioned by several studies reviewed above
that informal lenders in the rural areas an have Bdvantage
over rural banks because they can use interlinked markets to
reduce transaction and risk costs. In fact, this is the
main reason given for the suggestion to allow rural banks to
go into allied and non-allied activities. Unfortunately,
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however, there is no study providing estimates of the
transaction costs incurred by lenders and borrowers in
interlinked markets. There is a study that shows that a
trader-lender tends to undervalue the price of the produce
of borrowers. But what is his cost of jointly undertaking
lending and marketing? On the part of a borrower, what is
his cost of using interlinked markets as compared to
unlinked markets? It should be noted that a farmer incurs a
search or marketing cost if he does not enter into a pre-
arranged marketing agreement. The price undervaluation by
trader-lenders may just be equal to the net price farmer-
borrowers obtain after subtracting the marketing from the
gross unit price of the product. These issues are not
clearly dealt with by existing studies.
There is therefore a need to study the transaction
costs in an interlinked markets, both from the point of view
of lenders and borrowers. Perhaps, a multiproduct joint
cost function can be utilized here asan analytical
%echnique (see Lamberte [1982]). The main idea is to find
out whether cost savings are realized by having both lenders
and borrowers engage in interlinked markets. Aside from
informal lenders, the cooperative rural banks (CRBs) ma M be
included in this study.
(d) Differential Saving Rates Between Urban and Rural
Households
It has been observed that the average saving rate of
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rural households is higher than that of urban households for
the same income bracket. Thi_ has come as a surprise since
normally, the reverse is to be expected. What if the
marginal propensity to save also follows he same pattern?
It means that society will be better off if a scarce
resource is employed in the .rural areas to increase
household income since it would have greater impact on
aggregate savings than if it were e_aployed in urban areas.
In view of this policy implication, it is indeed important
to examine the urban and rural households' saving rates
separately and determine factors that can explain the
differential saving rate_.
/
(e) _--Financial Saving
As pointed out in the review, past shudies yielded
conflicting results regarding the "interest-rate elasticity"
and "institution elasticity" of financial saving. The
conflicting results could be due to differences in the
definition of dependent and independent variables, time
periods, and coverage of financial institutions. In
addition, the problem of simultaneity has not been dealt
with adequately by sticking to a single equation model.
Perhaps, a study will be made to sort out those factors that
produce the conflicting results so that we can have a
•definite answer whether the "interest-rate elasticity" and
institution-elasticiy" hypotheses work here in th_
Philippines.
_45
The TBAC-OSU-PIDS study on savings mobilization will
try to deal with this issue, but it will focus only on rural
banks. We suggest a study to be done for the entire banking
system since the presence of other banks in the rural areas
could have greater impact on savings mobilization.
The saving potentials of rural households must be
studied. Previous studies on rural saving have concentrated
on the farm households only. As pointed out above, non-farm
households in the rural areas are as important as farm
households. But their saving behavior has not been
analyzed. We suggest that a study employing the record-
keeping data gathering technique be utilized to study the
saving potentials of farm and non-farm households. The
objective is to find out _hether there are different cash
flow patterns among households in the same community that
can provide opportunities for financial intermediation.
Financial institutions operating in the area where sample
farm and non-farm households are located must likewise be
examined to determine the extent to which they exploit the
different cash flow patterns of various households. The
impact of the deposit retention scheme on the savings
mobilization performance of rural financial instihutions can
perhaps be examined here.
(f) Behavior of Borrowers
Studies dealing with the behavior of borrowers and loan
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repayment rates mainly focused on farmer'borrowers. Among
the farmer-borrowers, rice and corn farmers were the most
popular subjects on these studies. This is understandable
since many of these studies were designed to evaluate credit
programs, and most of the credit programs, even guarantee
schemes, were addressed mainly to rice/corn producers. In
_ddition, land reform has so far been confined to rice and
corn farms. Indeed, little is known about the demand for
credit of non-rice/corn producers, say vegetable growers,
who are not beneficiauies of land reform and their repayment
rates. How did they finance their farm enterprises? Are
the credit instruments "or arrangements including price and
tenor of credit substantially different from those normally
used among rice/c0rn farmer-borrower%? Here, we expect that
the kind of commodity influences to a large extent the
credit arrangements used by borrowers and lenders, whether
Eormal or informal. For example, vegetables have shorter
crop cycle and, unlike rice, cannot be stored for long. What
is their effective cost Of borrowing from formal and
informal l_nders? Is interlinked credit alsoprevalent
between lenders and producers of other crops other than rice
and corn? Alexander's (1985) anthropological study of the
Indonesian chili market yield some useful information above
commodity-specific credit arrangements.
Similarly, virtually nothing is known about the demand
for credit of non-farm households in the rural areas, Do
non-farm rural households borrow to finance consumption or
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production? Are the enterprises being financed through
credit have forward or backward linkages with the
agricultural sector? Do they haverelatively easy access to
formal and informal credit markets? What is their effective
cost of borrowing from alternative lenders? What is their
repayment rate?
Theanswers to these questions areextremely useful for
designing policies aimed at developing the rural financial
markets. Future researches on rural finance should
therefore take them into account.
Some of these studies may make use of data coltected by
previous studies such as those conducted by TBAC (see Annex
A).
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ANNEX B.I
THE ROLE OFFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
IN-RURAL DHVELOPMENT
q
Keynote Address Delivered By
Mr. Antonio H. Ozaeta, President
of the.Philippine Commercial International Bank,
On the Occasion of
The Workshop on Rural Financial Market
Research Held at the Central Bank Building
On January 6, 1987
Allow me first to congratulate the-organizers of this
workshop, namely, the Technical Board for Agricultural Credit,
the Philippine Institute for Developemnt Studies, the
Agribankers' Club and the Quedan Guarantee Fund Board for
bringing about this worthwhile activity. It is .indeed reassuring
that discussions about such a crucial subject as rural financial
markets continue to be. pursued with unrelenting vigor by multi-
sectoral groups like this.
.The timing of this workshop should condition to a large
extent the general perspective that its participants should be
inclined to adopt. Financial institutions, in recent years and
up to the present, have been..subjected to the toughest of tests
and have undergone a most excruciating catharsis. This crisis
though has not been without benefits for it has challenged the
more creative and dynamic financial institutions to reexamine
and, consequently, rewrite their strategic plans and overhaul
their .war rooms. The- crisislhas been bloody yet cleansing,
damaging yet strengthening, painful yet replete"with lessons.
l
I have been asked to give my thoughts on the role of
financial institutions in rural development. Years ago,
especially during the lethargic pre-crisis period, this would
have sounded like a hopelessly uninteresting and irrelevant
/
subject. At that time, so much remained to be addressed with
respect to the urban markets that any talk about involvement in
rural development would have, from the purely business
standpoint, appeared wasteful to most financial institutions.
Moreover, it then seemed that rural development was not among the
priorities of government and could not therefore have attracted
private sector interest andsupport, simply put, the task of
rural development seemed hopelessly unexciting then.
DEFINITION OF TERMS
For the purpose of our discussion, we shall view financial
institutions as encompassing only rural banks, countryside
branches of commercial banks and thrift banks and rural-based
operations of development flnance institutions.
Our perspehtive of rural development shall be so broad as to
inolude both agricultural and non-agricultural activities. The
technica! papers about to be presented to you today by Drs. Mario
Lamberte and Joseph Lim confirm that non-agricultural activities
account for a significant portion of rural incomes. Nonetheless,
most our insights on rural development draw heavily from our
actual involvement in agricultural activities.
2
HISTORICAL ROLE
Hindsight will aid us tremendously in understanding the role
of financial institutions in rural development. It would
therefore be helpful to retrace the historical scenario and
identify the factors that have either constrained or enhanced the
activities of financial institutions in rural markets.
Informal Credit Sector. It has often been pointm_d out that
the existence of an active and efficient informal credit sector
composed Of traders, processors, input suppliers and private
moneylenders in the rural areas has generally constricted the
demand for financing fromthe financial institutions (often
referred to also as the formal sector.) The other side of the
observation though is that these informal credit sources in fact
simply emerged as viable, necessary, and much-preferred
alternatives to the less efficient formal sector.
That these informal credit sources are more efficient can be
easily explained. Firstly, because of their essentially local
and indigenous operations, they have access to more credit
information. Thus, their loan processing is necessarily quicker
and their credit decisions are made on-the-spot. Secondly,
their flexibility allows them to lend for interim consumption
needs of their borrowers. Thirdly, their lending operation_ are
unregulated and are therefore not subject to reporting and
monitoring bureaucracies. Lastly, their lending operations are
merely peripheral activities (except for the moneylenders and
usurers), their bread and butter being their trading margins and
not their financing income. This is significant because in
agricultural lending (which accounts for the bulk- of rural
lending volume) , one must have a strong organization for
contr011 ing commodity flows (i .e. , tracking the goods from
harvest to: processing to storage up to marketing) and for-
en_ccing field -controls. The •cost of maintaining this
organization can be easily accomodated by the substantial •trading
margins -but not by the thin financing spread •that financial
• . ....
insti, totions have to live with.
Rural Environment. ,The dearth of bankable rural-based
projects •has kept f].nancial institutions away from rural markets.
Searching for causes, one sees.generally low productivity, lack
of organization among smallholders to achieve economies, poorly-
disseminated technology, and severe infrastructural limitations.
On the macr0-1evel, these limitations are compounded by an
overvalued foreign exchange which has been shown to hurt the
agricultural sector most, the absence of a genuine and
comprehensive land reform, inefficient local governments, and a
few policy disincentives.
Business Focus. There is little doubt that many of tl_e
rural banks that are now immobilized were either bled by tneir
owners to prop up-the•iF own individual business concerns or were
forced by fiat to retail specialized agricu]_turai cred_.t f,ands
•:. . .
from the government, mostly crop-specific credi.t l)FogvamS that
were-poorly monitored and administered, had no consistency in
i._plementation, and had aJnbi.guous objectives form the-very start.
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These problems were aggravated by poor management and weak
organizations.
RUral-based branches of commercial •banks and thrift banks
were primarily established to • scoop up deposits in the
•countryside •for lending to their clientele in the urban areas.
As a result, their branch organizations often had strong deposit
generating capabilities but had regrettably inadequate, if not
zero, lending skills.
But even if the lending expertise in the commerc%al/thrift
banks' head offices were moved out to the countryside branches,
they would, just the same, not have been able to undertake rural
lending with as much conviction, confidence, determination and
commitment as would normally be required for such activity. The
reasons are varied.
Rural lending is largely agricultural lending. In the past,
commercial banks have never really been looked upon as sources of
agricultural financing. By their basic functions, • even as
defined in the charter Which created them, commercial banks were
expected to provide trade finance and working capital loans. A
typical •commercial bank's sources of funds would be predominantly
short-term (current accounts, savings deposits, short-term time
deposits, etc.)• and could therefore be expected only to support
a short-term'portfolio. Unfortunately, most of _ne f£nanc£ng
requirements of agriculture partake of the nature of project
finance, essentially medium to long-term. This effectively
5
prevents banks from massively infusing funds into: agricultural
projects.
Apart from not being institutionally geared for aggressive
agricultural lending, banks are also ill-equipped technically to
handle agricultural projects. In order to evaluate agricultural
projects intelligently, a banker must have sufficient grounding
in the technical aspects of the project and the special risks
involved. Likewise in order to monitor and supervise projects
effectively, the banker must adequately understand the workings
of the business. Lastly, in order to expertly handle post-
default work-outs, the banker must have the capability to move
in, manage the project and preserve the value of the company's
assets until they are disposed. Many banks are sadly lacking in
these capabilities.
Because agriculture is vulnerable to such unpredictable
elemen£s as the weather, pests and diseases and other
environmental problems, the credit risk rating of the sector has
been traditionally poorer than the commercial and manufacturing
sectors. Lacking familiarity withtheways of handling and
managing the peculiar risks in this sector, some commercial
bankers have often conveniently dismissed agricultural projects
as something "speculative".
Because of these perceived constraints, most commercial
banks have chosen to stay in the periphery as far as rural
financing is concernedl A common practice is to finance only the
traders and processors. Production credits are oftentimes
6
limited only to such mature and highly-organized industries as
sugar, hog-raising, broiler contract-growing, milkfish and prawn
culture, etc. Since financing is normally extended on the basis
of a strong balance sheet rather than on the strength of
projected cash flow, start-up projects hardly ever survive the
rigorous credit evaluation by a commerciai bank.
THE CHALLENGE OF THE TIMES
Givenl the current focus on rural development, particularly
on the agricultural sector, financing institutions might have to
take on new initiatives if they are to remain major players in
the rural markets. The choice is between ver£ical growth which
means intensifying their existing role of mobilizing rural
savings and chanelling these resources to worthwhile projects or
horizontal expansion which means assuming new responsibilities
vis-a-vis rural development.
The scenario in avertical growth situation is one of
increased specialization. Financial institutions cannot forever
use ignorance as an excuse for not lending to agriculture. They
will thus have to beef up their rural/agricultural lending desks
and acquire, if painfully, a mastery of the nuances of
agricultural credit. Not only must they learn agricul%ural
credit evaluation, they must also thoroughly tool up for project
supervision and default handling.
However, it is not enough merely to supply credit - which is
merely vertical growth. A good number of agricultural projects
7
do not •only need credit to make them viable but also•• marketing
•and technology linkages, joint venture equity and project
development and management assistance. True, these are resources •
that financial institutions may not directly have; but these they
can easily locate and have access to with some additional effort
because of their exposure to a wide•variety of clientele. There
is therefore every opportunity for• financial institutions to
graduite•• into agricultural development corporations engaged not
only in lending but also•in trading, broking, merchant banking,
financial consultancy, project management/development, joint
venture promotion, venture capital/equity financing and the
buying/selling of bankable agricultural loan•papers. By adding
these services to their product counters, financial institutions
can improve their revenue mixes and hopefully bring down the
basic financing cost to the borrower. Likewise, by offering
these • additional services, financial institutions can directly
influence•and/or determine the viability of projects. They can
thus create new, •bankable markets. With this type of horizontal
growth, financial institutions can evolve into more relevant
rural organizations.
TO SUMMARIZE:
The past environment was not too encouraging for banks, •or
•the formal financial structures, to aggressively go into
agricultural i ending. That was for a variety of•reasons, as •I
have _ried to review for you, all quite valid at the time. Now,
however, the _ opportunities - and in fact, the moral
8
responsibilities - are such as to challenge all of us to
creatively explore new ways and means of expanding agricultural
lending and rural development.
That is the challenge, andthe work cut out for you, in this
workshop.
Thank you.
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ANNEX B.2
COMMENTS ON THE REVIEW
by
Dr. Cristina Dayid
International RiceResearch Institute
First, let me commend the authors for their excellent work
in integrating the large body of literature on rural finance and
rural credit related to the LDC 's a_d the Philippines in
particular. As they have pointed out, a significant part of the
Philippine literature was produced by TBAC. Many of them,
however, remain unpublished and confidential in nature.
My comments are very brief and are meant robe constructive.
The organization of the paper and presentation of the
arguments can improve substantially if the section on the
"Framework for the Conduct of theReview" is expanded to include
not only the components, or actors or activities in the RFM but
also equally important features, such as (a) the special features
and attributes of the production relations as well as the
behavioral factors - riskiness, risk aversion and lack of
information - which determine the nature of output and factor
markets includin_ the financial market; (b) the major features
of financial policies that also influence thecharacter of the
financial market and institution and (c) the major issues
confronting the rural financial market today.
The section on Description of the Economies of LDC's has to
go beyond McKinnon-Shaw view to bring out the characteristics of
the agrarian economy, specifically, the interlinking of credit
1
markets to other output factors markets, that determine the
nature of credit market. I am referring to the recent articles by
Binswanger and Rozenwig and Stiglitz and weiss, etc. The
explanation of market fragmentation simply describes what it is
but it does not sufficiently explain the causes which may be due
both to the nature of agrarian economy and behavioral factors, as
well as to policy. Oneshould be able to distinguish the two in
order to derive appropriatepolicy recommendation for reducing
the "fragmentation." In any case, my perception is that within
the Philippines, output and factor markets are surprisingly
relatively well-integrated rather than fragmented. Returns to
labor and land are surprisingly similar across regions of the
country. Differences could be accounted for bydifferences in
real factors, quality of land and labor.
Factors are relatively mobile so that factor prices tend to
equalize. Contracts and tied transactions or market interlinking
are institutions that enable output and factor markets to cope
with imperfect information, riskiness, and other imperfections in
the market. Recognition of the complexity of those markets can
greatly enrich the analysis.
The significant fragmentation is betweendomestic and border
Prices caused by government policies. The wide differences in
cost of credit faced by the population of poor farmers and _he
rich capitalfsts is not only due to repressed financial policies
but also due to the very unequal distribution of wealth and to
high variability in prices and yields faced by farmers.
I am very happy to see many more general econ0mists working
on agriculture related issues. As many of us have been Stressing
many of the governmen£ policies that have had adverse effects on
the welfare of the rural population are macroeconomic in nature.
I am specifically referring to trade, fiscal, and monetary
policies. Much of the strength of the paper stems from the
treatment of macroeconomic policies and issues related to formal
financial institutions. The weakness lies in the treatment of
the microeconomic issues, specificaliy, the behavior of rural
lenders and borrowers and the nature of rural financing
institution and the informal market. However, this is easily
remedied once it is recognized. Let me encourage interaction
among farmers, agricultural economists, lenders, bankers, at the
field level, i.e., at the farm and at the bank level. This will
also be aided by the fact that analytical studies on the workings
of informal market incorporating the interlinked nature of rural
transaction written by researchers knowledgeable about the nature
of agrarian structure, behavior of participants, and institutions
are now available. The review has pointed out much of this
originated from interests in explaining behavior in the land
tenancy market and thus focused on the interlinked credit and
land market. Withchanging production relations, theoretical
efforts need to be directed or extended towards unders£anding the
behavior of millers, traders, and private moneylenders who
presently form a more significant segment of the informal market.
In modelling the behavior of savers and borrowers, there has
been too little explicit attention paid to the fact that
3
borrowers •and savers in the rural areas undertake simultaneous
production and consumption decisions. Thus, theoretical efforts
need to focus on this and on integrating the effect on saving and
borrowing behavior in the presence of fragmented or interlinked
markets. •In terms of empirical literature and review of
literature of the informal market, the recent work by Floro and
to some •extent Serrano, in addition •to TBAC's studies, are very•
valuable.
Aside from being too brief relative to its importance, the
review did not sufficiently cover the neoclassical approach to
understanding the informal credit market as compared to the
"surplus view."
Another area where much more theoretical work is needed is
on the •issue of cooperatives. There has just been too many
failures •but we need to better understand the basis of the
successes so that we can promote them.
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ANNEX B. 3
COMMENTS ON THE REVIEW
by
Mr. Leopoldo P. d'e Guzman
President, Luzon Development Bank and
Development Bankers Association of the Philippines
Overall
The authors must be congratulated for an exhaustive revie9
of published literature on the key elements of the Rural
Financial Markets (RFMs) , and more ihlportantly in their own
observations and conclusions.
The section on theoretical issues on finance and development
was impressive in showing how econometric models can be applied
to studying rural finance. However, rural finance is a product
of many variables that I feel the puoduction coefficients at best
will be •useful tO show •trends or directions.
Major Relevant Findings
As a private development banker with an agricultural loan
oortfolio above the industry, and with branches all outside Metro
Manila, let me surL_narize the findings in the study which appear
to me relevant, and my reaction to these findings:
1. The issue of Whether financial development and economic
growth is caused by either "demand-following" or "supply-
leading" phenomenon is not as crucial as insuring that there
are action programs to develop the rural economy.
A ban_ operating in the countryside responds to both
"demand pull" and "supply push;" "demand pull" when it
matches competitio n by offering current accounts; and
"supply push" when it markets special program loans like
GFSME, IGLF, etc.
The issue of the traditional view of subsidized agricultural
credit versus the new view of a market-oriented agricultural
credit is a very important one.
The poor record of subsidized agricultural credit
programs in the past twenty years; the finding that
informal credit has a higher repayment rate and a higher
percentage of fully paid borrowers on a matured basis;
the findings that _le cheap credit are not really
cheap after all the transaction costs are taken into
account and the present situation where there are not enough
borrowers to avail of the cheap special credit program - all
these point to the need to re-examine the demand for credit
in the rural sector and how best to meet this demand.
Another relevant finding of _e study is the fact 5hat a
substantial portion of the rural sector have inadequate
incomes to guarantee loan repayments, and that loan defaults
are primarily due to inability to pay. The TBAC
UPBRF findings that 65 percent of farmers fell below a
threshold income of _,000/year and _0 percent of peasants
are dissavers is disturbing for we are looking at social
welfare patients using formal lending institution standards.
Personal Views •
•The following are the key questions facing us im the rural
sector :
(i) •Given the present state of the economy in the rural
sector, what developments are needed to accelerate the
increase in the standard of living?
(2) •_nat are the means to deliver •creditb to the rural •••
sector?
As was reported by Dr. Lamberte and Dr. Lira, credit does not
make•a non-viable enterprise viable. In •short, credit is not the
vital resource which will spell the success or failure of the
rural enterprise.
I fully •support •the observation that "to solve the rural
credit diiemna, the best policies •would be those that will• insure
the increased incomes and well-being of the majority tha£ is in
category (4) or Class C. only when the majority of farms become
viable• enterprises will rural credit (even without subsidies)
become stable and dynamic. This means that •subsidies to the
rural areas •should be given in terms of direct subsidies to
production. "
A nagging problem we •have today is how to deliver credit to
small farmers who are viable but whose circumstances are not
tailored to the formal lenders' requirements - or vice-versa,
where •the formal lenders have not come up with a tailored-fit
program. (I am not sure how serious this problem is, because
although there was _ supposed drop in agricultural loans in 1986,
as the authors pointed out agriculture still posted a positive
growth).
t
The development of multi-purpose marketing credit
cooperatives is one answer. However, our experience with this is
that it is successful only if the members are commercial farmers
whose products have to be packed or processed by a central
facilitysuch as sugar cooperatives, livestock cooperatives. But
organized among rice farmers who have only 30 to _0 cavans
disposable surplus at harvest time, and disposable right at _e
"patio," the chance for a cooperative' s success are s_all.
If cooperatives will be long in coming to help the small
farmers, there are still the following favorable developments,
although coming in indirect and a more expensive manner: ....
(!) financing _f traders, merchants, processors who in turn
will finance the producers on a forward contract basis.
(2) growth of integrators that we find in the poultry
industry, now branching into aquaculture and hopefully
into other non-farm rural industries such as
handicrafts.
There is a pressing need to come up with a sound and
practical program to rehabilitate the rural banking industry in
the shortest possible time. This is an asset which needs to be
rehabilitated as an instrument in rural development.
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However, in rehabilitating the rural banks, we need •to focus
on how Rural Financial Institutions can be encouraged to serve
the rural sector. The withdrawal of subsidies to rural banks and
development banks needs to be studied, because most financial
•institutions are reluctant to engage in rural finance - given its
high risk, long gestat.ion period and unfamiliarity with the
enterprise and borrowers.
Financial institutions generally look at three factors,
namely: Risk -_ty and Profits. Without any subsidies
or regulations, the rural sector will come out poorly compared to
the urban• sector. The fact that the banking system recently
bidded _27 billion •for _4 billion worth of Central Bank Bills at
a net yield of 8.5 percent per annum, reflects the poor credit
rating of the rural sector.
Comments on Policy Recommendations
Of the I_. policy recommendations contained in eJne Report, I
am in full agreement with the I0 recommendations but disagree on
two of them, namely:
(I) Need ;for Land Reform
The problems of lack of security of tenure and
high land rentals can easily be solved by existing
regulations which protect the tenants' right to the
land, and by fixing lease renta].s. Becuase of the cost
of buying land is i>roh_bitive - _lO0,O00/ha. in San
Isidro, Nueva _cija as the f_rmers present here can
attest_ - the returns on land ownership is low compared
to the returns if the money is invested in livestock
and non-farm ventures (e.g. tricycle, sari-sari store,
handicrafts, etc).
Also, the fact that Land Bank is experiencing a
very low collection rate on land reform areas - 4
percent collection in San Isidro, Nueva Ecijl, while
the Rural Bank of San Isidro, • Nueva Ecija has over 8_
percent collection rate - is a jolting experience (LBP
has 8 percent collection rate on loans to land reform
beneficiaries).
(2) Renewal of Loan Quotas (P.D.• 717)
Unless commercial and thrift b_nks are required to
@
devote _5 percent ag_i-agra loans they will avoid a_,ri-
agra projects for reasons cited above. What is wrong
is the implementation of the policy: CB •allowed the
bank to buy substitutes at low yields.
If P.D. 717 is retained and enforced strictly, what may•
develop is & secondary market for mortgages of agri-agra• loans
originated by countryside banks purchased by city-based _ banks.
Thus, rural banks and thrift banks which have good records in
agricultural lending can sell their agri-agra loan portfolios to
commercial banks with unfilled agri-agra loan quotas.
Lastly, I would like to add one policy recommendation, that
•is: Government must undertake progr_ns to reduce the risks in
6
rural credit, so that banks will be encouraged to lend more funds
to it. These risks cover •the following:•
(I) risks from drought/floods --- irrigation and drainage system
(_) risks from pests/disease --- plant quarantine and pest and
disease control
(3) market risks --- price support
(4) post harvest facilities --- driers, warehouses, mills, to be
encouraged by Government.
Research Needs
Finally, may I make a comment on research on rural credit.
It would be a great help to both the policy planners and the
0rivate financial institutions if more studies can be made on why
some financial institutions succeed and some fail. For example,
Q
OU_ _ the 1,000 rural banks X understand that i0 percent to l_
percent have done very well. Let us study these "survivors" for
they have the "genes, or virtues •which other rural banks might be
able to copy.
Case studies on the rehabilitation of some rural banks, on
the success and failure of some Cooperatives will be valuable to
planners and practitioners alike in meetimg the credit needs in
agriculture.
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ANNEX B.4
COMMENTS ON THE REVIEW
by
MS. Purita F. Neri
Director, CB-DER (Domestic)
The paper essentially achieves what it sets out to do. As a
matter of fact, the thrust of most of its poli_y recommendations
is being pursued in recent Central Bank policies., This is seen
in the move away from credit allo_ation functions towards
stabilization functions, market orientation and competition
rather than credit subsidies and arbitrary ceilings. A flexible
exchange rate policy and a market determined interest rate policy
are already being pursued while proposals to do away with loan
quota :schemes: are being supported. These moves were made in
recognition of the over-riding importance of and need for
increasing efficiency and rising productivity in developing
econom_es'_'t0 provide the main means by which sustained
advancement can be achieved through self-reliance.
Experience has shown only too well that' credit subsidies
only lead to misallocation and non-rationaluse of resources,
general inefficiency and inflation. It is bad enough when such
subsidies are funded by taxes. It becomes disastrous when funded
by new money or credit creation by the Central Bank thane only.
results in inflation and destabilization. It is generally agreed
that the a_ricultural sector, particularly the farmers should be
given assistance but it is also important to note the growing
consensus that such assistance would be best extended not throug_
credit subsidies but through production subsidies, i.e. means
that would directly help the farmer enhance his productive
capacity, improve his efficiency, productivity and selling
capability to make him creditworthy. The rehabilitation of
ailing banks should also be done not so much through such
painless means as continued subsidies, concessions but by
programs which would develop and enhance their equity and deposit
base to make them mobilizers o_f funds.
The paper questions the use of the weighted average savings
and time deposit rates as basis for determining the rediscount
rate and instead proposes the "prime rate" as base rate. For the
information of the group, it is not the weighted average of
savings and time deposit rates which is used as base rate but the
weighted average of time deposits and MRR 90 which best indicates
the point at which banks would be indifferent as to whether or
not they would source their funds from the rediscounting window.
Since the "prime rate" is a "lending" and not a "sourcing" rate,
it is seriously doubted whether it would be more appropriate than
deposit rates. Moreover, statistics on the prime rate are not
available and are difficult to get. Previous att_mpts to produce
a series on prime rates including one in cooperation with the BAP
were unsuccessful because of difficulties in definition (e.g.
what are prime customers, would it include collateral business)
and the reluctance of banks to disclose the rates they charge
prime customers, etc.
The paper concludes that financial intermediation is a
failure in %he Philippines and summarily indicts Central Bank
policies as the culprit for disintermediation. This conclusion
was based on the declining share of deposits to total assets of
the banking system from 1960 to 1984. A check of the figures
indicated that deposits here included only traditional deposits
i.e. demand, savings and time deposits and did not include
deposit substitutes. As such, the picture would be distorted
inasmuch as deposit substitutes became an increasingly important
component of banks' deposit liabilities on the late sixties •up to
the early eighties as banks tried to take advantage of
differentials in reserve requirement, interest rate ceilings,
taxes, etc. However, when interest rate ceilings were lifted and
reserve requiremen t and taxes were equalized (i.e. deposits
substitutes no longer enjoYed differentials) interest shifted
from deposit substitutes to traditional deposits. Recent
statistics indicate this. The inclusion of deposit substitute
could change the picture and {s strongly urged.
This paper also stated that the CB created specialized banks
through which credit to favored sectors can be channeled. This
does not seem to be accurate since the Central Bank Charter, I
belive, does not empower it •to create specialized banks. One
specialized bank, DBP, was already existing at the time .the
Central Bank was established and the two others, PNB and Land
Bank, 'have their own charters. As far as I know, the Central
Bank has disapproved or resisted proposals to put up specialized
ANNEX B. 6
COMMENTS ON THE REVIEW
by
Dr. Carlos• E. Chevas
Assistant Professor
Ohio State University
These notes are primarily a "first reaction" to the
excellent review of• literature '•and discussion of issues presented
by the authors. My comments and remarks att_npt •to follow the
order of chapters in the paper, even though sometimes they refer
to issues addressed in more than one chapter. General comments
are mixed with specific remarks or questions, I •apologize for
this.
Treatment of Finance in Formal Models.
There appears to be a gap between macro and micro models •in
this area. Models are defined either in terms of major macro
aggregates (money, wealth, savings, investment) or as behavioral
models of the firm (•farmer, lender) or the individual (borrower,
saver). There •is no "in between. " Multi-sector models of
development usually ignore finance and financial issues. It
seems to me that _there is "unexplored" research ground here.
li • ._ IITrad_.t.onal Views versus "New" Views
It is interesting to note here that both schools have shown
some evolution in recent years:. Of particular interest is the
position of the "new view" with respect to "supply-leading"
finance.
On the one •hand, the new schoo•[ has been usually critical of
supply-leading finance strategies, on the basis• that these
schemes are associated• with cheap credit policies, heavy
subsidization of government banks, and credit controls. On the
other hand, recent works by "new viewers" have been emphasizing
the importance of reducing transaction costs• to improve• savings
mobilization in rural areas and to reduce costs of borrowing. In
fact, the work by Srinivasan and Meyer _found the availability of
rural branches to be the most important • factor affecting rural
savings. These results point towards the implication that making
financial services _vailab le in remote (rural ) areas is
important, a•result that sounds "supply-leading" to me. Maybe
someone should write •a '°state of the new view '_ to get these
things sorted out.
The "Iron Law" and the Gonzales-Vega Model
There is no strong empirical support for the prediction of
this model as originally formulated. The basic prediction that
lenders adjust their loan portfolio in favor of large borrowers
through quantity restrictions has not received clear support.
Instead, the empirical work supports the notion of ,price"
adjustment, when the rationing effect of transaction costs is
taken into account, and transaction costs are considered as p_rt
of the total price of borrowing. As originally formulated, the
model ignores tran_saction costs (they do not appear anywhere in
the diagrams, do they?). Gonzales-Vega has revised this for his
lectures. The related issue of consistency with the "law of One
price" is not addressed in the model either.
I think that the more• general prediction that interest rate
restrictions will induce concentration in the distribution of
credit is still correct. The mechanism of adjustment however is
primarily through transaction costs (for borrowers), rather than
explicit quantity restrictions •by lenders. The source of the
adjustment • is • the ability of lenders to apply different • loan
practices to different borrowers (';selective application of the •
loan ,precedure") .
Interlinked •Markets
The interaction of formal and informal financial markets may
be one of the most promising research topics here. Whether
formal and informal financial intermediaries are "competitive,"
" stltutes e"complements or "sub " " ar questions that can be
addressed very rigourously with theoretical and empirical models.
I guess one possible starting concept is that, even though
finance is fungible, financial services are not. Financial
services may be conceived as the specific way in which finance is
"packaged" by suppliers. Those provided or offered by
institutions (e. g. formal loans ) may be seen as different
"commodities" vis-a-vis those offered by informal suppliers. The
idea is that the attributes or the vector• of characteristics of
financial services • are not homogeneous across different
suppliers. A formal model could be coasted in terms of utility
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ANNEX B.7
COMMENTS ON THE REVIEW
by
Dr. Epictetus E. Pa%alinghug
Assistant Professor
University of the Philippines
The paper is definitely an excellent effort at integrating
the various studies (published and unpolished) on rural fina,lce_
particularly those that refer to the Philippine setting. The
authors have done a tremendous job in producing this desirable
output. However, I would like to comment on the substance of the
review.
The paper talks about the_ three theoretical approaches (or
main tendencies) in the study of rural financial markets (RFMs):
(I) the traditional approach, (2) the new views on RFMs and (3)
the surplus approach. Actually, the so-called three approaches
are really just two groupings: (I) the traditional approac h and
(2) the n0n-traditional approach. (i) New views on RFMs or the
OSU-WB view, (ii) Transactions cost school or the interlinked
market view, and (iii) th'e surplus view are simply considered
sub-categories under the non-traditional approach.
It is quite surprising that beyond the discussion on
"theoretical approaches, " nothing has been mentinoned on various
methodological approaches employed in rural finance. The reader
will get the impression that only survey and regression
techniques are relevant in rural finance studies. Yet there is a
growing literature on flne use of (i) discriminant analysis in
predicting agricultural ]Loan repayment performance, (ii) models
1
on utility-maximizing borrowers faced with various options" such
as to repay or to become delinquent, and (iii) benefit-cost
studies on RFMs. The work of Best (1977) which is discussed in
the paper can easily be discussed under "Various Methodological
Approaches. " Likewise, the works of Gonzales-Vega, Tolentino,
Williamson, Van Atta, Burkner, Mejia, Tan, Fry, Sicat, and
Giovannini are •also good materials for a discussion on different
approaches employed in rural finance studies.
Most researchers have pointed to the inadequacies and lack
of comparability of data on rural finance in low income
countries. It might be interesting to point out under •a section
on "Nature of Data" whether the Philippine setting is relatively
better off as far as data availability is concerned.
Comparability •of data on savings has already been discussed in
the paper under the section on "Saving in the Philippines and in
the Rural Sector. '°
Conclusion
I want to reiterate that the above suggestions do not, •in
any way, diminish the laborious achievement of Dr. Lamberte and
Dr. Lim in producing an excellent paper that syntl_esizes existing
studies on rural finance with relevance to the Philippines. Such
an undertaking deserves much appreciation and encouragement.
ANNEX B.8 I
CAN MONEY BE MADE IN RURAL FINANCING?
Closing Remarks
Workshop on Rural FinancialMarketResearch
Central Bank, 6 January 1987
by RAMON K. KATIGBAK
Deputy Minister
Ministry of Finance
I am not sure if what I have to say can properly be called
closing remarks. Closing remarks for a conference such as this
should consist essentially of a commentary on the preceding
discussions, and I missed most of them, so I have very little
idea what the preceding discussions were.
What I will offer instead is some thoughts inspired by the
long and impressive paper -~ which is really a complete book --
prepared by Dr. Lamb erte and Dr. Lim as the starting point of
this conference. Since I was not here most of the day, there is
some danger that I will just be repeating what some of the
reactors have said before. But our dynamic Executive Director
and Organizer, Mrs. Agabin, has told me not to worry about that.
In fact, she said it might even be a good thing, because
independent repetition on my part would reinforce conclusions
reached at this conference.
However, my experience leads me to believe that what I have
to say will not entirely be a repetition. Rural credit is one of
the most important policy areas, and there have been many
confegences and discussions on it, some of which I have attended.
But it occurred to me on reading our conference paper that there
is one very basic ques£ion that I _e_e never heard asked •at any
agricultural policy conference, and I am willing to k_et tha£ it
wash' t asked _today.
The question is very simply, Can money be made in rural
financing? The object of the exercise is after all to make
resources flow into rural financing rather than say real estate
or some other commercial or industrial venture, and the way to do
this is to make investors perceive it as profitable.
By rural financing I of course don't mean financing of
commercial scale agri-business ventures. In terms of loan
processing _ and administratiQn these are not very differeht from
other commercial and industrial o_e_tions •, and I _•have the
impression that the present commercial bankingsystem handles
• J
them fairly well. At least, at one agricultural policy
conference, when I asked agri-business interests what they wanted
s ,
from the government, the reply was, "Just leave us alone."
•I mean the financing of the type of operation we usually
have in mind when we talk about the lack of agricultural
financing and indeed about the• agricultural problp_n in general:
the prevalent small-scale farm run by low-income f_rmers.
To me the most interesting things about our conference paper
are that it presents evidence that there is a large and
profitabl_e market for this type of r_rM1 financing; it provides
indicatio,s of the nature of this market; _ _nd it _gives
_uggestions on the type Of operation that mightbe designed to
tap th_s _marke_ mor_ systematically and effectively.
When we say that the vQlume of agricultural lending is low,
both in •absolute term_ and as a proportion of value-adde_, and
that the interest rates charged by informal agricultural lenders
range up to 83 per cent, or even more, what we are saying is that
in this market there is plenty of room for expansion and the
prices •are very good. In the present state •of our • economy, which
is still depressed even though the recovery has started, there
are not many products about which this can be said. So why isn't
there more of a rush of investment into rural financing?
There are three commonly cited reasons.
The first is that the average size• of loan is small, so that
administrative cost per loan is high.
The second is that the average size of farm is small, •so
that the collateral value available to the farmer is small, and
his title may be imperfect to begin with.
The third is that agriculture is subject to uncertainties of
weather and other things, and is thus inherently more risky than
other businesses.
The important thing to keep in mind about the new
government agricultural policy is that it's not going to change
any of this.
The main thrust of the new agricultural policy is •to •remove
policy biases against agriculture, and its effect wil:1 h_efully
be an inflow of investment into the agricultural sector. But
these will be co_nercial-scale ventures, of the sort that can be
•3
financed by the •present•banking system and thus outside the
scope of our discussion. On the other hand, the government also
plans to expand the land reform program, and one effect of this
will be to reduce the average size of farm still further.
Thus, the present characteristics of the:_p_ of farm we are
concerned with can be• expected to continue indefinitely, and a
rural financing operation must be designed to tak@ • them into
account. In particular, it must conside_ that the two main bases•
of conventional credit •evaluation, namely good_l_teral•value
and a _rack_record of consistently successful Ip_st Qperation,
cannotbe applied.
The informal credit system provides an alternative to
conventional credit evaluation in•the form of local knowledge and
ties of kinship or friendship, but this is of eQurse nQ_b_
basis for a ttracting_outside investment.
Fortunately, our conference paper reports other alternatives
, ,__
for developing good credit relationships between the rural lender
and the small farmers. These are the sale of inputs to the
farmer and theprocessing •and purchase of his output, with all
these operations involving the provision of Credit. This has two
additional advantages for the rural financier. First, it Qpens
up additional profit opportunities, in •_he form _f•mark-upS on
the input salesand trading margins oD the output purchase_.
Second, i_is much easier to get fima_%cing _9_a _er_ilizer
dealership or a rice milling or trading establishment than f_or a
pure moneylending operation.
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We are of course already moving in this direction, with
rural moneylenders going into trading and traders and dealers
expanding their businesses by providing credit. But what I would
like to see is the application of modern sophisticated business
•methods to theprovision of integrated agricultural services,
meanin_ • providing inputs, credit and an output market under one
roof. This would provide additional scope for increasing in size
and realizing scale economies. Our conference paper suggests
that if properly designed, such an operation could be •very
attractive to enterprising managers and investment bankers.
Providing integrated agricultural services is of course what
was done by the oldest rural financing system, that of the
landlord; •and the role of government policy here is to protect
thetf armer from similar domfnation by cQmmerci&l interests. This
can be done in two ways. The first is to encourage "competition
among the providers of services so that the farmer will have a
Choice and costs will be_bidded down. The • second is to ensure,
through a sound price stabilization policy, that the relationship
between input costs and output prices provides the farmer with a
decent income. Such a price stabilization policy will certainly
be the most important •and effective support for the small farmer.
This suggests that we need two further studies, both of
which are of great practical importance and neither Df which
appear_s explicitly in the policy agenda of our conferemCe •paper •,
•although elements of both are to be found in various places in
the paper.
iThe first is a sound price stabilization program, and this
should be coordinated with the work now being •done by• the
National Food Authority. I• should mention that various
international institutions have expressed interest in supporting
such a program, so this study could have immediate practical
application. •
The second is a project feasibility study for an integrated
input, credit and trading operation. Since the objective would
be to explore profit•possibilities and attract possible
investors, this would also have immediate practical application.
For example, it would be a natural for financing by•the private
agricultural investment corporation being developed by •the
Agriculture Ministry with AID.
I suppose I should now make the conventional closing remarks
and congratulate the participants for a useful and stimulating
conference. As you know, I was absent for most • of it, but
judging from the quality of the conference paper •and the
reputation of the participants, • I am sure it must have been
excellent.
Finally, since the objective of my remarks has been to
suggest new topics for study, they have really sounded more llke
the introduction to a •new conference rather than the end of an •
old one; but I •think this is also a legitimate function of
closing remarks.
Thank you.
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